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Andrew Scott Dillon, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2008 
This dissertation examines how agricultural households allocate children’s time between 
work and schooling activities and utilize access to production technology, namely 
irrigation, to assure minimum subsistence requirements in an arid and famine-prone 
region of northern Mali.  These questions are examined using a data set that the author 
collected which tracked 245 households in 2006 from a previous survey conducted in 
1997-98 and a larger cross-sectional survey of 2,658 households that was collected in 
151 villages across two regions of Mali (Tombouctou and Gao).  The second chapter of 
the dissertation provides descriptive statistics from the sample and an explanation of the 
survey methodology.  
The third and fourth chapters investigate children’s time allocation to schooling, home 
production, and market production using participation and hours data.  Two types of 
shocks to the household’s agricultural income and total labor availability provide 
plausibly exogenous variation to identify substitution effects across children’s 
activities including withdrawal from school and adult labor supply.  These results are 
robust to varying assumptions about the structure of unobserved heterogeneity at the 
household and village level.  The role of different asset types on child labor 
substitution between activities when households experience shocks is also 
investigated.  Because the collection of children’s time allocation information from 
household surveys is prone to significant sources of measurement error, the fourth 
 chapter also compares hours data and subjective measures of children’s work obtained 
through a game played with children.   
The fifth chapter investigates the impact of village level irrigation projects on various 
household welfare indicators.  Using difference-in-differences, propensity score 
matching, and matched difference-in-differences with an eight year panel, the impact 
of access to irrigation on poverty, agricultural production, and nutrient intakes is 
estimated.   This chapter also provides evidence of both saving and sharing within 
villages as an alternative strategy to consuming gains in agricultural production.  This 
finding suggests that estimating program impact using consumption data may 
underestimate the welfare gains of irrigation investment by ignoring the household’s 
saving and informal insurance network.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines two topics in development economics, child labor and 
agricultural production in Northern Mali, where little data exists in an arid and 
inhospitable region that is at the frontier of the Saharan desert.  This region has been 
labeled, ―le Mali inutile‖, by development agencies and as a result received little 
national or international attention until civil conflict broke out in the 1990’s partially 
as a result of these policies.  It is for this reason that topics such as child labor and 
agricultural production are interesting to test in such a place of extreme poverty, high 
transportation costs, few formal financial institutions, and forbidding agro-ecological 
conditions where household responses to shocks or access to technology would 
produce strong responses in the household’s welfare.   
In such resource scarce environments, the allocation of children between schooling and 
work represents for the household a tradeoff between meeting subsistence requirements 
today and investing in children’s human capital for higher future earnings.  How is 
children’s time allocated within agricultural households across household production, 
market production and schooling activities?  What do different types of production and 
health shocks reveal about labor allocation within the household?  What are the roles of 
different types of assets in insuring children against increased work in the face of 
shocks?  These questions address internal human resource allocation questions, but 
households also face decisions with respect to externally provided technologies, namely 
irrigation, that expand the household’s production possibilities set.  The potential 
linkages between access to irrigation, household consumption, and nutrition underscore 
the importance of how households appropriate the benefits of an increased agricultural 
production set that has implications on the current household welfare through increased 
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nutrient intakes or asset accumulation and future welfare such as increased child labor or 
changes in household composition.  How effective is irrigation technology in improving 
household consumption, nutrient intake and agricultural production?  Does access to 
irrigation alter household saving or informal village insurance networks?   
To address these two research topics, I collected household data that tracked 245 
households in 2006 from a previous survey conducted in 1997-98 and a larger cross-
section of 2,658 that was collected in six states (cercles) of Mali (Niafunke, Dire, 
Goundam, Tombouctou, Rharous, and Bourem).  The survey methodology, sampling, 
and questionnaire design are described in chapter two.  Descriptive statistics and a 
regional description are also provided to aid in the interpretation of the sample and the 
inferences that I draw from in subsequent chapters.   
Chapters three and four in this dissertation examine children’s participation and time 
allocation to domestic tasks, market-oriented tasks and schooling.  In chapter three, 
―Child Labor and Schooling Responses to Production and Health Shocks,‖ production 
shocks from harvest period pest infestations induce households to withdraw children 
from school and increase the probability they are selected into farm work.  Health 
shocks to women increases the probability a child participates in the family business 
and child care activities.  These results are robust to varying assumptions about the 
structure of unobserved heterogeneity at the household and village level.  Different 
measures of household assets are also constructed to test whether assets serve as a 
buffer against increased child labor in response to shocks.  Assets such as livestock 
have mixed effects on child labor and schooling, depending on the shock and asset 
type.  However, household durables are substitutes for increased child labor when 
household face production shocks.   
3 
 
The fourth chapter in this dissertation, ―Changes in the Distribution of Children’s 
Time in Response to Production and Health Shocks‖ analyzes evidence from hours 
data and the subjective evaluations by children.  The collection of children’s time 
allocation information from household surveys is prone to significant sources of 
measurement error due to recall error and proxy respondent bias.  This paper compares 
hours data and a subjective time allocation module with children as the respondents to 
elicit their relative time allocation across school, work and leisure time.  Using the 
hours data, conditional labor and schooling functions are specified in both an equation 
by equation random effects specification and a specification that permits cross 
equation correlation between work and schooling activities.  Ordered probit models 
are estimated using the outcomes of the child’s subjective module to determine the 
consistency of the outcome variables, controlling for household and community 
covariates.  The marginal effects of changes in the intensity of children’s work and 
schooling as a response to production and health shocks are also estimated using the 
hours and subjective welfare measures of children’s time allocation. 
The fifth chapter in this dissertation, ―Access to Irrigation and the Escape from 
Poverty‖ presents evidence on the impact of village level irrigation projects on 
household welfare.  Significant changes in the agricultural sector in northern Mali 
suggest a large contribution of irrigation to welfare increases over the past 8 years.  
Using differences in differences, propensity score matching, and matched differences 
in differences with a small panel, the impact of access to irrigation on poverty, 
production, and nutrient intakes are estimated.   These findings suggest that gains in 
agricultural production value do not transfer uniquely to household consumption.  
Two alternative hypotheses are tested; the gains in agricultural production induced by 
irrigation yield higher household saving or intra-village transfers from irrigators to 
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non-irrigators contribute to informal social insurance.  The paper provides evidence of 
both saving and sharing within villages as an alternative strategy to consuming gains 
in agricultural production.  This finding suggests that estimating program impact using 
consumption per capita may underestimate the welfare gains of irrigation investment 
by ignoring the household’s saving and informal insurance network.   
The final chapter of the dissertation provides a summary of the research results and a 
reflection on their implications. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: ETUDE SUR 
LA PAUVRETE ET LA SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE AU NORD MALI 2006 
I: Introduction 
The data used in this dissertation was collected as part of the Etude sur la Pauvreté et 
la Sécurité Alimentaire au Nord Mali 2006 that is a representative multi-topic 
household of 2,658 households in Northern Mali.  The survey was undertaken from 
February 2006 to November 2006 in six cercles
1
 (Niafunke, Dire, Goundam, 
Tombouctou, Rharous, Bourem) in the regions of Tombouctou and Gao.  Of the 2,658 
households in the sample, 245 households in the commune of Soboundou, Niafunke 
that were originally surveyed in a similar study conducted in 1997-98
2
, were 
resurveyed twice in 2006.  These households were resurveyed in February/March and 
August/September to correspond with the periods under which the 1997-98 survey 
was undertaken.  In this sense, there is both a panel and a cross section component of 
the data set. 
This chapter has two primary objectives.  The first objective is to describe the survey 
methodology and the program of research undertaken.  The second section of this 
chapter describes the survey objectives, survey area, the survey design and sample 
                                                 
1
 Administratively, Mali is divided into eight regions that are composed of several cercles each.  A 
cercle contains multiple communes.  The cercle is analogous to a state or province, while the commune 
is analogous to a county or district. 
2
 These data, originally collected by Luc Christiaensen with support from John Hoddinott have been 
made available by the International Food Policy Research Institute. Funding for data collection was 
provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (TA Grant No. 301-IFPRI) and 
USAID/Mali (TA Grant No. 301-IFPRI). Neither IFAD nor USAID are responsible for any errors in 
these data or in their interpretation. These data could not have been collected without the substantial 
assistance of Sidi Guindo, 
Abdourhamane Maiga and Mamadou Nadio, and the helpful cooperation of the residents of the Zone 
Lacustre. 
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selection, as well as the survey implementation.  The second objective is to outline 
some of the basic descriptive statistics that the survey has produced.  This will provide 
a general context for the analysis undertaken in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the dissertation.  
Sections three, four and five in this chapter provide basic analysis of household 
demographics, consumption, income and livelihood activities, agricultural production 
and poverty analysis.   
II: Survey Area Description 
The survey area of the Etude sur la Pauvreté et la Sécurité Alimentaire au Nord Mali 
2006  is composed of 2 regions (Tombouctou and Gao) from which 151 villages, 
nomadic fractions or towns in 6 cercles (Niafunke, Goundam, Dire, Tombouctou, 
Rharous, and Bourem) were randomly selected to participate in the study.  The 
Saharan zone (desert or arid region) receives less than 150 mm of rainfall par annum.  
This varies starkly with the Sahelien zone (grassland or semi-arid region) which 
receives 200-600 mm par annum and the south of Mali which can receive between 
600-1200 mm par annum (FIDA 1996).  The dominant ecological resource in the 
region is the Niger River that serves as a source of water for agriculture and animal 
husbandry.  The inner Niger Delta is a rich agricultural resource in which flooding 
from the Niger augments water levels in temporary and permanent lakes and ponds, as 
well as smaller streams and tributaries.  This diversity of water resources is harnessed 
by farmers through motorized pump irrigation, water-recession agriculture around 
lakes and streams and in the Niger River itself.  Rain-fed agriculture which does not 
depend on the water levels of the Niger River is also extensively practiced.  There is 
one primary agricultural season with a limited secondary agricultural season.  The 
secondary agricultural season is limited by the dearth of rainfall, the recession of the 
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Niger River, and the arid heat which begins at the end of January lasting until April or 
May.  Herders benefit greatly from the temporary and permanent lakes which provide 
water and pasture for cattle and sheep.  Fishing is also an important economic activity 
which capitalizes on the Niger River and its tributaries to supplement the income and 
diets of households along its banks.   
 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Mali 
Data Source:  Intute, Science, engineering and Technology, ―Mali: Geography and Maps,‖ Intute, 
http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/worldguide/html/951_map.html#map2 (accessed December 3, 2007). 
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The population in northern Mali is highly clustered around water sources, but sparsely 
distributed over the total area within the regions of Tombouctou and Gao.  Northern 
Mali has an estimated population of 809,111 people that live in an area bordered to the 
north by the Sahara Desert.  In 1998, the administrative population for the regions of 
Kidal, Gao and Tombouctou were 27,521; 335,976; and 445,614, respectively 
(Cartographie du Mali 2001).  Population density is increasingly concentrated around 
these water resources, so that regional population density statistics may be deceptive 
indicators of natural resource pressure from the population.  Statistics for northern 
Mali indicate 1.5 people per km
2
, while in the south of Mali, the density reaches 17 
people per km
2 
(FIDA 1996). 
The population of northern Mali is ethnically diverse.  Sedentary ethnic groups that 
primarily practice agriculture include the Songray, Bambara, and the Soninkés.  The 
Peulh, Tamasheq, Berabich and Maures are traditionally transhumant pastoralists, 
though increasingly are becoming sedentarized, especially in the region of 
Tombouctou.  Lastly, the Sorko, Korongoy, and Bozo derive their livelihood from 
fishing and transport activities along the Niger River.   
Poverty is a widespread phenomenon in Mali in general, but specifically in the rural 
regions of northern Mali.  The region has known several significant economic shocks 
including widespread drought and famine in 1914, 1973 and 1984, as well as a civil 
conflict which destabilized the region from 1990-1996.  The Government of Mali’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002 reports a national poverty rate of 63.8% with 
severe poverty in the country at the 21% level.  Indicators from the Rapport National 
2003 sur le développement humain durable au Mali (RNDH 2003) illustrate at the 
commune level the entrenchment of rural poverty in the north as compared to other 
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regions of Mali.  The rural entrenchment of poverty at the commune level in the 
regions of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou are often twice those found in Mali’s other 
regions with poverty rates of 67%, 40%, 48% for the three regions.   
Human capital indicators for the regions of Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal also illustrate 
the lack of public infrastructure in the education and health sectors.  According to the 
Rapport National 2003 sur le développement humain durable au Mali, 33 % of 
communes in Tombouctou, 30% in Kidal and 35% of communes in Gao had no access 
to primary schools in 1998, whereas the percentages for the regions of Kayes (13%), 
Koulikoro (1%), Sikasso (6%), Segou (4%), and Mopti (7%) were significantly lower 
indicating better access to primary schools.  The population also had little access to 
health services through community health centers (CSCOMs) in 1998.  94% of 
communes in Tombouctou, 100% of the communes in Kidal and 91% of the 
communes of Gao had no access to these community health centers.  This compares to 
the regions of Kayes (73%), Koulikoro (59%), Sikasso (74%), Segou (73%) and Mopti 
(78%) who also had poor, but slightly lower rates of inaccessibility to CSCOMs by 
commune.   
In addition to differences between the north and south of Mali, there are significant 
differences between the cercles included in the survey.  Below is a description of each 
cercle included in the survey.   
Niafunké (Region of Tombouctou) 
The cercle of Niafunke is the westernmost cercle in the region of Tombouctou.  It 
borders the regions of Segou to the west and Mopti to its south.  Its three major towns 
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(Niafunke, Lere, and Attara) and smaller villages are scattered around the Niger River 
and various lakes and streams.  Four broad systems of cultivation are practiced in this 
area which relies on diverse water sources.  These include motor pump irrigation 
(rice), lake recession agriculture (sorghum and corn), rain-fed agriculture (millet), and 
stream-based agriculture (sorghum).  The area of lakes concentrated around Niafunke, 
often called Zone Lacustre, provides residents arable land for cultivation, but also a 
zone of grazing areas for pastoralists.  The cercle of Niafunke has a high concentration 
of population relative to the other cercles mainly because the water resources of the 
inner Niger delta support multiple livelihood systems and diverse economic activities.   
Goundam (Region of Tombouctou) 
During the colonial period, the cercle of Goundam was a cultural and economic center 
of importance in northern Mali.  However, the majority of Goundam’s villages lack 
access to the Niger River and the complete drying up of Lake Faguibine has caused 
serious constraints on the cercle’s agricultural potential.  Lake agriculture around the 
lakes Fati, Horo, and Tele are the primary sources of agricultural production which 
due to their size permit several crop cycles throughout the year.  Pastoralists benefit 
from the pasture land that is enriched by the major lakes in the cercle and seasonal 
rains.  Agricultural villages around Lake Horo, like Guinda Gatta and Echelle, 
attracted economic and social refugees from Lake Faguibine and other villages 
affected by the civil conflict in the early 1990s.  In addition to agriculture and herding, 
the town of Tonka has emerged as an important commercial center which is situated 
strategically between Goundam, Niafunke, and Dire.   
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Dire (Region of Tombouctou) 
The cercle of Dire is bordered by Goundam and Tomboctou to its north, Rharous to its 
east and Niafunke to its west.  Dire, like Niafunke, is a cercle with agricultural 
potential since the Niger River and its tributaries extend throughout the communes in 
the cercle when the river levels increase, usually in July or August.  Agriculture, 
fishing and pastoralism are the primary economic activities.  Agricultural production 
is focused on irrigated or floating rice, but wheat has emerged as an important counter-
season crop.  The city of Dire is a vital commercial center and an important stop for 
interfluvial commerce.   
Tombouctou (Region of Tombouctou) 
The city of Tombcoutou serves as the regional administrative and commercial center 
in the cercle of Tombouctou.  Most government and non-governmental activity in the 
region is based in this city, as well as the region’s most extensive selection of schools 
and medical facilities.  Extensive commercial activity from trans-Saharian trade as 
well as a thriving tourist industry augments the traditional agricultural and pastoralist 
livelihood systems.  Large irrigation projects just outside of the town of Tombouctou 
illustrate the region’s rice production potential.  However, outside the city of 
Tombouctou and away from the Niger, the landscape quickly becomes dry and 
uncultivable.  These areas are comprised of transhumant pastoralists in various stages 
of sedentarization.  Access to water remains a serious issue for these communities.   
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Rharous (Region of Tombouctou)  
Rharous is a cercle that borders the regions of Tombouctou to its west and the cercle 
of Bourem to its east.  It extends south all the way to the Burkina Faso border and 
finds its limit to the north by the region of Kidal.  Primarily a zone of transhumant 
pastoralism, agriculture is practiced along and in the Niger River as well as several 
temporary lakes.  Access is limited by sand dunes along the river front, so options for 
linking potentially cultivable land to the river for irrigation purposes are limited.  
Rharous, relative to other cercles in Tombouctou, lacks public infrastructure.  Lack of 
electricity, potable water and passable roads are the cercle’s largest problems.  Only 
since September 2006 did cellular phone service ease the demand and high cost of 
telephone communication.   
Bourem (Region of Gao) 
The cercle of Bourem in the region of Gao is primarily an arid zone that borders the 
region of Kidal to its north.  It is here that the Niger River reaches its northernmost 
point before descending through Gao and out of Mali into Niger and Nigeria.  Bourem 
shares many of the same problems as Rharous.  Lack of electricity and passable roads 
are serious barriers to its development.  Agricultural potential is limited by massive 
sand dunes that line the Niger River on either side of the river’s path.  The primary 
agricultural activities in the region focus on floating rice that is planted along the 
banks of the river.  However, the recent proposal of a hydro-electric dam in the cercle 
may increase the region’s agricultural potential and supply of electricity, as well as 
facilitate the construction of roads that will be needed to access the site for the dam.  
Seasonal male migration towards Ghana remains a survival strategy which 
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significantly increased as a response to the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s as well as 
the civil conflict in 1990s. 
Kidal (Region of Kidal) 
The cercle of Kidal borders the regions of Gao to the south, Tombouctou to the west 
and Algeria to its north.  Most of its land lies in the heart of the Sahara desert.  
Agriculture is very difficult in this region and is found only where gardening projects 
and wells have been created.  Because of these environmental difficulties and a 
perceived lack of economic development, discontent in Kidal has become a national 
issue.  In addition to being seriously affected by the civil conflict in the 1990s, attacks 
against government military positions in May 2006 resulted in another negotiated 
peace settlement, the Accords d’Alger, that complement the Pacte National which was 
signed in 1992.  At the time of this writing, there is no armed conflict, but stability 
depends on the implementation of the signed agreements.  Otherwise, Kidal is an area 
of trans-Saharan commerce primarily between Algeria and Gao, as well as other trade 
routes that traverse the desert from the west to east.  The opening of a bridge in the 
city of Gao in September 2006 may increase trans-Saharan trade through Kidal from 
North Africa. 
III: Survey Design and Sample Selection 
The survey is designed as a representative two stage cluster sample of households in 
the cercles of Niafunke, Goundam, Dire, Tombouctou, Rharous, and Bourem.  
Villages, in the rural strata, or quartiers in the urban strata (the clusters) of the sample 
were randomly selected in the first stage and their population fully enumerated based 
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on households actually residing in the village or quartier during the period of 
enumeration.  The second stage used the lists generated from the first stage to 
randomly select a list of households to be interviewed
3
.  This sample design is 
commonly used in household surveys and is fully described in Deaton (1997). 
In addition to producing a large data set of households across northern Mali, a second 
objective of the study was to follow up with households originally surveyed in 1997-
98 by IFAD, IFPRI, Cornell University and USAID/Mali.  The objective of the 
previous survey was to understand and develop food security indicators for IFAD by 
implementing a four round household survey in 10 villages in the district of 
Soboundou in the Niafunke cercle.  Christiaensen (1998) provides a full description of 
the sample design and selection of households from the 1997-98 data.  By resurveying 
these 245 households found in 2006 from the 1997-98 survey, a better understanding 
of regional change and poverty dynamics is possible.  Information regarding sample 
attrition and the feasibility study undertaken to conduct this resurvey project is found 
in Dillon (2005)
4
.   
The data set is composed of a village questionnaire and a household questionnaire.  
The village questionnaire was administered to village leaders in each village or town 
concerned by the study.  The household questionnaire is differentiated by men’s, 
women’s and children’s sections.  Respondents for each questionnaire were addressed 
to either the head of household for the men’s survey, the head of household’s wife for 
                                                 
3
 See Appendix 2 for a list of communes included in the study and a decomposition of the sample.   
4
 Because of the multiple objectives in the survey design and sample attrition from the 1997-98 
households, sample weights should be used when conducting data analysis.   
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the women’s survey and each child for the children’s survey.  The questionnaire 
organization is provided in Appendix 1.     
To ensure the representativeness of the sample, sample weights are included in the 
data set to account for the different selection probabilities between urban and rural 
stratas.  Following common practice, urban residents have a higher selection 
probability than rural residents
5
, so to equalize their respective weights when 
conducting analysis, sample weights should be used.  Additionally, incorporating 
resurveyed households in 2006 from the 1997-98 survey posed a technical challenge.  
It was necessary to account for population changes between the two surveys and the 
selection probabilities for the 2006 sample, so that the appropriate weights could be 
assigned to the resurvey households.  These weights are reported in the data set to 
facilitate data analysis.  A description of the sample decomposition is provided in 
Appendix 2.   
IV: Survey Implementation 
The survey was conducted from February 2006 to October 2006 across northern Mali.  
Coordination of all data collection activities were assured by the Coordinator, a 
Research Assistant and a Field Supervisor/Trainer.  28 survey enumerators 
administered the survey throughout the different cercles by working in two person 
teams.  These survey enumerators participated in a training and field test before 
                                                 
5
 In the urban stratas, 33% of quartiers were selected in the first stage selection with 8% of the 
population in the quartiers selected.  In the rural stratas, 15% of the villages or fractions were selected 
in the first stage with 8% of the population of the villages or fractions selected.  Two exceptions to this 
rule were the urban strata of Tombouctou which used a second stage selection probability of 4% due to 
the high concentration of its urban population and the rural strata of Niafunke which used a 15 % 
second stage selection probability to assure an adequate sample size with which to conduct program 
evaluation in the primary intervention zone of the funding institutions.    
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beginning their work.  This enabled the screening of enumerators and the selection of 
the best possible candidates as well as providing an opportunity to field test the 
questionnaire before its implementation.   Survey questionnaires consisted of a village 
level questionnaire, a men’s questionnaire, a women’s questionnaire and a children’s 
questionnaire administered independently.   
Survey teams first visited the selected villages to explain the survey’s objectives and 
obtain oral consent from village leaders.  Then the village population would be fully 
enumerated and the village questionnaire administered.  The population lists were 
checked against official population statistics and for other anomalies before a random 
sample was selected from the list.  Teams would then re-visit the village to conduct 
the household level component of the survey.  Every effort was made to ensure that 
population lists were accurate, but the temporary displacement or refusal of a 
household to participate in the survey were occasionally encountered by the study.  
Replacement households were interviewed when it was determined that it was not 
feasible to interview the originally selected household.  Households that were unable 
to be interviewed were replaced by their nearest neighbor as signified by the next 
household on the interviewer’s list.  Of the 2,658 households interviewed in the 
survey, 20 were replacement households.  This constitutes a refusal or absentee rate of 
less than 1 %.  This low refusal or absentee rate is due to the detailed enumeration of 
the population undertaken within close proximity to the time when selection and 
household interviewing was undertaken.   
After teams finished the household component of the questionnaire, the household 
surveys were checked for consistency, quality and household omissions by the survey 
coordination.  Errors in the questionnaires or inconsistent responses to questions were 
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returned to enumerators for re-survey after review by a Coordinator or Field 
Supervisor.  Data entry for completed questionnaires was then conducted by a team of 
six data entry personnel who worked throughout the year.  Entered data was routinely 
checked for errors of internal consistency and validity by a Coordinator or Field 
Supervisor. 
V: Data Collected 
The four questionnaires administered in the field collected information from men, 
women, and children at the household level and from village leaders at the community 
level.  One of the key issues that was extensively discussed during enumerator training 
was the definition of a household.  Following FAO and World Bank definitions, we 
assumed the following working definition of a household:   
A household is composed of members of a family who live together under the same 
roof, eat together in common, conduct common economic activities together, and mix 
their incomes for the mutual benefit of the other members of the household.    
This definition of the household, as opposed to the family, has clear analogues in the 
Sonrai language as cousou and hyinka.   Based on this definition, a wide range of 
variables were collected to analyze the household’s agricultural production, income 
generating activities, herding, assets, education, health, and demographic composition.  
Questions concerning the household’s composition, education, primary activities, 
migratory status of household members and history of positive and negative economic 
shocks were addressed to the head of household, usually a man.  Questions concerning 
the household’s food consumption, health and dietary diversity were addressed to 
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women.  Sections concerning possessions, non-food expenditures, agricultural 
production, herding activities, credit, and time allocation were addressed to both men 
and women.  The children’s questionnaire solicited the child’s (aged 10-17) 
perspective on their work, schooling and leisure activities.  Additionally, children 0-5 
years old were weighed and measured to facilitate the analysis of child health.  The 
essential modules and the methodology of conducting men’s and women’s 
questionnaires were retained from the 1997-98 survey, so that analysis between the 
two data sets would not be biased by questionnaire design.  A full outline of the 
questionnaires is contained in Appendix 1 and a variable appendix with definitions for 
all variables used in the dissertation is contained in Appendix 3.   
Household Statistics  
2,658 households with 12,608 members participated in the Etude sur la Pauvreté et la 
Sécurité Alimentaire au Nord Mali 2006.  Table 2.1 provides a summary of the 
decomposition of the sample from the 151 villages.  31% of the households in the 
sample come from urban areas while 69% of the households are from rural areas.  
Men composed 50.55% of those surveyed, while women made up the other 49.45%.  
Statistics regarding household size and the age distribution of the population are 
presented in Table 2.2.  The mean number of people in the households surveyed was 
6.24 persons.  There is a difference of almost .5 persons between urban and rural 
households.  The composition of the population is represented in the age pyramid 
reported in Figure 2.2 which illustrates that the population is heavily weighted towards 
the young.  This is consistent with high fertility and mortality rates that explain high 
percentages of young people in the population, but lower numbers of people in older 
generations.     
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Table 2.1:  Sample Decomposition 
 
Urban Sample   664 
Rural Sample   1,749 
2nd Round 1997 HH Follow 
up 245 
Total Cross Section 2,413 
Total Sample Households 2,658 
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Figure 2.2:  Age Pyramid 
The migration of household members is a common strategy employed by households 
to spatially diversify risk and build networks to assure adequate resources for the 
household.  Mean numbers of migrants associated with the household are reported in 
Table 2.2 along with migrant remittances decomposed for the full sample, the rural 
sector and the urban sectors.  Rural households send one extra member on average to 
work than urban households.  Migrants remitted an average of 28,480 FCFA in the 
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three months prior to the survey interview.  However, the amount of remittances to 
rural households is almost four times that for urban households.   
Table 2.2 displays the mean value of the household’s durable assets in FCFA.  The 
household’s durable assets were solicited from both men and women.  These assets 
include agricultural materials (hoes, donkey carts, etc.), household furniture (tables, 
chairs, televisions, etc.) and means of transport (canoes, bicycles, motorcycles, etc.).  
Men and women were asked to value their assets at their current resale value if sold at 
the time of the interview.  Mean values of durable assets between men and women 
differ by almost 85,000 FCFA.  These inequalities are less persistent in urban areas 
than they are in rural areas.   
Table 2.2:  Sample Descriptive Statistics Disaggregated by Urban/Rural Strata 
Variable (Mean) Full Sample Urban Rural 
Household Size 6.24 6.44 5.94 
Number of Migrants 0.79 1.25 0.14 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA)  28480 40042 11926 
Durable Assets (Men) 282,710 425,728 202,600 
Durable Assets (Women) 198,445 358,148 128,735 
Household Weekly Food Expenditure 18,671 21,686 16,514 
Non-Food Expenditures (Men) 230,981 450,307 112,668 
Non-Food Expenditures (Women) 93,078 85,701 97,891 
Household Area Cultivated (ha) 1.55 2.76 0.98 
Agricultural Production (kg) per Hectare  2,071 2,116 2,049 
Agricultural Capital (Men) 59,347 56,122 61,154 
Agricultural Capital (Women) 4,403 8,417 2,651 
Herd Size (Men) 20 4 31 
Herd Size (Women) 33 24 40 
Herd Value (Men) 554,366 121,399 865,787 
Herd Value (Women) 179,739 74,668 249,098 
Non Agricultural Revenue (Men) 107,143 189,298 49,631 
Non Agricultural Revenue (Women) 31,372 47,386 20,391 
Total Household Consumption 1,960,875 2,513,938 1,598,450 
Consumption per Capita 340,318 443,141 272,937 
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Households’ expenditures on food and non-food items are also described in Table 2.2.  
Women were asked to recount the household’s food consumption expenditures over 
the previous seven days.  Mean weekly food expenditures were 18,671 FCFA with 
more than a 5,000 FCFA difference between urban and rural households.  These 
figures roughly correspond to a daily expenditure of a little less than 3,000 FCFA per 
day.  Non-food expenditure is reported from men’s and women’s interviews over the 
previous three month recall period.  Mean non-food expenditures for men are 230,981 
FCFA while women spent 93,078 FCFA.  There are again substantial differences 
between the urban and rural sectors in total non-food expenditures which are almost 
40 % higher in urban than rural areas.  Women assume much more responsibility in 
providing for family expenditures in rural areas than urban areas where the mean non-
food expenditure for women in rural areas is actually higher than for women in urban 
areas.  This may be because men account for approximately four times as many 
expenses in urban areas relative to rural areas, so that the distribution of expenses 
within the family changes according to the area.   The next section will describe how 
households finance these food and non-food expenditures through livelihood strategies 
such as agriculture, herding and non agricultural work.  
Production and Livelihood Statistics 
Agriculture, herding, and non-agricultural commercial activities (artisanal crafts, small 
business, manual labor, skilled trades, etc.) are three dominant production and 
livelihood systems in northern Mali.  Households often engage at various points in the 
year in all three.  This allows households to diversify against risk in any one sector as 
well as earn income throughout the year.   
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Agricultural production is a dominant primary activity for both urban and rural 
residents.  The primary crops produced across northern Mali for commercial and own-
consumption are rice, sorghum and millet.   Corn and wheat are of importance in 
certain cercles as are beans, onions and tomatoes.  Various fruits and vegetables such 
as watermelons, okra, potatoes, and squash are also produced in gardens or on the 
periphery of irrigated fields. 
Table 2.2 presents agricultural characteristics aggregated across the household’s plots.  
The mean area cultivated by the household differs between the rural and urban sector 
with rural farmers cultivating approximately 150% more land than urban farmers.  
However, the productivity across rural and urban households is essentially equal with 
mean production (kg) per hectare equal to approximately two tons in both rural and 
urban sectors.   
Access to agricultural capital is a critical input into the production of the household’s 
food needs.  Men and women have differing access to agricultural capital.  In general, 
this stark difference may be because women do not have access to their own plots, 
even though they contribute significant amounts of labor to their household’s plots.  
Table 2.2 shows that rural men have higher actual amounts of agricultural capital than 
urban men.  More hectares cultivated may be an important factor in explaining this 
difference.   However, urban women have larger values of agricultural capital than 
rural women.  This difference may be explained by the fact that community gardening 
projects targeted at women are primarily placed in urban areas.  Table 2.2 also 
presents mean productivity (kg per hectare) disaggregated by cercle.  Cercles located 
along the river in the inner Niger delta (Niafunke and Dire) exhibit higher productivity 
yields than the other cercles.  This may be because of inherent differences in soil 
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quality between the cercles.  Rharous and Bourem show the lowest productivity 
(approximately 1.3 tons per hectare) and in the most arid of the survey zone.   
In addition to the importance of agricultural production as a livelihood system, 
pastoralism is a dominant primary activity for a smaller fraction of households in 
northern Mali.  As a primary livelihood system, pastorialists seek to live off their 
animal stocks to increase wealth and generate revenue.  As a secondary activity for 
most households in northern Mali, owning animals serves as an important store of 
wealth in the absence of a well developed financial system.  However, these 
households shouldn’t be necessarily considered trans-humant pastoralists.  In our data 
women actually own more animals than men, but the value of these animals is 
considerably less than that of men’s. This is primarily because women with fewer 
means own more chickens and goats, while men own cattle, sheep and goats.  These 
trends are illustrated in Table 2.2.    
In addition to agriculture, households are engaged in various income generating 
activities outside of agriculture.  The net revenues of these activities were calculated 
from the survey data on gross revenues and expenses of the activity conducted in the 
previous month before the interview.  Men gain consistently higher amounts of 
revenue across rural and urban sectors than women, but the differences in total net 
revenue gained between the sector is large.  Men earn a mean net non-agricultural 
revenue of 107,143 FCFA while women earn only 31,372 FCFA (Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.3:  Agricultural Production and Consumption by Cercle 
 Niafunke Goundam Dire Tombouctou Rharous Bourem 
Agricultural 
Production (kg 
per hectare) 2,504 1,907 2,538 1,999 1,374 1,360 
Consumption 
Aggregate 
(FCFA) 1,619,353 1,982,213 1,829,792 2,527,745 1,280,234 1,467,539 
Poverty Analysis 
Table 2.4 displays mean total consumption and consumption per capita for the full 
sample, the rural sector and urban sector in northern Mali.  Consumption aggregates 
were calculated to reflect the use value during the year of the household’s possessions, 
its non-food expenditures and its food expenditures.  Mean total consumption per 
household is 1,960,875 FCFA with a difference of almost 1,000,000 FCFA between 
urban and rural households.  Mean consumption per capita statistics display similar 
differences between rural and urban sectors with a difference of almost 285,000 FCFA 
per person per household.   
Differences in total consumption are distinct not only across rural and urban sectors, 
but also across the different cercles of the study.  Tombouctou has the highest total 
household consumption while Rharous has the lowest total household consumption.  
Although the two cercles border each other, these differences can be explained by the 
regional importance of the city of Tombouctou which serves as the region’s 
commercial center and the isolation of Rharous as a cercle in which there is a 
significant lack of infrastructure and arable land.    
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Headcount, poverty gap and severity measures are reported for the full sample, urban 
and rural sectors and across the cercles.  The poverty line is based on a common 
international standard of 1 Euro per person per day to delineate extreme poverty.  This 
poverty line represents a yearly per capita income of 365 Euros or 239,217 FCFA.  
The poverty statistics for this poverty line are reported in Table 2.4. 
The cercles of Rharous, Bourem and Niafunke are the poorest cercles considered in 
this sample.  The urban poverty rate is approximately 18% of the population while 
rural poverty rate is almost 53%.  The PSRP 2002 indicates that nationally the severe 
poverty rate is 21% which suggests that even in urban areas of northern Mali severe 
poverty is close to previous national averages, while rural poverty in northern Mali is 
more than twice the national average.  In addition, significant differences in the 
dispersion of poverty as measured by the poverty gap and severity measures exist 
between the urban and rural regions.    
Table 2.4:  Poverty line--1 (2006) Euro per day per capita (239,217 FCFA) 
  Headcount Gap Severity 
Full Sample 0.388 0.120 0.053 
Urban 0.181 0.038 0.012 
Rural 0.529 0.176 0.082 
VI: Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to provide a description of the research 
methodology, sample design and a brief regional overview of the Etude sur la 
Pauvreté et la Sécurité Alimentaire au Nord Mali 2006.  These summary statistics 
provide a general overview of differences between the cercles and the urban and rural 
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sectors in northern Mali.  The following three chapters explore the implications of 
child labor and access to irrigation in these data.  
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CHAPTER 3:  CHILD LABOR AND SCHOOLING RESPONSES TO 
PRODUCTION AND HEALTH SHOCKS IN NORTHERN MALI 
I. Introduction 
Child labor is an economic imperative for many households, especially poor 
households in developing countries.  The 2004 International Labour Organization 
estimate of working children aged 5-14 suggests that more than 190 million children 
work worldwide, of whom more than 49 million (26.4 percent of the region’s child 
population) reside in Sub-Saharan Africa (Hagemann et al. 2006).  Children contribute 
to household labor supply when reserves of labor are essential at critical periods of the 
production process, supervision of labor is costly, and household production by 
children frees other household members to pursue remunerative market activities.  
While some children do contribute income directly to households through formal wage 
labor,
6
 most often children perform a combination of market activities and/or domestic 
activities, especially in Africa.  These market activities include unpaid agricultural 
production on the family farm and formal or informal family businesses.  Domestic 
activities include participation in the provision of household public goods such as food 
preparation, household cleaning, and provision of childcare for other siblings.  
Without children’s work, poor households lose one of the few mechanisms they have 
to increase incomes or smooth consumption in the face of economic shocks.  This 
chapter investigates children’s time allocation to schooling, home production, and 
market production. It uses a unique data set collected from northern Mali to examine 
the marginal effects of production and health shocks on child time allocation.  In 
                                                 
6
 A child agricultural wage rate was reported in only 7 percent of the villages we surveyed, indicating 
the lack of a child agricultural labor market.  Manufacturing is not a predominant economic activity in 
northern Mali, so children’s manufacturing wages were not collected in the village questionnaires.   
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addition, the chapter estimates the effect of assets on mitigating children’s withdrawal 
from school and increased participation in work activities.   
While the literature on children’s schooling is extensive7 and the fertility literature 
explicitly models the quantity/quality tradeoffs among additional children,
8
 the child 
labor literature has focused on the causes of children’s work (Basu and Van 1998; 
Basu 1999; Baland and Robinson 2000; Bhalotra and Heady 2003) and the 
substitution effects caused by household composition and birth order (Edmonds 2006b 
and Emerson and Souza 2007).  Increasing attention has also been paid to the income 
effect of production shocks and the ex-post changes in the distribution of children’s 
work and schooling caused by these shocks (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Jensen 2000; 
Beegle et al. 2006, de Janvry et al. 2006, Kruger 2007).  As Edmonds et al. (2007) 
note, our understanding of the mechanisms that determine child labor and schooling 
substitution effects are a critical lacuna in the literature.  This chapter contributes 
evidence regarding these substitution effects by using data that disaggregates 
children’s work to better reflect the multiplicity of activities that children carry out in 
the developing world. 
The chapter also contributes to the literature by developing a model of children’s 
participation in market production, home production, and schooling.  The model, 
developed in the chapter’s second section, builds on Beckerian models of human 
capital investment in children within unitary household models (Becker 1965; Becker 
and Lewis 1973; and Becker and Tomes 1976), agricultural household models 
developed by Rosenzweig (1977a, 1977b, 1980), Singh et al. (1986), and de Janvry et 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Glewwe (2002), for a review.   
8
 See for example Becker and Lewis (1973). 
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al. (1991), and more recent models of child labor by Basu and Van (1998), Basu 
(1999), Baland and Robinson (2000), Cigno and Rosati (2005), and Edmonds (2007).   
The third section of this chapter develops the econometric strategy for estimating the 
marginal effects of household and community characteristics and idiosyncratic shocks 
on schooling, home production, and market-oriented production.  Three econometric 
specifications (a probit model, a probit model with shocks and shock asset 
interactions, and a multivariate probit model) are investigated with different 
assumptions about the structure of potential unobserved heterogeneity.  These error 
term assumptions include household-level random effects, village-level random and 
fixed effects, and cross-equation correlation to check for consistency across parameter 
estimates.  Outcome variables include children’s participation in multiple types of 
activities and the child’s role in joint production.  These variables allow the 
examination of substitution effects within the household including the gender-
specificity of tasks or the multiplicity of activities that children undertake.  This 
analysis is infeasible when children’s activities are aggregated into ―work,‖ rather than 
reported as specific activities in which a child engages.  The econometric strategy uses 
production shocks from harvest-period pest infestations that reduce household income 
and illnesses within the family that reduce total household labor availability in order to 
identify substitution patterns of child labor and schooling.      
The fourth and fifth sections of this chapter describe the survey and the data collected 
in northern Mali. The sixth section presents the empirical results and investigates the 
role assets play in insuring against shocks and as buffer stocks.  Different measures of 
household assets are constructed to test whether assets indeed serve as buffers against 
increased child labor in response to shocks.  Results from investigating asset-shock 
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interactions suggest that different asset types provoke different substitution effects 
within the household.  To ensure that these results are robust to concerns about 
unobserved heterogeneity, model specification and endogeneity, robustness checks are 
conducted that include disaggregating the sample by gender and age, examining the 
effects of omitting household composition variables, and estimating the probability 
that a household reports a shock.  The last section offers conclusions.   
II. Model 
The purpose of this model is to examine the mechanisms by which children’s time is 
allocated to different activities (education, home production, or market production) 
within an agricultural household model.  The household decision problem is divided 
into three periods.  In the first period, the household decides how many children to 
have given their existing birth-control possibilities, preferences, social norms, and 
expectations about the future of raising children.  In the second period, the household 
incurs a fixed cost for each child born as well as the cost of providing food and 
consumption goods to the child in this period.   
The second period requires households to invest in their children, which will 
determine the child’s third period income.  Investment in children comes from food 
and consumption goods provided to children, but also from the amount of schooling 
that children acquire.  Parents allocate the time of their children between school, home 
production, and market production, deciding simultaneously their participation in 
these activities and the hours to be worked.  The first and second periods can be 
thought of, in the Beckerian sense, as parental investment in both the quantity and 
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quality of children.  The third period ends as parents become old, consuming the 
return on their assets, and as children earn their own income.   
For ease of exposition, consider the last two periods of the allocation process and 
assume that the household maximizes an additive utility function over these two 
periods, considering its own consumption in period 2 and a discounted valuation of 
children’s consumption in period 3.   
Building on the Cigno and Rosati (2005) model of child labor in a unitary household, 
let a2 and a3 be adult consumption in periods 2 and 3.  Children’s period 2 
consumption and period 3 income are represented by c2 and y3.  Parents maximize a 
separable utility function with arguments that include their own periods 2 and 3 
consumption as well as a discounted function of their n children’s period 2 
consumption and period 3 income when they become adults and form their own 
households.   
Household Utility Function:  2 3 2 3( , ) *( , )U u a a nU c y                (3.1) 
The household faces a budget constraint in each period.  In the second period, the 
household must divide its revenue from market production and home production 
between adult consumption and assets or savings, denoted k.  For each of the n 
children born in period 1, a fixed cost is also incurred, b, which includes all the costs 
of childcare in period 1.  Two other costs are borne by the household in period 2, the 
child’s period 2 consumption, 2c , and the cost of schooling for each child who is sent 
to school, s.  If s is set to zero, then the child does not go to school.  In period 3, adults 
no longer work and children form their own households.  The budget constraint for the 
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household in period 3 is simply the return on the household’s assets invested from 
period 2.
9
 
Budget Constraint Period 2:  
2 2 2 1( )
W W
A AY H w T a b c s n k                   (3.2) 
Budget Constraint Period 3:  3a rk                  (3.3) 
Both adults and children have time constraints.  Adults divide their time among self-
employed market production, F
AT , home production, 
H
AT , the wage labor market, 
W
AT , and leisure activities, 
L
AT .   Children divide their time among schooling,
S
CT , 
market production, H
CT , home production,
H
CT , and leisure, 
L
CT .  Parents choose 
simultaneously whether children work in a particular activity and the hours worked.  If 
a child’s time is not allocated to a particular activity, the child’s time is set to zero.  
Because there is a low incidence of child wage labor in northern Mali, only the adult’s 
return in the wage labor market is modeled.   
The household generates profits from agricultural production or a home business via 
the market profit function in Equation 3.4.  The revenues from the business are 
generated by scaling output from the production function, f, that converts adult and 
child labor given the quasi-fixed inputs capital, K, and land, L, by a vector of output 
prices, p.  Adult and child labor inputs are valued at wage rates that represent the 
opportunity cost of the adult or child’s time.  Domestic profits are valued according to 
                                                 
9
 Implicitly, the model makes two assumptions in Equations 3.2 and 3.3. The first is that period 1 
production, consumption, and labor supply decisions have no impact on period 2 decisions.  Second, the 
absence of credit markets and borrowing are constraints for households.  Credit market transactions are 
small with short term loans that do not exceed one of the periods purposed by the model.  Credit 
contracts of long duration or debt bondage are not considered in this model.    
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a home production function minus the labor inputs that generate the final goods.  Both 
production functions are quasi-concave functions.   
Market Profits in Period 2: 
2 ( , | , )
F F F F F F
C A A A C CY p q T T K L w T w T               (3.4) 
Domestic Profits in Period 2: 
2 ( , )
H H H H H H
A C A A C CH h T T w T w T                (3.5) 
δ is a random production shock included in Equation 3.4 with E(δ)=1 and an i.i.d. 
distribution that represents unexpected positive or negative production shocks.  These 
could include rainfall variation, crop losses due to insect or animal infestations, or 
household illness that affects market production.   
The child’s period 3 income is the return that the child (now an adult) receives on her 
labor given her cognitive development, E, and period 1 and 2 consumptions.  The 
child’s period 3 income is a function of her cognitive skills, E, which are developed in 
period 2, and of period 2 consumption, c2, which determines physical development 
and work capacity.  Childhood nutrition is a critical component of future adult health, 
which contributes to the adult’s work capacity in period 3.   
Income Generation in Period 3:  3 3 2( , )Y w E c                (3.6) 
Cognitive development is represented by a production function, E (Equation 3.7) with 
inputs including the child’s time in school, S
CT , schooling inputs such as books, s, and 
the school’s quality, Q.  Following Glewwe (2002), a parameter of the learning 
efficiency of the child that is exogenously given is specified as θ.  As θ increases, the 
cognitive development of the child increases.  Included in θ are unobservable 
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characteristics that increase a child’s cognitive development, such as innate ability, the 
child’s motivation, and the parent’s motivation to help the child learn.  These 
unobservable characteristics are grouped in the vector θ.  The interaction between 
unobservable individual and household characteristics with school quality and time in 
school produces cognitive skills.   
Cognitive Skills:  ( , ) ( )SCE f Q s g T                 (3.7) 
The full model is outlined in Appendix 1, but testable implications are developed from 
the solution to the household’s problem summarizing the conditions under which 
children’s time is allocated to schooling, home production, and market production.  
The comparative statistics of household shocks on child labor and schooling are also 
derived, and can be tested with the data.   
School 
Equation 3.8 defines the schooling participation equation to be estimated.  
*
,
C
i hS  is a 
discrete choice that depends on the following factors.  First, if the shadow value of the 
child’s time is relatively high, then the demand on the child’s time in either the home 
or market production of the household in period 2 will outweigh any future benefit in 
period 3 that schooling may provide.  Factors that increase child schooling include 
school quality, which increases the future benefits of cognitive skills.  A child’s 
unobservable characteristics and her parent’s motivation to help her succeed in school, 
represented by θ, will also increase the benefits of schooling and make the 
development of cognitive skills more desirable.   
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Schooling Condition:  * , 1
3
*
( , ) ( )C Si h C
U
S n f Q s g T
y
  

 

             (3.8) 
Home Production 
The child’s participation in home production can be explored by transforming 
Equation A.8
10
 such that: 
1
2
( , )H H HA C Ch T T wu
a

  

 .                  (3.9) 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, Equations A.8 could be solved to derive the 
optimal hours worked by the household’s child for the general case.  Alternatively, if a 
Cobb Douglas production function is assumed for h, a closed form solution can be 
derived. By using this functional form, child and adult labor become either 
complements or substitutes.  Much of the child labor literature suggests that child and 
adult labor are substitutes.  However, complementary adult and child labor seems to be 
the more intuitively plausible because it is relatively rare to see children working 
without adult supervision.  This proposition is testable using analysis of the asset-
shock substitution effects.  Using the functional form assumption for the household 
production function, the household child labor demand becomes: 
                                                 
10
 Equations referenced are found in Chapter 3, under VIII:  Model. 
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1
2[ ]
(1 )( )
H
C
H
C H
A
w
u
a
T
T









   .                (3.10) 
If 0HCT  , then Equation 3.11 characterizes the equilibrium condition.  When the 
shadow value of the child’s time and the increase in the adult’s marginal utility from 
the return on the child’s time in home production are greater than the marginal utility 
from the change in productivity of the home production function due to the child’s 
labor, it is inefficient to allocate the child’s time to home production.  The child’s 
participation in home production is characterized as a discrete choice, 
*
,
C
i hL .   
Home Production Condition:   * , 1
2 2
( ,C H H Hi h A C C
u u
L h T T w
a a

 
  
 
          (3.11) 
Market/Farm Production 
The analysis of the allocation of children to the market production activities of the 
household is similar to the decision rules for the home production activities.  However, 
the household’s decisions are driven by the marginal returns of allocating additional 
hours of child labor to market/farm production and the return to the child of each 
additional unit supplied.  Manipulating Equation A.9 yields:   
1
1
( , )F F FA C Cp q T T wu
a

   

 .               (3.12) 
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A closed form solution, assuming the Cobb-Douglas production function yields: 
1
1[ ]
(1 )( )
F
C
F
C F
A
w
u
a
T
p T



 





  .                (3.13) 
If 0FCT  , then from the first order conditions Equation 3.14 must hold which 
characterizes the discrete choice of child labor in market production. 
Market Production Condition:   * , 1
2 2
( ,C F F Fi h A C C
u u
L q T T w
a a

 
  
 
          (3.14) 
Equation 3.14 states that when the marginal utility value of adding an additional unit 
of child labor to market production exceeds the shadow value of the child’s time and 
the shadow wage, then a child will be allocated to market production.   Together with 
Equation 11, these equations suggest there are thresholds over which children’s time is 
allocated to certain types of market and domestic production.  The importance of 
covariates suggested by these participation conditions on observed child labor 
decisions are estimated in the sample of children from northern Mali in section 6.   
Response to Shocks in Market Production 
The changes in child labor in response to market production shocks are characterized 
by taking the derivative of the child labor demand equation with respect to the 
production shock: 
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1 1
11 1
2
[ ] 0
(1 )( ) (1 )( )
F F
C C
F
C
F
A A
w w
u u
T a a
p T p

 
 

     

 
 
  
  
  
  .            (3.15) 
In response to positive production shocks, households decrease child labor supply to 
market activities.  Negative production shocks induce larger allocations of children’s 
time to income generating or subsistence activities.  Child and adult productivity 
shocks have inverse effects on allocation of child time to work.  This is because the 
marginal value of children’s labor input increases when less labor is allocated to the 
production process.  The responses of both production and health shocks can be tested 
empirically in these data. 
III. Econometric Specification 
Three different econometric specifications are used to investigate allocation of 
children’s time in home production activities such as childcare provision,11 market 
activities such as agricultural production and small family business activities, and 
school enrollment.  Participation in any of these activities is indicated dichotomously 
by the latent variables 
*
,
C
i hL  and
*
,
C
i hS , which were derived above.  For simplicity, all 
child work and school participation decisions are specified as 
*
,
C
i hL  below.  The three 
econometric specifications represent three different sets of identification assumptions 
about the structure of the disturbance term and the inclusion of crop loss shocks and 
household health shocks.   
                                                 
11
 87 percent of children in our survey reported doing domestic chores, so while this category of work 
performed by children is the highest category in terms of percentage of children participating, 
estimation of the determinants of this activity is not possible given the lack of variation in the dependent 
variable.   
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Specification 1: Selection into Activities:  Probit with Random Effects 
To estimate the probability of selection into child labor, a probit model is specified for 
each of the sectors independently for which a child works, given household and 
individual specific covariates (Xi,h), community covariates (Zi,h), a household effect on 
each child ( hc ), and a child/household unobservable ( ,i h ), which can be combined in 
a composite error term: 
, ,i h h i hc   . The following equation is specified such that: 
*
, , ,
C
i h i h h i hL X Z     .                (3.16) 
where   ,
C
i hL  = 1  if 
*
,
C
i hL  > 0              (3.17) 
          = 0 otherwise 
and obtain the distribution of L
C
i, h given X i, h, Z i,h, and ch using the familiar result: 
*
, , , ,( 1| , , ) ( 0 | , , )
C C
i h i h h h i h i h h hP L X Z c P L X Z c    
             
, , ,( | , , )i h i h h i h h hP X Z X Z c       
             
, ,1 ( ) ( )i h h i h hX Z X Z                    (3.18) 
where Ф(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  Following Butler 
and Moffitt (1982), the conditional likelihood function can be derived to estimate the 
joint distribution of ,
C
i hL  conditional on ,i hX  and hZ , which requires that the random 
effect is integrated out of the likelihood function.   
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The cognitive skills production function (Equation 9) implies that there is an 
unobservable term, , that is partially household-specific and influences children’s 
learning efficiency, through parental involvement in the child’s learning.  Because this 
term is determined in part from parental involvement in the child’s learning and the 
child’s genetic and psychological disposition to learning, a random effect that 
potentially varies among children within the household seems to correspond closely to 
the proposed theoretical model.  Besides the theoretical motivation for investigating 
household-level effects on children’s work and schooling, there is empirical evidence 
that suggests parental preferences have large effects on children’s schooling decisions.  
For example, 54 percent of children aged 11-17 in Senegal reported that they had not 
been to school because their parents refused to send them, while 19 percent had not 
attended school because their parents needed their help to meet subsistence 
requirements (Dumas and Lambert 2004).  This suggests that household preferences 
may influence children’s time allocation patterns.  Household fixed effects are not a 
feasible econometric strategy to control for household unobservables because other 
fixed household characteristics such as household assets or parental education will not 
vary across children, but have a potentially influential role on children’s schooling and 
work.  Therefore, to control for both household unobservables and observable 
household characteristics that do not vary between children, a random effects 
specification is employed.   
Econometrically, there are certain advantages to using a probit model with random 
effects to control for household unobservables.  Maddala (1987) argues that an 
unobserved household heterogeneous effect, hc , for which there is information and/or 
some a priori belief that it might not be fixed, ought to be treated econometrically as 
ihu , in order to measure the household-specific effects about which the econometrician 
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is also ignorant.  Since fixed effects capture all time-invariant characteristics of the 
cross-sectional units, no estimate of the effect of parental education or household 
assets on child work and school participation would be possible.
12
  In addition, the 
household fixed effects estimator suffers from the incidental parameters problem, 
which renders the maximum likelihood estimates inconsistent.   
Random effects estimation is not without innocuous statistical assumptions that 
require consideration.  Identification is conditioned on assumptions regarding the 
relationship between the random effect and the covariates and distributional 
assumptions.  Precisely, these assumptions are:  
1. Strict Exogeneity:  ( 1| , ) ( 1| , ) ( )ih i i ih ih i ih iP y x c P y x c x c       
2. 1, ,i iHy y are independent, conditional on ( , )i ix c  
3. 2| (0, )h h cc x Normal   
Given a priori beliefs about the nature of the household’s child work and schooling 
decisions and econometric arguments, three econometric specifications are proposed 
to measure the effects of children’s home production, market production, and 
schooling given household, parental, child-specific and community covariates, using 
household random effects.  As a robustness check, the results of the random effects 
and fixed effects estimation at the village level are also reported. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Several examples of random effects estimation in the children’s health and education literature 
include Pitt (1997), Glick and Sahn (1999, 2005), or Paxson and Schady (2005). 
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Specification 2:  Investigating the Impact of Agricultural Shocks and Household 
Morbidity 
Building on specification 1, household-reported sicknesses and production shocks that 
result in crop losses that are rated in severity by the farmer (large or small) are 
included in the second specification.  The sickness shocks are disaggregated into 
men’s illness, women’s illness, and children’s illness where sickness is defined as 
having at least one day in the previous month when the respondent was unable to work 
due to feeling ill.  Including the shocks in the probit model specified as in Equation 16 
yields:  
*
, , , ,
C
i h i h h i h h i hL X Z Shock c          .              (3.19) 
Exogeneity of Shocks 
Self-reported health shocks may not be a reliable measure of health if reporting is 
correlated with wealth and education (Strauss and Thomas 1995).  Production shocks 
also may be endogenous if households’ ex-ante decisions mitigate the expected risk of 
seasonal variations.  A simple test of the plausibility of the shock’s exogeneity 
estimates the probability that a household reports a shock, controlling for observable 
household characteristics that may likely be correlated with the reporting itself.  If 
these covariates are significant determinants of the probability of experiencing a 
shock, it would be difficult to argue that the shock is exogenous.  The following 
specification is estimated:   
( 1) ( , )h ih hP shock f X Z  .                (3.20) 
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This exogeneity test examines correlations between household characteristics and self-
reported morbidity or crop-loss shocks.  Alternatively, using a small subset of panel 
data from the survey also produces evidence regarding the strict exogeneity 
assumption.  The specification below controls for previous shocks to illustrate that the 
effects of self-reported morbidity and crop-loss shocks are transitory.  If lagged shocks 
have persistent effects on the dependent variable, then the strict exogeneity 
assumption on which the random effects estimate depends would be questionable.  
Equation 21 includes controls for time-invariant household and community 
characteristics and includes household fixed effects. 
*
, ,2006 , 2006 , ,2006 1997 , ,1997 ,
C
i h i h h i h i h i hL X Z Shock Shock                    (3.21) 
 Smoothing Shocks:  The Role of Assets 
Several categories of assets, including the values of the household’s durable goods, 
agricultural capital, and livestock, are of particular interest because of their varying 
liquidity.  Faced with production and health shocks, households may choose to 
liquidate assets rather than change the allocation of children’s time.  These shocks are 
interacted with the asset types in the probit model such that Equation 19 becomes:  
*
, , , , , ,( )
C
i h i h h i h i h i h h i hL X Z Shock Shock Assets c             .          (3.22) 
This specification can provide some evidence with respect to the role of assets in 
mitigating ex-post responses to shocks that include increasing child labor.  However, a 
strictly causal interpretation is difficult due to the cross-sectional nature of the data.  
Observing household asset stocks before and after a shock would be ideal, but 
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variation within the cross-section of asset stocks interacted with the shock, controlling 
for seasonality, can also give evidence about the role that asset stocks may have in 
mitigating child labor responses to shocks.    
Specification Three:  Multivariate Probit 
The previous econometric specifications treated the dependent variables as 
independent decisions in an equation-by-equation specification.  However, the 
theoretical modeling suggests that cross-equation correlation is likely.  Parents 
potentially make decisions jointly across the multiple activities in which children 
could participate.  These cross-equation correlations can be modeled by using a 
multivariate probit model such that:  
*
1 , , , 1; ,
C
i h i h h i h i hS X Z Shock       , 
*
2 , , , 2; ,
C
i h i h h i h i hL X Z Shock       , 
*
3 , , , 3; ,
C
i h i h h i h i hL X Z Shock       , 
*
4 , , , 4; ,
C
i h i h h i h i hL X Z Shock       ,              (3.23) 
where each subscripted equation, 
*
,
C
m i hL , m=1,2,3,4, represents an activity for which a 
child may participate dichotomously.  To facilitate the interpretation of the effects of 
shocks on schooling for children, 
*
1 ,
C
i hS  is defined as the discrete choice of whether 
the child was withdrawn from school in the previous year.  Conditional on the child 
having been enrolled in school the previous year, the interpretation of the shock 
variables are cleanly identified.  The relevant question is whether production and 
health shocks are causing students to withdraw from school.  School enrollment for 
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children not enrolled in school during the last academic year will be unaffected by 
shocks in the same year.     
Restrictions on the residuals, 
; ,m i h  require:  
; , ,( | , ) 0m i h i h hE X Z  , 
, , ,[ | , ] 1m i h i h hVar X Z  , 
; , 1; , ,[ , | , ]m i h m i h i h hCov X Z     where jk kj  .             (3.24) 
Using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator, the system of equations in 
3.24 can be estimated by evaluating the four-dimensional normal integrals in a 
likelihood function (Geweke et al. 1994). 
IV. Data Description 
The Survey Area:  Northern Mali 
The regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal lie in the arid and semi-arid regions of 
northern Mali.  The most southwesterly communes of the region of Tombouctou are 
located in the inner Niger Delta, where the Niger River breaks into multiple streams to 
irrigate small ponds and lakes that supply water to otherwise parched soils that are 
increasingly sandy from the climactic forces of desertification.  The defining 
geographic feature of this region is the juxtaposition between the vast and desolate 
Saharan desert and the third largest river in Africa, the Niger, which meanders 
northeasterly until it reaches its most northern point in the commune of Bourem before 
descending past the ancient city of Gao into the country of Niger.  Besides providing 
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the primary water source in an otherwise arid zone, the Niger River is a primary 
transportation route, enables fishing for food and the cultivation of floating rice, and 
provides grasses called bourgou (Echinochloa stignina) for the alimentation of 
livestock.  
Rainfall in the three regions is scarce and intermittent during the rainy season which is 
generally considered to span July to September.  The Saharan zone (desert or arid 
regions) receives less than 150 millimeters of rainfall per year.  This varies starkly 
with the Sahelien zone (grassland or semi-arid regions), which receives 200-600 
millimeters per year, and the south of Mali, which can receive between 600 and 1200 
millimeters per year (Christiaensen 1998).  Depending on the date of planting, the 
primary harvest begins in October and could last into December or early January.  
Grains, particularly rice, sorghum, and millet are the primary crops cultivated.  
December and January are the coldest periods, which lead to the hot and hunger 
seasons that span from February to June.  During this period, a limited number of 
counter-seasonal crops are produced, but these are cultivated mostly from smaller 
garden plots than from the larger plots used for grain cultivation during the primary 
agricultural season. The school year usually begins in September and ends in June, 
leaving children available for planting, but potentially occupied with schooling during 
the harvest season.  Rainfall scarcity is counterbalanced by irrigation from the Niger 
River and lake recession agriculture in the inner Niger delta.  The source of the Niger 
River, Tembakounda, lies in the Djallon Mountains of Guinea, where rainfall is 
siphoned into the river, determining its volume for the most part.
13
  But after the rainy 
                                                 
13
 Christiaensen (1998) provides a detailed description of river levels and rainfall data that illustrates 
this relationship.  In particular, this is why rainfall data is unlikely to be correlated with production 
yields.   According to the EPSANM 2006, 22 percent of farmers use irrigation drawn from the Niger 
River (Dillon 2006).  The timing and levels of this flooding and water recession are the critical 
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season in the mountains ends, river levels diminish, exacerbating water scarcity in 
northern Mali.  As a result, primary and secondary tributaries along the river’s primary 
bed dry up completely.   
Seventy-three percent of households in our survey participate in agriculture as a 
primary activity.  Primary activities are predominantly determined by ethnicity, with 
the Sonray, Soninké, and Bambara being the primary cultivators; the Peuhl, 
Tamasheq, Berabich, and Maures the traditional pastoralists; and the Sorko, 
Korongoy, and the Bozo deriving their livelihood from fishing.  However, there is 
idiosyncratic variation across communities, most notably among selected Tamasheqs, 
who, after the Touareg rebellion of 1990-96, increasingly have become more 
sedentary as part of governmental and nongovernmental interventions.   
Poverty is a widespread phenomenon in Mali, but specifically in the rural regions of 
northern Mali.  The region has known several significant economic shocks, including 
widespread drought and famine in 1914, 1973, and 1984, as well as the civil conflict 
noted above in the early 1990s.  The Government of Mali’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Chapter 2002 reports a national poverty rate of 63.8 percent, with severe 
poverty in the country at the 21 percent level.  Indicators from the Rapport National 
2003 sur le développement humain durable au Mali (RNDH 2003) illustrate the 
entrenchment of rural poverty at the communal level in the north, as compared to other 
regions of Mali.  Because northern Mali is geographically isolated and considered to 
have less potential than other regions of Mali, differences in public investment are 
                                                                                                                                            
covariates in these production systems. They determine water availability and thus agricultural income, 
not local rainfall.   
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stark.
14
   According to the 2003 Rapport National, 33 percent of communes in 
Tombouctou, 30 percent in Kidal, and 35 percent in Gao had no access to primary 
schools in 1998. Other regions further south and west of these northern regions had far 
lower percentages of communes without access: Kayes (13 percent), Koulikoro (1 
percent), Sikasso (6 percent), Segou (4 percent), and Mopti (7 percent).   
Survey Design  
The data for this chapter were collected as part of the Etude sur la Pauvreté et la 
Sécurité Alimentaire au Nord Mali (EPSANM) 2006.  This multi-topic household 
survey was implemented to study household behavior related to human capital 
formation and household production activities, including agriculture, herding, and 
nonfarm activities in northern Mali.  A representative cross-section of 2,155 
households in 151 villages was undertaken from February 2006 to October 2006 in 
seven cercles or states (Niafunke, Goundam, Dire, Tombouctou, Rharous, Bourem, 
and Kidal) in the regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal.  Households were drawn 
randomly using a two-stage cluster sample.  Detailed documentation of the survey 
design and methodology can be found in the previous chapter.   
The data set is composed of a village questionnaire and a tripartite household 
questionnaire.  The village questionnaire was administered to village leaders in each 
village or town covered by the study.  The household questionnaire comprised 
modules for an adult male, adult female, and child.  Survey modules concerning the 
                                                 
14
 The concept of Le Mali inutile became a popular characterization of northern Mali, which was 
considered useless due to low production possibilities as deemed by USAID and the World Bank, 
especially after the 1974 droughts.   See Poulton and ag Youssouf (1998) for a detailed recent history of 
northern Mali.     
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household’s composition, education, primary activities, migration, and history of 
positive and negative shocks were addressed to the household head, usually a man.  
Questions concerning the household’s food consumption, health, and dietary diversity 
were addressed to women.  Sections concerning possessions, nonfood expenditures, 
agricultural production, herding activities, credit, and time allocation were addressed 
to both men and women.  The children’s modules were addressed to children aged 10-
17 years old with questions about their participation in multiple household and market 
production activities and schooling, the hours worked during the past week in these 
activities, and the time spent on a set of activities in order to determine the distribution 
of time amongst work, school, and leisure.  A second section of questions collected 
more detailed schooling information for all children enrolled in school.   
V. Descriptive Statistics 
Children’s participation rates in schooling, home production, and market-oriented 
production are summarized in Table 3.1
15
.  Thirty-three percent of children in our 
survey are currently in school, the lowest percentage of any category of activity.  
Another indicator of children’s schooling status is whether children were withdrawn 
from school in the last academic year.  Of students who were enrolled, 18 percent 
were withdrawn.  Most children (87 percent) do some household work, while 45 
percent are responsible for watching other children within the family.  Market-oriented 
productive activities also have high child participation rates, with farm work 
occupying 54 percent of children in the survey and work in the family business
16
 
                                                 
15
 The percentage of idle children in our survey is only 2 percent.  That is, children who neither work 
nor go to school.    
16
 In northern Mali, family businesses are primarily run by women who have small enterprises, usually 
manufacturing condiments for food, artisanal goods, or housewares such as mats or kitchen tools.  
Products are sold on weekly market days as a supplement to household income.   
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occupying almost 68 percent.  Children’s joint production activities are also 
summarized in Table 3.1.  Twenty-five percent of children combine some market 
work with school.  Twenty-eight percent combine domestic work with school, while 
only 20 percent of children perform some market work and domestic work.   
Table 3.1:  Participation by Activity, Children 10-17 years 
Participation by Activity  Mean Std. Err. 
Child Care 0.449 0.016 
Domestic Chores 0.870 0.010 
Work in the Family Business 0.677 0.015 
Farm Work 0.542 0.015 
School 0.334 0.015 
Child Care + Domestic Chores 0.880 0.010 
Family Business + Farm Work 0.845 0.011 
Joint Production     
Market Work + School 0.247 0.014 
Domestic Work + School 0.278 0.014 
Market Work + Homework 0.204 0.013 
Changes in Child’s School Enrollment   
Withdrawn from School in the Last Year (N=761) 0.179 0.019 
 
Notes:  For all variables, N=1859, except Withdrawn from School (N=761).  Withdrawn from 
school last year is conditional on the child having been enrolled in the previous school year.  
Discrete variables, domestic work and market work, are aggregated from children’s activities: 
Market Work = Family Business + Farm Work and Domestic Work= Child Care + Domestic 
Chores.  All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors are corrected for 
clustering. 
Northern Mali’s child labor rates are higher than regional means. The ILO estimates 
that 26.4 percent of children in Sub-Saharan Africa performed some type of economic 
activity in 2004 (ILO 2006). Within West Africa, Dumas and Lambert (2004) report 
that of children aged 11-17 in Senegal, 67 percent attended school, 69 percent reported 
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participating in domestic work, and 25 percent participated in non-domestic work.
17
   
Higher mean participation rates in work activities and lower schooling rates may 
reflect higher poverty levels and less public infrastructure in northern Mali relative to 
other African countries.  
Tables 3.2.A and 3.2.B present disaggregated children’s participation rates across 
activities by sex and urban/rural area.  Girls bear most of the responsibility for 
domestic work as defined by both watching other children in the household and doing 
domestic chores.  A higher percentage of urban girls than rural girls participate in 
domestic work, although the differences between participation rates is most striking 
for domestic childcare that girls provide to the family.  Forty-nine percent of rural girls 
watch other children in the family, while 74 percent of urban girls do so.  The 
distinction between urban and rural boys is also wide with 36 percent of rural boys and 
61 percent or urban boys being responsible for watching other children.  Ninety 
percent of urban boys also do some sort of domestic chores, whereas 79 percent of 
rural boys do so.  Rates of participation in domestic chores for girls are high in both 
urban and rural areas, with rates of 97 percent and 95 percent, respectively.  Studies 
from Ghana, such as Bhalotra and Heady (2003), report rural school participation rates 
for girls and boys at 68.9 percent and 76.5 percent; farm work at 34.4 percent and 40.5 
percent; and joint participation in school and farm work at 29.9 percent and 24.6 
percent, respectively
18
. 
 
                                                 
17
 L’Enquete Education et Bien-Etre des Menages au Senegal 2003 investigates multiple types of 
children’s domestic and market-oriented activities (Dumas and Lambert 2004), suggesting that these 
results are a good comparison for EPSNAM 2006.   
18
 Bhalotra and Heady (2003) use the rural sample from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 1991/92 for 
children aged 7-14.   
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Table 3.2.A:  Participation Rates of Boys and Girls (10-17 years)  
in Rural and Urban Areas 
 
Activity   Rural  Urban Girls Boys 
Child Care 
     
Mean 0.4164 0.6698 0.5219 0.3871 
Std. Error 0.0483 0.0715 0.0526 0.0466 
Domestic 
Work 
     
Mean 0.8600 0.9352 0.9531 0.7997 
Std. Error 0.0242 0.0342 0.0122 0.0330 
            
Work in the 
Family 
Business 
     
Mean 0.6747 0.6813 0.7325 0.6278 
Std. Error 0.0440 0.0722 0.0367 0.0450 
Farm Work 
     
Mean 0.5687 0.3706 0.3565 0.7001 
Std. Error 0.0285 0.0827 0.0418 0.0316 
School 
     
Mean 0.3177 0.4619 0.3233 0.3465 
Std. Error 0.0405 0.0530 0.0410 0.0395 
Joint 
Production           
       
Market 
Activities 
and School 
     
Mean 0.2390 0.3029 0.2162 0.2729 
Std. Error 0.0343 0.0365 0.0381 0.0336 
            
Domestic 
Activities 
and School 
     
Mean 0.2564 0.4354 0.2936 0.2670 
Std. Error 0.0328 0.0519 0.0406 0.0301 
            
Market and 
Domestic 
Activities 
     
Mean 0.2009 0.2281 0.2216 0.1899 
Std. Error 0.0358 0.0723 0.0401 0.0315 
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors are corrected for 
clustering.  For all variables, N=1859.   
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Table 3.2.B:  Participation Rates of Boys and Girls (10-17 years)  
in Rural and Urban Areas 
Activity 
  
Rural 
Girl 
Urban 
Girl 
Rural 
Boy 
Urban 
Boy 
Child Care       
Mean 0.4893 0.7398 0.3559 0.6082 
Std. Error 0.0560 0.0603 0.0477 0.0845 
Domestic 
Work 
      
Mean 0.9501 0.9730 0.7853 0.9019 
Std. Error 0.0136 0.0130 0.0357 0.0568 
Work in the 
Family 
Business 
      
Mean 0.7366 0.7051 0.6232 0.6603 
Std. Error 0.0413 0.0576 0.0498 0.0855 
Farm Work       
Mean 0.3762 0.2254 0.7285 0.4984 
Std. Error 0.0434 0.0927 0.0311 0.0778 
School       
Mean 0.3117 0.4009 0.3227 0.5157 
Std. Error 0.0464 0.0700 0.0445 0.0446 
Joint 
Production           
Market 
Activities 
and School 
      
Mean 0.2135 0.2345 0.2602 0.3631 
Std. Error 0.0435 0.0412 0.0380 0.0386 
Domestic 
Activities 
and School 
      
Mean 0.2802 0.3829 0.2367 0.4815 
Std. Error 0.0458 0.0659 0.0313 0.0493 
Market and 
Domestic 
Activities 
      
Mean 0.2250 0.1982 0.1808 0.2544 
Std. Error 0.0438 0.0915 0.0344 0.0678 
 
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors are corrected for 
clustering.  For all variables, N=1859.   
Work in the family business does not differ with respect to urban and rural areas.  
However, participation in the family business differs between girls and boys by a rate 
of almost 11 percent.  Another market-oriented activity, farm work, shows distinct 
rural/urban and boy/girl differences.  Rural boys and urban boys farm with rates of 
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participation of 73 percent and 50 percent, respectively, whereas only 38 percent of 
rural girls and 23 percent of urban girls work on the farm.  With regard to children’s 
participation in schooling, rates of schooling differ across rural and urban areas, but 
they are similar between girls and boys.  Forty-six percent of urban children go to 
school while only 32 percent of rural children are currently being schooled.  Girl and 
boy school participation rates differ by only 2 percent, with boys favored slightly.   
Summary statistics of the child, parental, and household characteristics are 
summarized in Tables 3.3.A and 3.3.B.  Boys comprise 54.5 percent of the children in 
the sample.
19
  The distribution of ages, restricted to children between 10 and 17 years 
old, is presented as indicator variables of each age reported from the household roster.  
Because official administrative record-keeping has only recently become common at 
the commune level in Mali and a high percentage of natural births outside of hospitals 
are common, correct reporting of a child’s age can be difficult.  There seems to be 
some grouping of children’s ages around even numbers (10, 12, 14, and 16 year olds), 
with odd ages reporting lower numbers.  There is no particular natural phenomenon 
that could explain this pattern, so the interpretation of age-specific results should be 
conducted with caution in light of potential measurement error in the age variable.  In 
addition to age, sex, and ethnicity, the child’s relationship to the head of household is 
reported.  The household head is plausibly the primary decision maker whose 
influence on the child’s work and schooling may in part be dictated by social 
relationships.  Eighty percent of children are the biological offspring of the head of 
household.  
                                                 
19
 This deviation from proximate parity in the sex ratio suggests that girls and boys may have 
characteristics which systematically differ, causing higher migration out of northern Mali or higher 
mortality rates.  The assumption of pooling both genders will be relaxed in the forthcoming 
econometric investigation to test this proposition.   
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Table 3.3.A:  Descriptive Statistics:  Household and Child Characteristics 
  Mean Std. Dev.   
Child Characteristics    
Sex (Boy=1) 0.545 0.498  
Ethnicity  
 
  
Sonrai 0.665 0.472  
Tamasheq 0.134 0.341  
Peuhl 0.111 0.313  
Bambara 0.040 0.196  
Other Ethnicity 0.050 0.217  
    
Age Dummies    
Age 10 0.201 0.401  
Age 11 0.075 0.264  
Age 12 0.138 0.345  
Age 13 0.085 0.279  
Age 14 0.135 0.342  
Age 15 0.129 0.335  
Age 16 0.145 0.353  
Age 17 0.091 0.287  
Adult Characteristics     
Mother’s Education (1 if any education) 0.055 0.227  
Father’s Education (1 if any education) 0.106 0.308  
Age of Household Head 41.2 21.6  
Age of Household Head’s spouse  33.7 14.7  
 
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors 
 are corrected for clustering.  For all variables, N=1859.   
Table 3.3.B:  Descriptive Statistics:  Household and Child Characteristics 
    Mean Std. Dev. 
 Household Composition   
 Own Child 0.803 0.398 
 Number of Girls in HH 1.407 1.215 
 Number of Boys in HH 1.722 1.361 
 Number of Adult Women in HH 1.697 1.277 
 Number of Adult Men in HH 1.638 1.148 
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 Table 3.3.B (Continued) 
    Mean Std. Dev. 
 Household Assets and Unearned Income    
 Herd Size 19.18 19.54 
 Herd Value (FCFA) 531946 57044 
 Agricultural Capital (FCFA) 47051 12744 
 Durables (FCFA) 302671 69356 
 Migrant Remittances (FCFA) 40508 114356 
 Shocks    
 Production Shock    
 No Crop Loss 0.533 0.042 
 Small Crop Loss 0.217 0.034 
 Large Crop Loss 0.250 0.036 
 Labor Availability Shock    
 Adult Male Sick 0.131 0.019 
 Adult Female Sick 0.212 0.045 
 Child Sick 0.144 0.037 
 
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors  
are corrected for clustering.  For all variables, N=1859.   
Household composition is potentially a critical determinant of children’s schooling 
and work activities.  The number of household members may determine total labor 
availability to allocate to various market and domestic activities.  The mean number of 
boys is 1.7, girls 1.4, women 1.7 and men 1.6.
20
   Adult characteristics such as the ages 
of the household head and spouse are also included in the econometric analysis.  These 
variables capture potential life-cycle influences of the primary decision makers who 
influence children’s time allocation.  The household’s human capital is measured by 
parental education.  Education is measured as an indicator variable of the parent ever 
                                                 
20
 Adults include any person aged 18 or older in the household.  This may not necessarily be congruent 
with the social conception of how households themselves may view members, since persons aren’t 
usually considered adults until after marriage.  However, for the purposes of investigating work, 
persons aged 18 have reached full physical development and are usually out of school to be freely 
allocated to different activities.  Children aged 17 or under may still be developing and/or have 
obligations to school, which may differentially impact their time allocation.   
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having completed a grade level of education.  Only 5 percent of mothers have any 
education whereas fathers have an education rate of 10 percent.
21
     
Household assets and unearned income are reported in the second column of Table 
3.3.  Four types of assets are reported:  herd size, herd value, agricultural capital value, 
and household durables value.
22
  Herd size captures the number of animals that require 
supervision, resulting in higher child labor demand.  However, herd value captures the 
value of animals as an asset.  Hence, households may choose to store their wealth in 
fewer, high-value animals that are less liquid, or a larger number of low-value 
animals. Households have a mean of 19.25 animals with a value of 532,000 FCFA, 
slightly more than USD 1,000.  Agricultural capital had much lower mean household 
value, less than USD 100, or 47,000 FCFA.  Durable goods, which include furniture, 
radios, motorcycles, and other house wares, had a mean value of 303,000 FCFA, or 
less than USD 600.  These assets represent varying levels of liquidity, which may 
affect whether households choose them to smooth consumption or choose instead to 
increase children’s work.  A primary component of unearned income is captured by 
migrant remittances that have a mean value of 40,508 FCFA, but with a high standard 
deviation across households.   
The incidence of household shocks is summarized in Tables 3.3.A, 3.3.B and 3.6.  
Twenty-five percent of households reported a large crop shock caused by insects or 
birds eating pre-harvest crops, a common problem in northern Mali over which 
                                                 
21
 Parental education is potentially endogenous, but we have no plausible instruments, such as 
grandparent’s education, to identify this relationship.  The schooling participation of grandparents 
reported in the study is close to zero.  Concerns about this source of potential endogeneity may be 
assuaged by the low incidence of parental education in these data.   
22
 The value of all assets is reported in local currency, the CFA Franc (FCFA).  During the period of the 
survey, US$ 1 = 515 FCFA approximately.  Herd size is reported here as the total number of animals 
owned by the household.   
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farmers have limited control.  Fifty-three percent of farmers reported no crop losses, 
while another 22 percent reported only minor crop losses.  Households also reported 
which members had been sick in the previous month.  Adult males had an illness 
incidence rate of 13 percent.  Twenty-one percent of women reported that they were 
sick in the previous month, while 14 percent of children were reported to have been 
sick.  The distribution of these shocks across the regions studied also provides 
evidence of the variability of their incidence in different zones.  Table 3.6 shows that 
the incidence rates of large crop losses by cercle are highest in Rharous, Bourem, and 
Niafunke, with Rharous being particularly hard hit by crop losses in the last 
agricultural season.
23
  The rates of male, female, and child sickness display a different 
regional distribution than the production shocks.  The highest rates of male illness 
rates come from Rharous, Tombouctou, and Dire, while female illness rates are 
highest in Bourem, Tombouctou, and Dire.  Children’s illness rates are highest in 
Bourem, Rharous, and Tombouctou. 
There are two types of community characteristics that are also included in the 
econometric specifications:  characteristics that proxy for market development and the 
potential of children’s work opportunities and school quality, and characteristics that 
increase the efficiency of children’s learning, i.e., the cognitive skills attained per unit 
of time spent in school (Table 3.5).  Table 3.4 presents the community characteristics 
that include whether the child comes from an urban or rural area, a regional indicator, 
and variables indicating whether the child’s village or town has access to the Niger 
River or an improved road.  Access to either the river or an improved road increases 
the commercial potential of a village or town because transportation and 
                                                 
23
 Despite the high incidence rates in Bourem, only seven percent of the villages surveyed come from 
this area, reflecting perhaps a more isolated incident than the percentage of households affected may 
seem to indicate if the sample were evenly distributed across the cercles.   
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communication links increase.  Commune-level data is also collected to indicate the 
size of potential markets as a function of the commune’s total population and the 
concentration of this population by the number of villages per commune.  These 
community characteristics may have alternative effects on the allocation of children’s 
time across different activities.  Greater access to income-generating activities may 
increase the child’s market-oriented work as households struggle to meet subsistence 
requirements.  Alternatively, access to income-generating activities may cause adults 
to work more, decreasing children’s market-oriented work, but increasing their 
domestic work as adults leave the household to pursue income opportunities.  Exactly 
how these income and substitution effects, both on children and adults, affect the 
allocation of children’s time to different activities is an empirical question.   
Table 3.4:  Descriptive Statistics:  Community Characteristics 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Regional Characteristics and 
Distribution      
Urban 151 0.086 0.281 
River Access 151 0.331 0.472 
Regional Indicators      
Niafunke  151 0.377 0.486 
Goundam  151 0.166 0.373 
Dire 151 0.159 0.367 
Tombouctou 151 0.099 0.300 
Rharous 151 0.073 0.261 
Bourem 151 0.119 0.325 
Kidal 151 0.007 0.081 
Access to Roads      
Road Connects with Village 151 0.139 0.347 
within 1-10km 151 0.417 0.495 
within 11-20km 151 0.232 0.423 
more than 20km 151 0.212 0.410 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Commune Population      
less than 5000 151 0.093 0.291 
5001-10000 151 0.225 0.419 
10001-20000 151 0.391 0.490 
20001-30000 151 0.146 0.354 
more than 30000 151 0.146 0.354 
Villages per Commune      
Less than 10 151 0.152 0.361 
11-20 151 0.205 0.405 
21-30 151 0.285 0.453 
more than 30 151 0.358 0.481 
  
Table 3.5:  School Characteristics 
Primary School Characteristics     
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
No Primary School Access 151 0.258 0.439 
Primary School in Village 151 0.563 0.498 
less than 5 km 151 0.099 0.300 
greater than 5 km 151 0.079 0.271 
Multiple Primary Schools in Village 151 0.132 0.395 
Student-Teacher Ratio--Primary 107 45.496 20.418 
Repetition Rate—Primary 98 0.305 0.148 
Boys Exam Pass Rate--Primary 71 0.651 0.266 
Girls Exam Pass Rate--Primary 67 0.590 0.325 
Secondary School Characteristics       
Secondary School in Village 151 0.159 0.367 
High School Characteristics      
High School in Village 151 0.026 0.161 
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Table 3.6:  Distribution of Shocks by Region 
Region 
Male 
Illness 
Female 
Illness 
Child 
Illness 
Small 
Crop 
Shocks 
Large 
Crop 
Shocks 
      
Niafunke 0.107 0.082 0.082 0.138 0.198 
Goundam 0.079 0.041 0.011 0.185 0.166 
Dire 0.183 0.165 0.018 0.064 0.009 
Tombouctou 0.270 0.255 0.102 0.153 0.163 
Rharous 0.329 0.146 0.195 0.000 0.890 
Bourem 0.071 0.503 0.420 0.330 0.260 
VI. Estimation Results 
The effects of household characteristics—assets and household composition, parental 
and child characteristics, community characteristics such as school quality, and crop 
and health shocks—on participation across schooling, home production, and market-
oriented production
24
 are presented in this section.  All reported coefficients in the 
tables are marginal effects.   
Probit Model with Random Effects 
 Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the results from the random effects model.
25
  Gender has 
significant impacts on the selection of children into farm work, family business 
activities, and child care.  Joint production of market work and schooling for boys also 
becomes significant at the 10 percent level after controlling for random effects.  Boys 
                                                 
24
 The outcome variables we consider include indicators for school, farm work, working in the family 
business, domestic work, watching other children, and three joint-production categories:  market 
production and school, home production and school, and market production and home production.  Full 
regression results are presented in Tables 3.7-3.18.   
25
 The domestic work equation has been dropped because its high positive response rate made the 
random effects estimation unable to converge.   
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are more likely to engage in farm work and joint production of market work and 
schooling.  However, boys are less likely to engage in work in the family business and 
child care activities.  As expected, age effects are positive for schooling at age 11 and 
negative for older children (16 and 17 year olds).   
Table 3.7: Probit—Random Effects 
  
School Farm 
Family 
Business Childcare   
Boy Indicator     
 0.036 2.022*** -0.470** -0.812*** 
 (0.137) (0.176) (0.237) (0.178) 
Ages         
age11 0.418* 0.296 -0.007 0.295 
 (0.249) (0.268) (0.434) (0.317) 
age12 0.013 0.496** 0.513 0.321 
 (0.201) (0.214) (0.342) (0.275) 
age13 0.271 0.047 0.010 0.233 
 (0.235) (0.245) (0.422) (0.296) 
age14 -0.118 0.153 0.071 0.013 
 (0.214) (0.219) (0.345) (0.275) 
age15 -0.502** 0.824*** 1.054** 0.048 
 (0.240) (0.245) (0.434) (0.285) 
age16 -0.677*** 0.263 0.703* -0.171 
 (0.223) (0.220) (0.377) (0.281) 
age17 -1.128*** 0.451* 0.423 0.236 
 (0.274) (0.269) (0.409) (0.320) 
Household Composition        
Biological child indicator 0.365* -0.005 -0.519 -0.530** 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.355) (0.244) 
Number of girls 0.064 -0.218*** -0.016 0.594*** 
 (0.073) (0.080) (0.189) (0.121) 
Number of boys 0.042 -0.103 -0.102 0.221** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.142) (0.089) 
Number of adult men -0.102 0.0736 -0.336* -0.473*** 
 (0.086) (0.084) (0.173) (0.119) 
Number of adult women 0.067 0.14 0.00848 -0.181 
 (0.091) (0.094) (0.192) (0.124) 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
  School Farm 
Family 
Business Childcare 
Household Assets         
and Unearned Income         
Livestock Value (FCFA) 0.034** -0.013 -0.023 -0.035 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.036) (0.027) 
Herd Size (Number of 
Animals) -0.011* 0.010 -0.009 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) 
Agricultural Capital 
(FCFA) 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.019) 
Household Durables 
(FCFA) 0.005 -0.027 0.007 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.007) (0.019) 
Migrant Remittances 
(FCFA) -0.062* -0.067 -0.017 -0.022 
 (0.035) (0.049) (0.056) (0.070) 
Parental Characteristics     
Any Mother's Education 1.170*** 0.314 2.215** 1.598*** 
(1=Yes) (0.346) (0.374) (0.892) (0.533) 
Any Father's Education 1.024*** -0.288 -1.950*** -0.079 
(1=Yes) (0.267) (0.282) (0.624) (0.381) 
Age of HH Head -0.004 0.005 -0.017 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Age of HH Head's spouse 0.005 -0.012* 0.029* 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) 
Community 
Characteristics         
Access to River -0.32 -1.073*** 1.198** -0.133 
(1=Yes) (0.291) (0.294) (0.592) (0.379) 
Roads     
within 1-10km 0.036 0.714** 0.469 1.674*** 
 (0.325) (0.307) (0.656) (0.452) 
within 11-20km 0.395 0.441 -0.182 1.014** 
 (0.419) (0.378) (0.901) (0.514) 
greater than 20km 0.564 1.447*** 2.199* 2.029*** 
 (0.446) (0.449) (1.190) (0.591) 
School Characteristics         
Primary School in Village 2.261*** -0.065 3.167** -0.208 
 (0.617) (0.506) (1.266) (0.690) 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
  School Farm 
Family 
Business Childcare 
Primary School within 1-
5km 0.570 0.082 2.893* -1.178 
 (0.774) (0.588) (1.493) (0.773) 
Primary School farther 
than 5km -0.250 -0.234 3.467** -0.447 
 (0.859) (0.715) (1.639) (0.937) 
Multiple Primary Schools 0.084 0.012 0.148 0.324 
(1=Yes) (0.335) (0.296) (0.647) (0.394) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.014** -0.000 -0.035** -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) 
Repetition Rate -0.554 0.553 2.458 1.955* 
 (0.747) (0.761) (1.764) (1.029) 
Exam Pass Rate-Boys 0.261 -0.458 -1.084 -0.704 
 (0.619) (0.605) (1.767) (0.849) 
Exam Pass Rate-Girls 0.201 -0.199 -0.296 -0.888 
 (0.580) (0.582) (1.638) (0.817) 
Secondary School in 
Village 0.961*** -0.655** -1.403** 0.021 
 (0.274) (0.279) (0.669) (0.387) 
High School in Village 0.602 -0.013 -0.94 2.872*** 
 (0.490) (0.499) (1.289) (0.692) 
Constant -2.187*** -2.543*** 6.217*** -2.955*** 
 (0.828) (0.778) (1.932) (1.082) 
Observations 1859 1859 1859 1859 
Number of hid 1045 1045 1045 1045 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are multiplied by 
100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per commune, ethnicity and seasonal 
indicators are included in the regression, but results are not displayed.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.8: Children’s Joint Production:  Probit—Random Effects 
  Market 
Production  
and School 
Home 
Production  
and School 
Market and 
Home 
Production   
Boy Indicator    
 0.309** -0.087 0.311 
                (0.151)               (0.138)               (0.206) 
Ages       
age11 -0.094 0.461* 0.051 
               (0.285)               (0.251)               (0.383) 
age12 -0.130 0.240 0.356 
               (0.226)               (0.206)               (0.333) 
age13 -0.004 0.421* -0.002 
               (0.260)               (0.237)               (0.340) 
age14 -0.323 0.030 -0.168 
               (0.235)               (0.216)               (0.355) 
age15 -0.481* -0.364 0.224 
               (0.268)               (0.242)               (0.340) 
age16 -0.697*** -0.401* -0.227 
               (0.246)               (0.223)               (0.334) 
age17 -1.414*** -1.071*** -0.108 
               (0.324)               (0.290)               (0.382) 
Household Composition       
Biological child indicator 0.245 0.124 -0.174 
               (0.218)               (0.193)               (0.288) 
Number of girls 0.001 0.115 -0.023 
               (0.088)               (0.074)               (0.123) 
Number of boys 0.052 0.062 -0.156 
               (0.079)               (0.067)               (0.117) 
Number of adult men -0.169 -0.163* -0.178 
               (0.106)               (0.090)               (0.146) 
Number of adult women 0.136 0.012 0.016 
               (0.108)               (0.093)               (0.160) 
Household Assets        
and Unearned Income       
Livestock Value (FCFA) 0.007 0.023 -0.028 
               (0.019)               (0.016)               (0.034) 
Herd Size (Number of Animals) 0.001 -0.012* 0.015 
               (0.008)               (0.007)               (0.011) 
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Table 3.8, (Continued) 
 
Market 
Production 
and School 
Home 
Production 
and School 
Market and 
Home 
Production 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA) 0.013   
               (0.014)               (0.011)               (0.018) 
Household Durables (FCFA) 0.008 0.019 -0.037 
               (0.010)               (0.013)               (0.040) 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA) -0.080* -0.119*** -0.115 
               (0.046)               (0.045)               (0.146) 
Any Mother's Education 0.824** 1.227*** 2.434*** 
(1=Yes)               (0.395)               (0.342)               (0.621) 
Any Father's Education 0.840*** 0.695*** -1.238** 
(1=Yes)               (0.313)               (0.260)               (0.557) 
Age of HH Head -0.005 -0.004 0.002 
               (0.005)               (0.004)               (0.008) 
Age of HH Head's spouse 0.003 0.010 0.019* 
                (0.008)               (0.007)               (0.011) 
Community Characteristics       
Access to River -0.129 0.022 -1.400** 
(1=Yes)               (0.356)               (0.289)               (0.583) 
Roads    
within 1-10km 0.210 -0.190 2.362*** 
               (0.399)               (0.324)               (0.599) 
within 11-20km 0.503 0.013 1.539** 
               (0.513)               (0.423)               (0.689) 
greater than 20km 0.575 0.472 2.714*** 
               (0.539)               (0.443)               (0.777) 
School Characteristics       
Primary School in Village 2.855*** 2.857*** 1.599* 
               (0.749)               (0.637)               (0.936) 
Primary School within 1-5km 0.169 0.949 0.850 
               (1.017)               (0.785)               (0.986) 
Primary School farther than 5km 1.145 0.502 1.024 
               (1.045)               (0.877)               (1.364) 
Multiple Primary Schools -0.091 0.030 0.180 
(1=Yes)               (0.417)               (0.336)               (0.527) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.032** 
               (0.008)               (0.007)               (0.014) 
Repetition Rate 0.177 -0.933 2.396 
               (0.904)               (0.756)               (1.484) 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
 
Market 
Production 
and School 
Home 
Production 
and School 
Market and 
Home 
Production 
Exam Pass Rate-Boys -0.582 0.236 0.076 
               (0.775)               (0.645)               (1.186) 
Exam Pass Rate-Girls 0.513 -0.262 -1.877 
               (0.729)               (0.607)               (1.239) 
Secondary School in Village 0.820** 0.269 -1.530** 
               (0.328)               (0.272)               (0.639) 
High School in Village 1.158* 1.025** 2.476** 
               (0.605)               (0.494)               (0.986) 
Constant -3.002*** -2.206*** -7.822*** 
               (1.006)               (0.835)               (1.586) 
Observations 1859 1859 1859 
Number of hid 1045 1045 1045 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per 
commune, ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not 
displayed.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
  
Household characteristics and composition are also important determinants of 
children’s participation in work and schooling activities.26  Controlling for random 
effects, the probability of being selected into schooling increases by .365 for 
biological children,
27
 indicating that foster or adopted children may not receive the 
same investments in human capital.  The number of boys, girls, and adults in the 
household determines the household’s labor availability.  The higher the number of 
girls, the lower the probability that they will be selected for farm work, but the higher 
                                                 
26
 The number of children within the household and whether the child is fostered into the household 
may be endogenous, even controlling for household random effects.  We relax this assumption later and 
perform a robustness check on the stability of the coefficients without these variables included in the 
regression.  
27
 This suggests that foster or adopted children may not receive uniform investments in human capital, 
but the causality may not be directly related to foster parents.  If birth parents have already withheld 
children from enrolling in school, it may be prohibitively costly or impossible for foster parents to 
reverse this decision.  See for example, Akresh (2007a and 2007b) on the decision to foster and the 
impact of foster on children’s schooling. 
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the probability that they will be selected for childcare.  An increase in the number of 
boys also increases the probability that a child will be selected into childcare.  Higher 
numbers of adult men in the household lowers the selection of children into all work 
activities except farm work. 
Household assets are less important factors of selection into children’s work and 
schooling activities.  For selection into schooling, herd value positively affects 
schooling participation, while herd size negatively affects it.  These marginal effects 
suggest that livestock has dual implications for the household; as a store of wealth 
which requires supervision and a task that may increase the demand for child labor.  
Hence, livestock holdings influence the internal mechanisms of both household labor 
demand and asset accumulation strategy to mitigate risk.   
Parental education has large and significant effects on children’s work and schooling.  
Children of educated fathers have higher selection probabilities into schooling and 
lower selection probabilities into the family business and joint market and home 
production.  However, children of educated fathers face higher selection probabilities 
for the other two joint production variables.  Mother’s education has significant effects 
for all activities except farming.  This suggests that educated parents may have 
increased income-generating opportunities that require not only additional labor from 
their children in market-oriented activities, but also in home production.  This 
hypothesis is reinforced by the finding that children of educated mothers have higher 
selection probabilities into joint production.     
Examining the commune-level demographic and school characteristics data, the 
presence of a primary school in a village increases the probability that a child is 
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selected into schooling.  In the random effects specification, the presence of a 
secondary school also increases this probability.  The latter may reflect parents’ 
expectations that having their child finish high school would provide a higher return 
than stopping at primary education.  The presence of a primary school also increases 
participation in joint production, both market-oriented and home production with 
schooling, as well as in domestic work and family business work. The latter two are 
time-insensitive activities that can accommodate schedules outside of school hours.  
School quality characteristics also influence selection into school.  For example, an 
increased student teacher ratio in primary schools lowers selection into schools by 
.014.  In most villages, only one school exists which minimizes concerns that school 
choice could be explaining variation in child labor and schooling outcomes.   In the 
next section, production and health shocks are used to identify labor substitution 
patterns within the household.   
Impact of Health and Crop Loss Shocks on Children’s Work and Schooling 
Before estimating the effects of production and morbidity shocks on child labor and 
schooling variables, the exogeneity test described by Equation 22 was conducted.  
Table 3.9 reports these results.  The probability that a production or morbidity shock 
was reported does not increase with parental education in this sample.  Reporting of 
large production shocks actually decreases with parental education by 8 percent for 
mothers and 6 percent for fathers.  Some asset variables are correlated with production 
shocks and male morbidity.  However, all but one of the four significant coefficients is 
greater than .01 and over half are actually negative.  Seasonal indicators that 
potentially control for the timing of the interview to the recall period for the shock, are 
only positive in the reporting of child morbidity shocks during the harvest period.  The 
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harvest period indicator increases the probability a child illness shock is reported by 
.1.  Despite a few correlations, there is not a strong argument for the endogenity of 
these reported shocks based on observable household characteristics within this 
sample.   
Table 3.9:  Determinants of the Incidence of Shocks 
  
Large 
Production 
Shocks 
Small 
Production 
Shocks 
 Adult  
Child Sick 
Adult 
Male Sick 
Female 
Sick 
Household Composition           
Number of girls 0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.034*** 0.025*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Number of boys 0.022** -0.002 0.008 0.007 0.017** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Number of adult men 0.014 0.007 0.001 0.022** 0.017** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) 
Number of adult women 0.051*** -0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.027*** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Household Assets           
Livestock Value (FCFA) -0.011*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.006 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Herd Size (Number of 
Animals) 0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA) 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) 
Household Durables (FCFA) -0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.006* -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA) -0.004 0.002 -0.023* 0.018** 0.007** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.008) (0.003) 
Parental Education           
Any Mother's Education -0.084** 0.015 -0.010 0.038 0.015 
(1=Yes) (0.042) (0.056) (0.037) (0.070) (0.034) 
Any Father's Education -0.058* 0.076 0.003 0.010 -0.026 
(1=Yes) (0.033) (0.047) (0.038) (0.039) (0.021) 
Age of HH Head -0.001 -0.003*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age of HH Head's spouse 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 3.9 (Continued) 
  
Large 
Production 
Shocks 
Small 
Production 
Shocks 
Adult  
Male Sick 
Adult 
Female 
Sick 
 Child 
Sick 
Community Characteristics           
Access to River -0.227*** -0.006 -0.025 -0.029 0.040 
(1=Yes) (0.061) (0.064) (0.043) (0.056) (0.033) 
Season Interviewed           
Post-harvest  -0.097 -0.053 0.101 0.082 -0.030 
 (0.070) (0.103) (0.095) (0.086) (0.041) 
Harvest -0.034 0.033 0.007 0.076 0.103** 
 (0.052) (0.074) (0.033) (0.051) (0.049) 
Observations 1859 1859 1859 1859 1859 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Controlling for random effects, the effects of shocks are statistically significant for 
agricultural shocks and health shocks to women making participation decisions across 
schooling and work activities.  Table 3.10 presents the results of the probit model with 
random effects and shocks.  Large and small crop shocks induce higher participation 
by children in farm work.  Both types of crop shocks decrease the probability of 
working in the family business, with large crop losses having much larger magnitudes 
than small crop losses.  A large crop loss increases the child’s probability they will be 
withdrawn from school, while significantly decreasing children’s participation in 
providing childcare to other children and the joint production of market and schooling 
activities.  Small crop losses increase children’s childcare to other children in the 
household, but the effect is opposite for large crop losses.  This may confirm the 
hypothesis that adults, when fully occupied responding to smaller crop losses, leave 
children to increasingly care for themselves in these minor crises.  However, as the 
magnitude of the shock increases, the household may be forced to mobilize all 
available labor to either salvage a harvest quickly or replant before the rainy season 
passes completely.   
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Table 3.10.A: Marginal Effects of Shocks on Children’s 
 Participation in Work and School 
  
Withdrawn 
from  
School 
Farm 
Work 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Market-
School 
Home-
School 
Market-
Home 
Large Crop 
Loss 2.049** 1.046*** -4.826*** -0.603 -0.853** -0.413 -0.495 
 (1.026) (0.293) (0.754) (0.395) (0.366) (0.300) (0.511) 
Small Crop 
Loss 0.315 0.809*** -1.469* 0.549 0.615* 0.401 -0.04 
 (0.882) (0.274) (0.779) (0.384) (0.328) (0.275) (0.481) 
Adult Male 
Sick 0.709 0.283 -0.296 0.0229 0.065 0.342 -0.304 
(1=Yes) (0.853) (0.280) (0.814) (0.364) (0.326) (0.272) (0.497) 
Adult Female 
Sick 1.506* 0.207 2.424*** 0.849* 0.228 0.37 2.051*** 
(1=Yes) (0.869) (0.297) (0.742) (0.445) (0.346) (0.286) (0.599) 
Child Sick -0.212 -0.133 -1.246 -0.0326 -0.122 -0.143 0.308 
(1=Yes) (0.966) (0.327) (0.821) (0.464) (0.392) (0.324) (0.620) 
Observations 761 1859 1859 1859 1859 1859 1859 
Number of 
households 483 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All covariates are estimated in the regression, but only the 
shock results are displayed. Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.  * significant at 10%  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 3.10.B: Multivariate Probit Estimates 
 
  Withdrawl 
Farm 
Work 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Large Crop Loss 0.832*** 1.010*** -1.045*** -0.903* 
      (0.290)  (0.312)     (0.324)     (0.504) 
Small Crop Loss 0.257 0.643** 0.178 -0.41 
       (0.266)     (0.299)    (0.239)    (0.309) 
Adult Male Sick 0.412 0.213 0.305 0.254 
(1=Yes)      (0.369)    (0.243)     (0.367)     (0.231) 
Adult Female 
Sick 0.545** 0.12 0.736*** 0.611** 
(1=Yes)      (0.243)    (0.224)    (0.264)   (0.263) 
Child Sick -0.033 0.184 -0.248 0.100 
(1=Yes)      (0.252)    (0.276)    (0.273)    (0.336) 
Observations 761 761 761 761 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in  
FCFA are multiplied by 100,000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$.  All covariates are  
estimated in the regression, but only the shock results are displayed. Absolute value  
of z statistics are in parentheses.  * significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1%.  
Health shocks to women have large substitution effects on the participation of children 
across school and work activities
28
.  A sick adult women in the household increases 
the probability that a child will be withdrawn from school, work in the family 
business, and that a child will watch other siblings.  These results suggest that children 
are substitutes for women when female labor supply is reduced in the household by 
illness, as women’s primary role in the household, apart from domestic tasks are 
small-scale family businesses that usually rely on household labor.   
                                                 
28
 A robustness check was conducted to verify whether differences in the definition of a health shock 
altered significantly the results.  The current definition of the health shock is whether an individual 
reported being sick at all in the previous month.  As a robustness check, at least a week of sickness was 
used in the analysis.  The results were not significantly different, though a few of the variables were no 
longer significant.  This may be because the incidence of illness is already small in the sample when the 
illness variable is constructed as being ―sick at least one day in the past month‖.  Because there is a 
higher tolerance for poor health someone who says they were sick may still understate the days they 
were sick or didn’t work due to sickness.  For this reason, the current construction of the health shock 
was maintained.  
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It is important to note in the interpretation of these coefficients that it is likely high 
substitution of child labor into income generating activities such as farming or the 
family business in the presence of shocks is caused in part to poor labor market 
integration in Northern Mali.  Due to the spatial dispersion of the population and its 
low density, transportation costs are quite high between villages.  Hiring in labor on 
short notice is difficult in rural areas.  Even in larger towns, households will schedule 
seasonal laborers to meet labor demand at crucial times in the crop production cycle.  
Therefore, when shocks occur, mobilizing labor is most easily undertaken within the 
family.    
Shock-Asset Interactions with Random Effects 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 present the results that investigate the role of assets in mitigating 
shocks, controlling for random effects.  The value of asset stocks have significant 
effects when interacted with crop shocks.  Higher levels of durable assets decrease the 
probability a child works on the farm in response to a large production shock. 
Agricultural capital interacted with the large crop loss shock lowers the selection of 
children into childcare or into the joint production of market and home production 
with schooling.  Livestock values interacted with small crop losses increase child 
participation in joint market production and schooling.  As noted in the discussion of 
the econometric specification above, a strictly causal interpretation is difficult without 
a detailed panel data set.  However, these results are broadly consistent with the 
hypothesis that different asset types have varying interactions with child labor based 
on the ex-post responses available to the household who holds different portfolios of 
assets.  For example, a household who holds high levels of agricultural capital has less 
labor intensive responses to production shocks which is reflect in the lower 
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probabilities children are engaged in joint production activities.  Durable assets reduce 
the probability a child works on the farm in response to idiosyncratic production 
shocks because the household faces fewer liquidity constraints in hiring in labor.  
However, the magnitude of the durable-shock interaction coefficients in comparison to 
the agricultural capital-shock coefficients are lower because poor labor market 
integration still constrains the household’s response.    
Table 3.11: Probit—Crop Shocks with Asset Interactions and Random Effects 
 
 
Withdrawn 
from 
School 
Farm 
Work Child Care 
Market-
School 
Home-
School 
Market-
Home 
Durables x -0.526 -0.135* 0.097 0.119 0.060 -0.032 
Large Crop Loss (0.356) (0.076) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.143) 
       
Durables x -0.093 -0.078 -0.035 0.044 0.027 -0.334 
Small Crop Loss (0.345) (0.062) (0.033) (0.054) (0.046) (0.215) 
       
Agricultural 2.395 -0.025 -2.767*** -1.431* -2.107** -1.357 
Capital x (1.957) (0.580) (1.025) (0.865) (0.929) (1.247) 
Large Crop Loss       
       
Agricultural  0.886 -0.379 0.664 0.196 -0.338 -0.342 
Capital x (2.256) (0.473) (0.876) (0.520) (0.491) (0.859) 
Small Crop Loss       
       
Livestock Value x -0.363 0.009 0.034 0.075 0.076 0.104 
Large Crop Loss (0.263) (0.053) (0.076) (0.072) (0.064) (0.096) 
       
Livestock Value x -0.157 -0.037 -0.023 0.064** 0.012 0.041 
Small Crop Loss (0.131) (0.028) (0.048) (0.032) (0.026) (0.058) 
Observations 761 1859 1859 1859 1859 1859 
Number of hid 483 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are multiplied 
by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$.  All covariates estimated in the regression, but only asset 
interactions are displayed. Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.  * significant at 10%  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 3.12:  Probit—Health Shocks with Asset Interactions and Random Effects 
  
Withdrawn  
Farm 
Work 
Child 
Care 
Market-
School 
Home-
School 
Market-
Home 
from 
School 
Durables x -0.365 -0.217** -0.197* -0.099 0.046 -0.350** 
Sick Male (0.328) (0.102) (0.118) (0.107) (0.091) (0.171) 
       
Durables x 0.409 0.063 -0.125 -0.105 -0.124 -0.184 
Sick Female (0.313) (0.097) (0.144) (0.124) (0.113) (0.237) 
       
Durables x 0.428 0.012 0.109 0.005 -0.030 -0.031 
Sick Child (0.367) (0.057) (0.158) (0.040) (0.056) (0.234) 
       
Agricultural 0.059 0.075 0.034 0.059 0.004 -0.008 
Capital X (0.480) (0.059) (0.114) (0.094) (0.062) (0.150) 
Sick Male       
       
Agricultural  0.702 0.067 1.253 1.212* 0.502 1.023 
Capital x (1.680) (0.594) (0.843) (0.713) (0.611) (1.357) 
Sick Female       
       
Agricultural  0.214 -0.101 -1.920* -1.023 -0.467 -1.287 
Capital x (2.649) (0.748) (1.039) (0.861) (0.758) (1.522) 
Sick Child       
       
Livestock 
Value 0.177 0.164*** 0.157** 0.090 0.046 0.160* 
x Sick Male (0.149) (0.063) (0.070) (0.057) (0.049) (0.090) 
       
Livestock 
Value -0.273 -0.093* -0.073 0.085 0.143** 0.034 
x Sick Female (0.198) (0.054) (0.078) (0.059) (0.056) (0.121) 
       
Livestock 
Value -0.334 -0.034 0.076 -0.032 -0.138** 0.022 
X Sick Child (0.345) (0.068) (0.096) (0.061) (0.057) (0.126) 
Observations 761 1859 1859 1859 1859 1859 
Number of hid 483 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 
Notes:  All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100 000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$. All covariates estimated in the regression, but only 
asset interaction results displayed.  Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.  * significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Assets are also fundamental to the household’s ex-post response to health shocks.  
Durables stocks decrease the probability that a child works on the farm in response to 
the sickness of an adult male in the household.  Durables also decrease selection into 
childcare and the joint activities of market and home production.  When adult men fall 
ill, livestock values interacted with the shocks increase child participation in farming, 
childcare, and joint market and home production.  When adult females fall ill, 
livestock values interacted with the shock increase participation in farm work, child 
care, and joint market production and schooling.  This suggests that child labor and 
some asset types may be complementary, in contrast to the literature on consumption 
smoothing, which suggests assets help insure households against falling into poverty.  
While this may be true in the short term, if shocks induce households to withdraw 
children from school and assets provide no insurance against this response to shocks, 
lower human capital of children may lead to increased levels of future poverty.   When 
adults fall ill, assets, specifically durables, are the only types of assets that insure 
children against higher participation in market and home production activities.  
Verifying the Assumptions of the Random Effects Estimator 
The assumptions of strict exogeneity, independence of dependent variables 
conditioned on the unobservable effect and independent variables, and independence 
of the independent variables and the unobservable effect are strong. But these 
assumptions are necessary given the extensive literature that suggests that household 
effects such as parental education and assets influence child labor and schooling 
participation.  While likelihood ratio tests that the unobserved effect is absent were 
rejected in all equations at the 5 percent significance level, this only confirms the 
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presence of an unobservable, not the conditions under which it can consistently 
estimate the parameters.     
Using a small subset of child panel data with observations from 1997 and 2006, 
estimates of Equation 23 are reported in Table 3.13.  While sickness data for all 
household members from 1997 is not available, crop loss shock data is available.  If 
strict exogeneity is violated, coefficients from crop loss shocks in 1997 should have 
significant effects.  However, this is not the case in the data.  Asset-shock interactions 
for 1997 are also not significant in regression results.  While this evidence supports the 
strict exogeneity hypothesis, the absence of significant effects may be due to the 
relatively small sample size rather than the actual absence of a lagged effect.   
Table 3.13: Panel Estimates 
 School Farm 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Large Crop Loss 2006 0.0003** -0.069 0.076 -0.366*** 
 (.000)    (0.273)    (0.115) (0.135) 
Large Crop Loss 1997 6.60E-07 0.043 -0.305 -0.053 
 (0.000)    (0.076)    (0.227)    (0.206) 
Asset-Shock Interaction 2006 -5.50E-06*** 0.099*** 0.043** -0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.020) (0.042) 
Asset-Shock Interaction 1997 6.65E-08 -0.0613 0.115** -0.05 
  (0.000)    (0.099) (0.048) (-.085) 
Observations 186 186 186 186 
Notes: Regression controls for gender, ethnicity, and parent's education.   Robust standard  
errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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To provide additional evidence for the strict exogeneity hypothesis, the sample was 
disaggregated according to younger (ages 10-13) and older (ages 14-17) cohorts using 
the full cross-section.  If strict exogeneity is violated, there should be distinct 
differences in parameter estimates for asset stocks and household composition 
variables if changes in these variables in subsequent periods have persistent effects on 
current child time allocation.  Presumably, the older cohort would have been exposed 
to more of these lagged changes, which would result in systematic differences between 
the two cohorts.  However, this pattern does not appear in the sample
29
.  Parameter 
estimates, especially for assets, have small differences in magnitude and do not differ 
in significance across cohorts.   
Pooling Child Labor and Schooling Equations by Gender 
Given the importance of gender in our initial estimates of child labor and schooling, 
the sample was disaggregated to evaluate differences in parameter estimates by gender 
and the pooling of girls and boys.  These results are presented in Tables 3.14.A and 
3.14.B.  Differences between boys and girls are most pronounced in the schooling 
participation equation.  Girls that are biological children of the head of household are 
50 percent more likely to attend school than girls who are not biological children.  
Asset values measured either by livestock value or durable goods increase boys’ 
school participation by 5-6 percent per increase of 100 000 FCFA, while assets have 
no effect on girls’ schooling.  Parental education also has differential impacts on girls 
and boys.  Any mother’s education increases by 69 percent the selection probability on 
boys’ schooling than for girls’ schooling.  Any father’s education has a 53 percent 
                                                 
29
 These regression results are available on request, but are suppressed for brevity.   
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greater impact on girls.  Despite these differences in magnitude, having either an 
educated mother or father greatly increases the child’s probability of attending school.   
Table 3.14.A:  Participation Equations Controlling for Household  
Random Effects, Disaggregated by Gender 
  School   Farm   
Sample 
Restriction Girls Boys Difference Girls Boys Difference 
Household 
Composition             
Biological 
child indicator 0.762** 0.195 0.567 -0.055 -0.496 0.441 
 (0.338) (0.237)  (0.487) (0.491)  
Number of 
girls -0.021 0.111 -0.132 -0.257 -0.325* 0.068 
 (0.117) (0.086)  (0.198) (0.194)  
Number of 
boys 0.018 0.042 -0.0234 0.086 -0.383** 0.469 
 (0.105) (0.074)  (0.174) (0.172)  
Number of 
adult men -0.071 -0.177* 0.106 0.007 0.202 -0.195 
 (0.137) (0.093)  (0.228) (0.218)  
Number of 
adult women -0.024 0.117 -0.141 0.260 0.221 0.039 
 (0.136) (0.105)  (0.264) (0.269)  
Household 
Assets and 
Unearned 
Income             
Livestock 
Value (FCFA) 0.022 0.066** -0.045 -0.044 -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.023) (0.026)  (0.038) (0.033)  
Herd Size 
(Number of 
Animals) -0.015 -0.012 -0.002 0.036** 0.021 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.009)  (0.016) (0.015)  
Agricultural 
Capital 
(FCFA) -0.013 -0.000 -0.013 -0.156 0.075 -0.231 
 (0.035) (0.010)  (0.348) (0.079)  
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Table 3.14.A (Continued) 
  School   Farm   
Sample 
Restriction Girls Boys Difference Girls Boys Difference 
Household 
Durables 
(FCFA) 0.006 0.043 -0.038 -0.062 -0.011 -0.051 
 (0.009) (0.029)  (0.065) (0.016)  
Migrant 
Remittances 
(FCFA) -0.090* -0.038 -0.052 -0.066 -0.176* 0.110 
 (0.051) (0.043)  (0.118) (0.107)  
Adult 
Characteristics             
Any Mother's 
Education 0.975* 1.592*** -0.617 1.537 -0.183 1.720 
(1=Yes) (0.530) (0.429)  (0.936) (0.835)  
Any Father's 
Education 1.500*** 0.619** 0.881 -0.716 -0.541 -0.175 
(1=Yes) (0.448) (0.293)  (0.755) (0.687)  
Age of HH 
Head -0.002 -0.008* 0.006 0.007 0.012 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.012) (0.011)  
Age of HH 
Head's spouse 0.013 0.006 0.008 -0.016 -0.027 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.007)  (0.016) (0.017)  
School 
Characteristics             
Primary 
School in 
Village 2.393** 2.120*** 0.273 0.593 -2.121 2.714 
 (1.005) (0.716)  (1.363) (1.317)  
Secondary 
School in 
Village 0.176 1.252*** -1.076 -0.886 -0.986 0.100 
 (0.434) (0.324)  (0.724) (0.648)  
High School in 
Village 1.213 -0.238 1.451 0.388 -0.375 0.763 
 (0.813) (0.552)  (1.402) (1.148)  
Observations 833 1026   833 1026   
Number of hid 629 704   629 704   
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per 
commune, ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not 
displayed.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
82 
 
Table 3.14.B:  Participation Equations Controlling for Household  
Random Effects, Disaggregated by Gender 
  Family Business   Child Care   
Sample 
Restriction Girls Boys Difference Girls Boys Difference 
Household 
Composition             
Biological child 
indicator -1.152* 0.365 -1.517 -1.187* -0.676 -0.511 
 (0.647) (0.547)  (0.666) (0.432)  
Number of girls -0.367 0.029 -0.396 1.094*** 0.692*** 0.402 
 (0.353) (0.246)  (0.328) (0.191)  
Number of boys 0.209 -0.030 0.239 0.582** 0.152 0.43 
 (0.226) (0.189)  (0.260) (0.142)  
Number of adult 
men -0.0364 -0.611*** 0.5746 -0.975** -0.604*** -0.371 
 (0.297) (0.212)  (0.442) (0.174)  
Number of adult 
women -0.358 0.507 -0.865 -0.690** -0.015 0.705 
 (0.380) (0.310)  (0.310) (0.192)  
Household Assets 
and Unearned 
Income             
Livestock Value 
(FCFA) -0.021 -0.076* -0.097 -0.040 -0.082* -0.122 
 (0.053) (0.043)  (0.061) (0.049)  
Herd Size 
(Number of 
Animals) -0.021 -0.001 -0.020 -0.012 0.026 -0.039 
 (0.023) (0.016)  (0.027) (0.017)  
Agricultural 
Capital (FCFA) 0.021 0.001 0.020 0.048 0.015 0.033 
 (0.051) (0.021)  (0.040) (0.022)  
Household 
Durables (FCFA) 0.008 0.012 -0.005 0.039 0.016 0.023 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.046) (0.038)  
Migrant 
Remittances 
(FCFA) -0.088 0.102 -0.190 -0.107 -0.036 -0.072 
 (0.120) (0.065)  (0.147) (0.128)  
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Table 3.14.B (Continued) 
  Family Business 
 
Child Care 
 Sample 
Restriction Girls Boys Difference Girls Boys Difference 
Adult 
Characteristics             
Any Mother's 
Education 2.976** 1.143 1.833 3.190** 2.807*** 0.383 
(1=Yes) (1.399) (1.025)  (1.407) (0.925)  
Any Father's 
Education -2.175** -1.316 -0.859 0.196 -0.795 0.991 
(1=Yes) (1.056) (0.841)  (0.931) (0.614)  
Age of HH Head -0.026 -0.010 -0.015 0.031* 0.025** 0.006 
 (0.016) (0.014)  (0.017) (0.010)  
Age of HH Head's 
spouse 0.043* 0.022 0.021 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.024) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.014)  
School 
Characteristics             
Primary School in 
Village 5.241** 2.147 3.094 -0.507 0.351 -0.858 
 (2.213) (1.585)  (1.821) (1.075)  
Secondary School 
in Village -0.969 -1.295 0.326 -0.540 0.829 -1.369 
 (1.111) (0.795)  (1.000) (0.636)  
High School in 
Village 0.286 -1.891 2.177 6.395*** 3.326*** 3.069 
 (2.113) (1.697)  (1.811) (1.098)  
Observations 833 1026   833 1026   
Number of hid 629 704   629 704   
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per commune, 
ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not displayed.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robustness Check:  Family Composition 
Because of additions of new family members either through fostering or new child 
births, family composition variables should be considered endogenous in a structural 
model of household decision-making.  These data do not contain plausible instruments 
to correct for the possible correlation between family composition variables and 
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unobservables.  To test whether this potential endogeneity affects parameter estimates, 
the previous probit model with household level random effects is re-estimated by 
omitting various combinations of the family composition variables to test the stability 
of the parameters
30
.  The parameters of assets, parental education, gender, age effects, 
and community characteristics are stable across various combinations of assumptions 
about the family composition variables.  All variables that had previously been 
significant remained significant with parameter estimates that were within reasonable 
levels of variation.   
Controlling for Village-Level Fixed and Random Effects 
An alternative to the household level random effects model previously estimated is to 
assume that there are no household-level effects, but only village-level effects that 
influence child time allocation.  These village effects could be social norms or 
political influence.  Social norms may affect whether children are encouraged to go to 
school as a result of the village overriding parental preferences that may differ with 
the norm.   Political influence may determine whether the village is able to attract 
public investment such as schools, roads, or market location, which affects children’s 
opportunity costs of attending school and working.  
Tables 3.15.A and 3.15.B present the results under the assumption of no village 
effects, village fixed effects, and village random effects.  There are differences in both 
parameter estimates and the significance of parameters under these three assumptions.  
This suggests that appropriately specifying the equation of interest is quite important 
to the empirical results.  Regardless of specification, gender is a significant 
                                                 
30
 These regression results are available on request, but omitted for brevity.  
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determinant of participation with similar signs across the specifications, but different 
parameter estimates.  The number of boys is significant under the random and fixed 
effects specification for schooling.  For the farm fixed effects specification the number 
of boys remains significant, but is insignificant under the random effects specification.  
Village random effects also suggest significance at the 1 percent level for mother’s 
and father’s education, whereas fixed effects only capture a significant effect for 
father’s education.  The parameter estimates in the fixed effects specification are also 
quite similar to the no effects specification. 
 
Table 3.15.A:  Comparison of No Village Level Effects,  
Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimates 
 
  School Farm 
Unobservables 
Assumption No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects 
Boy Indicator -0.008 -0.045 0.014 0.412*** 0.499*** 1.048*** 
      (0.038)    (0.060)    (0.087)      (0.053)      (0.069)      (0.084) 
Household 
Composition       
Biological 
child indicator 0.053 0.033 0.122 0.069 0.041 0.040 
      (0.041)  (0.063)    (0.099)      (0.046)      (0.056)      (0.092) 
Number of girls 0.013 0.024 0.020 -0.048*** -0.046** -0.073** 
      (0.013)    (0.019)    (0.033)      (0.015)      (0.021)      (0.031) 
Number of 
boys 0.0035 0.043** 0.052* -0.038** -0.038* -0.035 
      (0.012)    (0.018)    (0.029)      (0.016)      (0.022)      (0.026) 
Number of 
adult men -0.015 -0.016 -0.071* 0.023 0.037 0.028 
      (0.014)    (0.022)    (0.038)      (0.017)      (0.023)      (0.033) 
Number of 
adult women 0.009 -0.017 0.018 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.050 
      (0.020)    (0.030)    (0.040)      (0.021)      (0.024)      (0.036) 
       
       
86 
 
Table 3.15.A (Continued) 
  School Farm 
Unobservables 
Assumption No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects 
Household 
Assets and 
Unearned 
Income       
Livestock 
Value (FCFA) 0.007** 0.004 0.014** -0.002 -0.010* -0.007 
      (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.007)      (0.004)      (0.005)      (0.006) 
Herd Size 
(Number of 
Animals) -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 0.002* 0.003 0.003 
      (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003)      (0.001)      (0.002)      (0.003) 
Agricultural 
Capital (FCFA) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002** 0.004*** 0.007 
      (0.001)   (0.002)    (0.005)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.005) 
Household 
Durables 
(FCFA) 0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 
      (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.005)      (0.005)      (0.006)      (0.008) 
Migrant 
Remittances 
(FCFA) -0.008 -0.011 -0.026* -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.033* 
       (0.005)    (0.008)    (0.015)      (0.008)      (0.006)      (0.018) 
Adult 
Characteristics       
Any Mother's 
Education 0.142 0.129 0.533*** -0.074 -0.093 0.139 
(1=Yes)      (0.107)    (0.117)    (0.141)      (0.113)      (0.147)      (0.147) 
Any Father's 
Education 0.128* 0.168** 0.515*** -0.068 -0.107 -0.231** 
(1=Yes)      (0.070)    (0.081)    (0.107)      (0.064)      (0.075)      (0.109) 
Age of HH 
Head -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003* 
      (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.002)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.002) 
Age of HH 
Head's spouse 0.002 0.004* 0.004 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006** 
      (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.003)      (0.001)      (0.002)      (0.003) 
School 
Characteristics       
Primary School 
in Village 0.349*** -0.540*** 1.128*** -0.097 -0.316*** -0.067 
      (0.048)    (0.018)    (0.428)      (0.113)      (0.063)      (0.302) 
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Table 3.15.A (Continued) 
  School Farm 
Unobservables 
Assumption No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects 
Secondary 
School in 
Village 0.150** -0.814*** 0.451* -0.047 0.355*** -0.306 
      (0.059)    (0.021)    (0.233)      (0.066)      (0.083)      (0.196) 
High School in 
Village 0.049 0.352*** 0.446 0.128 0.216** -0.346 
       (0.104)      (0.070)    (0.474)      (0.152)      (0.106)      (0.399) 
Observations 1859 1429 1859 1859 1708 1859 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per commune, 
ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not displayed.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 3.15.B:  Comparison of No Village Level Effects,  
Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimates 
  Family Business Child Care 
Unobservables 
Assumption No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects 
Boy Indicator -0.082*** -0.101*** -0.162 -0.156*** -0.185*** -0.347*** 
      (0.022)      (0.038)      (0.100)      (0.042)      (0.054)      (0.096) 
Household 
Composition       
Biological 
child indicator 0.038 0.035 -0.111 -0.020 -0.070 -0.292*** 
      (0.036)      (0.064)      (0.107)      (0.050)      (0.075)      (0.105) 
Number of 
girls 0.004 -0.002 -0.085** 0.097*** 0.114*** 0.216*** 
      (0.012)      (0.023)      (0.039)      (0.024)      (0.037)      (0.038) 
Number of 
boys -0.015 -0.010 0.012 0.053*** 0.077*** 0.058* 
      (0.011)      (0.019)      (0.032)      (0.019)      (0.028)      (0.030) 
Number of 
adult men -0.012 0.005 -0.032 -0.050** -0.086*** -0.184*** 
      (0.013)      (0.026)      (0.043)      (0.020)      (0.028)      (0.042) 
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Table 3.15.B (Continued) 
  Family Business Child Care 
Unobservables 
Assumption No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects 
Number of 
adult women -0.000 -0.013 0.055 -0.038** -0.046 -0.106** 
      (0.017)      (0.034)      (0.048)      (0.018)      (0.031)      (0.046) 
Household 
Assets and 
Unearned 
Income       
Livestock 
Value (FCFA) -0.000 -0.001 -0.010* -0.008 -0.008 -0.016 
      (0.003)      (0.004)      (0.006)      (0.005)      (0.006)      (0.010) 
Herd Size 
(Number of 
Animals) -0.000 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.006 
      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.003)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.004) 
Agricultural 
Capital 
(FCFA) -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004** 0.008 
      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.006)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.007) 
Household 
Durables 
(FCFA) 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.006 
      (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.002)      (0.003)      (0.003)      (0.007) 
Migrant 
Remittances 
(FCFA) 0.005 0.008 0.013 -0.010 -0.009 -0.031 
       (0.007)      (0.010)      (0.013)      (0.011)      (0.012)      (0.024) 
Adult 
Characteristics       
Any Mother's 
Education 0.068 0.060 0.351** 0.078 0.146 0.785*** 
(1=Yes)      (0.058)      (0.117)      (0.163)      (0.109)      (0.121)      (0.183) 
Any Father's 
Education -0.107 -0.103 -0.227* 0.036 0.084 -0.021 
(1=Yes)      (0.069)      (0.106)      (0.125)      (0.078)      (0.093)      (0.128) 
Age of HH 
Head -0.001 -0.002 -0.006*** 0.002* 0.002 0.005** 
      (0.001)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.001)      (0.002)      (0.002) 
Age of HH 
Head's spouse 0.000 -0.002 0.006* -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
      (0.001)     (0.002)      (0.003)      (0.001)      (0.002)      (0.003) 
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Table 3.15.B (Continued) 
  Family Business Child Care 
Unobservables 
Assumption No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects No effects 
Village 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village 
Random 
Effects 
Primary 
School in 
Village 0.394** 0.297*** 0.911 0.027 0.442*** 0.052 
      (0.165)      (0.111)      (0.655)      (0.147)      (0.076)      (0.433) 
Secondary 
School in 
Village -0.122 0.889*** -0.047 0.000 0.374*** 0.199 
      (0.083)      (0.027)      (0.455)      (0.078)      (0.114)      (0.285) 
High School in 
Village -0.042 0.445*** -0.408 0.549*** 0.103 1.774*** 
       (0.185)      (0.011)      (0.938)      (0.094)      (0.180)      (0.604) 
Observations 1859 1264 1859 1859 1376 1859 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per commune, 
ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not displayed.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The Multivariate Probit Model 
The final econometric specification to be estimated controls for cross-equation 
correlations using a multivariate probit model (Table 3.16).  Parameter estimates are 
generally smaller than in the household-level random effects specification, but patterns 
of significance among the covariates are similar.  One notable exception is mother’s 
education, which is significant in the household level random effects specification, but 
insignificant under the multivariate probit.  Migrant remittances have negative effects 
on the probability that a child participates in farm work, which is not captured in the 
random effects specification.  
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Table 3.16: Multivariate Probit Estimates 
  School 
Farm 
Work 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Boy Indicator -0.039 1.089*** -0.286*** -0.406*** 
      (0.118)      (0.154)         (0.082)      (0.110) 
Household Composition     
Biological child indicator 0.145 0.171 0.143 -0.0273 
      (0.132)      (0.113)         (0.123)      (0.127) 
Number of girls 0.043 -0.117*** 0.015 0.262*** 
      (0.039)      (0.038) 
          
(0.045)      (0.061) 
Number of boys 0.015 -0.092** -0.055 0.134*** 
      (0.035)      (0.040) 
          
(0.040)      (0.049) 
Number of adult men -0.037 0.057 -0.042 -0.119** 
      (0.042)      (0.044) 
          
(0.042)      (0.051) 
Number of adult women 0.018 0.158*** -0.002 -0.092* 
      (0.060)      (0.052)         (0.061)      (0.048) 
Household Assets and 
Unearned Income     
Livestock Value (FCFA) 0.022** -0.006 -0.000 -0.020 
      (0.011)      (0.010)         (0.009)      (0.013) 
Herd Size (Number of 
Animals) -0.003 0.005* -0.001 0.002 
      (0.005)      (0.003)         (0.003)      (0.004) 
Agricultural Capital 
(FCFA) 0.005 0.006** -0.005 0.009 
      (0.004)      (0.003)         (0.007)      (0.006) 
Household Durables 
(FCFA) 0.003 -0.012 0.001 0.009 
      (0.004)      (0.011)         (0.002)      (0.007) 
Migrant Remittances 
(FCFA) -0.027* -0.071*** 0.017 -0.026 
      (0.016)      (0.022)         (0.025)      (0.026) 
Parental Education     
Any Mother's Education 0.395 -0.218 0.243 0.261 
(1=Yes)      (0.284)      (0.288)         (0.266)      (0.275) 
Any Father's Education 0.377** -0.172 -0.320 0.072 
(1=Yes)      (0.180)      (0.164)         (0.204)      (0.191) 
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Table 3.16 (Continued) 
  School 
Farm 
Work 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Age of HH Head -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005 
      (0.002)      (0.003)         (0.003)      (0.003) 
Age of HH Head's spouse 0.006 -0.011*** 0.001 -0.003 
      (0.004)      (0.003)         (0.004)      (0.004) 
Community Characteristics     
Access to River -0.118 -0.256 0.185 0.104 
(1=Yes)      (0.169)      (0.196)         (0.238)      (0.194) 
Roads     
within 1-10km 0.553*** 0.354 0.240 0.561* 
      (0.187)      (0.290)         (0.267)      (0.312) 
within 11-20km 0.474** 0.199 0.208 0.537 
      (0.225)      (0.283)         (0.368)      (0.336) 
greater than 20km 0.878*** 0.432 0.416 0.808** 
      (0.255)      (0.351)         (0.358)      (0.349) 
Commune Population     
less than 5000 people 0.653 -0.079 -0.402 -0.943** 
      (0.474)      (0.387)         (0.559)      (0.470) 
5-10,000 people -0.192 -0.545* 0.789* -0.497 
      (0.302)      (0.285)         (0.436)      (0.377) 
10-20,000 people 0.102 0.941*** -1.115*** -0.838*** 
      (0.279)      (0.243)         (0.340)      (0.275) 
Villages per Commune     
fewer than 10 0.309 2.109*** -2.492*** -0.636 
      (0.503)      (0.470)         (0.727)      (0.684) 
11-20 villages 0.563* 1.412*** -1.852*** -0.467 
      (0.324)      (0.356)         (0.497)      (0.458) 
21-30 villages 0.167 0.488 -0.832** 0.440 
      (0.292)      (0.307)         (0.421)      (0.361) 
School Characteristics:  
Primary     
Primary School in Village 1.711*** -0.233 1.094** 0.086 
      (0.470)      (0.297)         (0.448)      (0.390) 
Primary School within 1-
5km 1.029* -0.066 0.835* -0.096 
      (0.548)      (0.338)         (0.437)      (0.402) 
Primary School farther than 
5km -0.124 -0.217 1.112* 0.158 
      (0.594)      (0.442)         (0.605)      (0.512) 
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Table 3.16 (Continued) 
  School 
Farm 
Work 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Multiple Primary Schools 0.879*** -0.065 0.241 -0.302 
(1=Yes)      (0.220)      (0.241)         (0.335)      (0.334) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.012** 0.001 -0.011** -0.003 
      (0.006)      (0.004)         (0.006)      (0.004) 
Secondary School in 
Village 0.439*** -0.122 -0.420* -0.004 
      (0.165)      (0.169)         (0.253)      (0.203) 
High School in Village 0.133 0.308 -0.0792 1.792*** 
      (0.297)      (0.418)         (0.618)      (0.609) 
Constant -2.243*** -1.702*** 0.997 -1.907*** 
       (0.586)      (0.570)         (0.680)      (0.618) 
Observations 1859 1859 1859 1859 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per 
commune, ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not 
displayed.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
The results of the shock estimates (Table 3.10) under the multivariate probit model are 
quite similar to the estimates from the household random effects model.  The 
parameter estimates are lower, but the patterns of significance remain constant.  Of 
particular interest is the change in the child’s participation in the family business in 
response to large crop loss shocks.  The parameter estimate is almost four times less 
under the multivariate probit specification.  Tables 3.17 and 3.18 present the results 
for the asset-shock interactions.  These results differ significantly from the household-
level random effects specification.  For the crop loss shocks, durables have a 
duplicitous role depending on the magnitude of the shock.  Interactions with large crop 
loss shocks have significant and negative impacts on the child’s selection into the 
family business.  Durable-small crop loss shock interactions raise the probability that a 
child will work in the family business.  Livestock values interacted with large crop 
shocks lower the probability a child is withdrawn from school, suggesting that assets 
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that are more liquid may serve as an alternative to changes in children’s time 
allocation in response to crop shocks.  In response to adult sicknesses, durables lower 
the probability that children are withdrawn from school when men are sick and the 
probability children work in the family business when women are sick.  When women 
are sick, higher levels of durables increase the probability a child is withdrawn from 
school and participates in farm work.  Livestock values have opposite effects on the 
probability a child is withdrawn from school when adults are sick.  When men are 
sick, increased livestock value increases the probability a child is withdrawn from 
school, reflecting the increased labor demand to care for animals.  When women are 
sick, increased livestock value lowers the probability a child is withdrawn from 
school.   
Table 3.17:  Multivariate Probit Asset-Crop Loss Shock Interactions 
Interactions 
Withdrawn 
from School 
Farm 
Work 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Durables x  -0.084 -0.018 -0.540*** 0.031 
Large Crop Loss      (0.074)     (0.080)      (0.195)      (0.157) 
      
Durables x  0.000 -0.025 0.284** 0.007 
Small Crop Loss      (0.025)     (0.019)      (0.111)      (0.031) 
      
Agricultural Capital x 0.677 -0.056 -2.096** -0.326 
Large Crop Loss       (0.554)     (0.675)      (1.041)      (1.159) 
      
Agricultural Capital x -0.832 0.270 0.527 -0.679 
Small Crop Loss       (0.661)     (0.427)      (0.647)      (0.772) 
      
Livestock Value x -0.188*** -0.026 0.057 -0.204 
Large Crop Loss      (0.070)     (0.052)      (0.061)      (0.141) 
      
Livestock Value x -0.093 0.001 0.025 0.019 
Small Crop Loss      (0.067)     (0.038)      (0.038)      (0.041) 
Observations 761 761 761 761 
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Table 3.17 (Continued) 
Notes:  All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in  
FCFA are multiplied by 100 000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$. All covariates estimated in 
 the regression, but only asset interaction results displayed.  Absolute value of z statistics  
are in parentheses.  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 3.18:  Multivariate Probit Estimates: Asset-Illness Shock Interactions 
Interactions 
Withdrawn 
from 
School 
Farm 
Work 
Family 
Business 
Child 
Care 
Durables x -0.728*** -0.084 -0.010 -0.090 
Sick Male (0.261) (0.074) (0.066) (0.057) 
      
     
Durables x 0.196** 0.104* -0.187** 0.011 
Sick Female      (0.099)  (0.062)     (0.081)     (0.047) 
      
     
Durables x 0.166 0.073 0.149 0.077 
Sick Child      (0.162)    (0.159)   (0.137)   (0.210) 
      
Agricultural Capital X -1.064 0.259 -1.798 -0.169 
Sick Male      (1.217)  (0.652)     (1.101)     (0.135) 
      
Agricultural Capital x -0.816 -0.241 0.170 -0.157 
Sick Female      (0.581)    (0.467)   (0.443)   (0.582) 
      
Agricultural Capital x 1.475 -0.765 1.187 -2.200** 
Sick Child      (1.132)    (0.894)     (1.067)     (1.002) 
      
Livestock Value 0.148*** 0.066 -0.001 0.062** 
x Sick Male      (0.038)    (0.041)     (0.056)     (0.026) 
      
Livestock Value -0.136** -0.102** -0.013 -0.046 
x Sick Female      (0.058)   (0.040)    (0.042)     (0.030) 
      
Livestock Value -0.164 0.060 0.005 -0.015 
X Sick Child (0.112) (0.045) (0.048) (0.076) 
Observations 761 761 761 761 
Notes:  All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in  
FCFA are multiplied by 100 000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$. All covariates estimated  
in the regression, but only asset interaction results displayed.  Absolute value of z  
statistics are in parentheses.  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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VII. Conclusions 
Understanding the mechanisms by which children’s time is allocated to school, home 
production, and market production is fundamental to the development of a broader 
economics of children and the competing opportunity costs of their time.  Children 
conduct multiple domestic and market-oriented production activities for their 
households. These activities directly contribute to income generation or free other 
household members to conduct renumerative activities.  Most children who work 
contribute to household income or to meeting subsistence needs without being 
employed in the worst forms of child labor.  However, participation in work outside of 
the worst forms can have differential effects; either increasing children’s human 
capital from increased work experience or limiting their total time in school or the 
quality of schooling due to work requirements.  Our understanding of child 
participation in market and domestic activities and these welfare effects are relatively 
underdeveloped compared to adult labor supply.   
The model of children’s work and schooling that is developed in Section 2 of this 
chapter explains selection into different activities based on the shadow value of a 
child’s time.  In the econometric specifications, proxies for the myriad of factors that 
may alter the value of the child’s shadow wage include household composition, labor 
market opportunities represented by demographic variables, and school quality 
characteristics.  Household composition and asset values, specifically livestock values, 
influence selection into work and schooling.  Despite low incidences of formal 
education in northern Mali, father’s and mother’s education have large, significant 
point estimates.  Proximity to school influences selection into school under all of our 
econometric specifications.   
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The importance of shocks on child welfare cannot be underestimated.  While 
substitution into and out of market and domestic work is relatively innocuous, save the 
impact of the additional hours, substitution out of schooling has relatively long-term 
welfare consequences for the production of human capital.  Children, once withdrawn 
from school, may have difficulty returning even after a few months of absence.  To 
recuperate the loss of schooling time, children may have to completely repeat grade 
levels.  This ―ratchet‖ effect, that is, the shock’s role of completely halting the process 
of human capital accumulation, holds more serious welfare implications than moving 
into or out of work activities.  From a policy perspective, constructing insurance 
schemes to protect households against shocks have implications not only for 
household consumption, but also for children’s work and schooling.  In addition, these 
results illustrate that when women fall ill, children are substitutes for their home and 
market production.  Investing in women’s health care may have the secondary benefits 
of lifting households out of long-term poverty because children’s schooling would not 
be reduced as often by immediate household labor demands.   
As documented in the literature by such papers as Beegle et al. (2006), assets play a 
substantial role in protecting children from the negative effects of shocks.  This 
chapter provides additional support for this empirical finding with one important 
caveat:  types of assets may differ in providing insurance against shocks.  Not only 
does the type of shock matter (income or labor productivity shock), but whether the 
asset in question is complementary to or a substitute for child labor.  These results 
show that increasing assets such as livestock may have differential effects on child 
labor and schooling, depending on type of shock and who it affects within the 
household.  However, household durables do insure children against adult illness and 
to a lesser extent, production shocks.  More research to understand the interactions 
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between asset types and the impact of shocks on child labor and schooling can 
improve interventions targeted at households that live in risky environments in order 
to reduce poverty in the long term by keeping children in school.    
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CHAPTER 4:  CHANGES IN CHILDREN’S TIME ALLOCATION IN RESPONSE 
TO PRODUCTION AND HEALTH SHOCKS 
I. Introduction 
Excluding the worst forms of child labor, the welfare implications of child labor 
depend on the amount of time that children participate in work relative to schooling 
and the types of work in which they are employed.  Without detailed information on 
the hours of children’s activities, the magnitudes of a shock or a development 
intervention are masked by the analysis of participation variables that are only partial 
components of the distribution of children’s time.  However, increased information 
about the distribution of children’s time comes at the expense of precision because 
hours data are likely to suffer from measurement error.   
This paper has three main contributions.  The first contribution is the estimation of the 
substitution effects induced by production and health shocks on the child’s time 
distribution (schooling, farm work, work in the family business, domestic chores, and 
child care).  Several authors have explored the effects of production shocks on 
children’s time include Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) in India, Jensen (2000) in Côte 
d’Ivorie, Beegle et al. (2006) in Tanzania and Guarcello et al. (2007) in Cambodia.  
However with the exception of Beegle et al. (2006), labor substitution effects are only 
investigated with respect to work and schooling categories, despite the fact that 
children engage in a multiplicity of domestic and market oriented work.  Emerson and 
Souza (2003, 2006) provide evidence that working earlier in life is harmful to future 
adult earnings and that there is intergenerational persistence of child labor.  If labor 
substitution effects from shocks are large, then social protection programs such as crop 
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insurance or the development of improved health services will have implications for 
children apart from their direct effects. 
Evaluations of the impact of several social protection programs on the distribution of 
children’s time including pensions (Edmonds 2004), conditional cash transfers (de 
Janvry et al. 2006), and school feeding programs (Ravallion and Wodon 2000) 
illustrate the mixed impact that interventions may have on child labor.  While 
Edmonds (2006) finds that pensions do increase children’s school and decrease child 
labor, Ravallion and Wodon (2000) find that school feeding programs induce changes 
in the distribution of children’s time, raising schooling, reducing leisure and only 
slightly lowering children’s work time.  The welfare effects of the school feeding 
program then become ambiguous because reduced leisure time may lower the quality 
of schooling.  In the case of the PROGRESA conditional cash transfer program, de 
Janvry et al. (2006) find that school enrollment was protected for children whose 
household benefited from PROGRESA, but parents still increased child labor in the 
face of income shocks.  Because different social protection programs have had 
ambiguous effects on the distribution of children’s time, this research focuses on 
identifying how shocks induce labor substitution effects.   
The paper’s second contribution is to investigate the role that assets play in potentially 
mitigating the effects of increased hours in response to production and health shocks.  
Different types of assets (durables, agricultural capital, and livestock) may have 
differential effects with respect to production shocks and health shocks to men, 
women and other children within the household.  These differential effects exist 
because variation in asset composition provides households different ex-post 
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smoothing mechanisms which may include more or less child labor to effectuate the 
strategy.     
Lastly, this paper tests an alternative measure to hours data for eliciting the 
distribution of children’s time between work, school and leisure.  Hours data are 
subject to higher propensities of measurement error than participation variables due to 
recall bias.  Tradeoffs exist between the more detailed information provided by hours 
data and the quality of the estimates.  In the United States, prominent surveys such as 
the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics and the Current Population Survey have been 
subjected to verification surveys to investigate the measurement error in hours data 
reported in these surveys.  Duncan and Hill (1985), Mellow and Sider (1983), and 
Rodgers et al. (1993) all find evidence that measurement error is a significant source 
of bias in hours data estimates.  In agricultural areas where households primarily 
engage in self-employed activities that do not have finite work schedules, 
measurement error is likely to be an important source of bias.  Because children’s 
hours data is normally reported by proxy respondents, measurement error may, in fact, 
be a more significant source of bias.  It is important to note that, even though hours 
data is subject to measurement error critiques, bias in dependent variables increases 
the overall variance of estimates without biasing the parameter estimates per se 
(Deaton 1997).  Bias in the dependent variable does decrease the likelihood of 
identifying significant effects of covariates.   
In a subjective child labor module directed to child respondents aged 10 to 17, an 
alternative method of collecting information regarding the relative distribution of time 
was employed.  Children were engaged in a game that measured the distribution of the 
child’s time between work, school and leisure activities by having the child choose 10 
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cards among three different sets of colored cards to visually represent their week.  This 
survey instrument is similar to the subjective evaluations of rainfall probability that 
Lybbert et al (2007) conducted in Ethiopia and Kenya with pastoralists.  Comparisons 
between the hours data and these subjective welfare data yield a consistent story with 
respect to the descriptive patterns of child labor and the magnitudes of time spent in 
differing activities at the means.  However, when compared to the estimated 
conditional labor supply and schooling coefficients, the impact of shocks on the 
subjective welfare variables mimic more closely the results from the participation 
variables.   
The organization of this paper is standard.  The second section presents the analytic 
framework for examining the effects of production and health shocks.  This section 
builds on the model of child labor presented in Chapter 3.   The third section describes 
the data, specifically with respect to the subjective child labor module.  The fourth 
section presents the data’s descriptive statistics.  The fifth section outlines the 
econometric specifications used to identify the effects of shocks on child labor and 
schooling hours, while the sixth section presents the empirical results.  The last section 
concludes. 
II. Analytic Framework 
In the previous dissertation chapter, an analytical framework for analyzing the factors 
influencing the labor allocation patterns of children among schooling, market 
production and domestic production was developed.  Conditions A.7, A.8 and A.9 
from the first order conditions in Chapter 3
31
 include equations for schooling hours, 
                                                 
31
 Equations referenced are found in Chapter 3, under VIII:  Model. 
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domestic work, and market oriented work.  This model builds on Beckerian models of 
human capital investment in children within unitary household models (Becker 1965; 
Becker and Lewis 1973; and Becker and Tomes 1976), agricultural household models 
developed by Rosenzweig (1977a, 1977b, 1980), Singh et al. (1986), and de Janvry et 
al. (1991), and more recent models of child labor by Basu and Van (1998), Basu 
(1999), Baland and Robinson (2000), Cigno and Rosati (2005), and Edmonds (2007).   
In deriving the reduced form labor and schooling supply functions, a Cobb-Douglas 
functional form was assumed for the work functions, but no functional form is 
assumed for the schooling function.  The schooling hours are given by equation 4.1, 
domestic work supply function is given by equation 4.2, and the market work supply 
function is given by equation 4.3.   
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Variables that are positively associated with children’s market and domestic work are 
those that affect the return on children’s time in the market or domestic activity and 
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the opportunity cost of the child’s time.  Variables that are inversely related to 
children’s work time include the allocation of adult’s time in the market or domestic 
tasks.  Adult labor supply is proxied by the labor availability of adults given by the 
household’s composition.   
Children’s time allocation is determined by seven sets of observable characteristics 
(child, adult, household, village, and district characteristics; exposure to shocks and 
shock-asset interactions) and a household level unobservable (household preferences) 
summarized in the equations to be estimated below (Equations 4.4-4.6).  Child 
characteristics include the child’s age, ethnicity and gender.  Adult characteristics 
include parental ages and education.  Durables, livestock values and number of 
animals, value of agricultural capital, and unearned migrant remittances are the 
variables employed to characterize the household’s assets.  Household composition 
(the number of adult men, women, girls and boys) are also included as household 
variables that proxy for total available household labor.  Village level variables 
include such indicators as whether the village is urban or rural, access to roads, school 
proximity, and school quality capture access to services and infrastructure.  District 
level variables proxy for labor market integration which include village population 
indicators and the density of villages in the district.  Seasonal indicator variables are 
also included in the specification to control for potential variation in the labor demand 
between periods.  A regional indicator is also included to distinguish the five regions 
in the survey.  The reduced form equations are summarized by equations 4.4 to 4.6 
below.   
( , , , , , ,   , )
S S
C
T T Child Adult Household Village District Shocks Shock x Asset HHpreferences  
 (4.4) 
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( , , , , , ,   , )
H H
C
T T Child Adult Household Village District Shocks Shock x Asset HHpreferences   
(4.5) 
( , , , , , ,   , )
F F
C
T T Child Adult Household Village District Shocks Shock x Asset HHpreferences   
(4.6) 
III. Data Description 
The data for this paper was collected as part of the Etude sur la Pauvreté et la Sécurité 
Alimentaire au Nord Mali 2006 which is described fully in Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation.  Of particular interest for this paper is the comparison of the effect of 
using hours data versus a subjective survey module posed to children directly to 
estimate the effect of household composition, assets, community characteristics and 
shocks on the distribution of children’s time.   
This paper analyzes information about children’s hours in different activities 
(schooling, domestic work and market work) from the children’s questionnaire and the 
relative distribution of children’s time from a subjective child labor module within the 
children’s questionnaire.  Children’s hours data are potentially biased with recall 
errors and proxy respondent biases.  In a series of papers that investigate measurement 
error in the reporting of hours worked by adults, Mellow and Sider (1983), Duncan 
and Hill (1985) and Rodgers et al. (1993) all find evidence of significant measurement 
error in reported hours worked.  It is unclear in the case of children in Northern Mali 
whether perceptions of time which are seasonally linked with the agricultural seasons 
and daily linked with the Muslim prayer cycle would provide more precise estimates 
than hours measured with watches or clocks.  If households over-report hours of 
children’s work relative to the true value, parameter estimates will not be biased, but 
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the overall variance of the equation increases, decreasing the precision of the 
parameters.  Reported hours data for children’s activities as well as subjective 
evaluations of children’s work over the previous week are investigated to evaluate 
whether differences in survey design will produce different patterns of significance in 
the covariates.   
During the subjective module, children are given three stacks of ten different colored 
pieces of paper
32
.  The game was explained during community meetings and 
individually with each survey respondent, so that sufficient time and reflection passes 
before respondents play the game.  Respondents are asked to pick ten total pieces of 
paper in whatever color combinations they choose to represent their allocation of time 
between work, school and leisure.  Each piece of colored paper represents work, 
school or leisure time.  The exact question in English is the following: 
Now, I’d like to do an exercise with you to understand the amount of 
time you spend in school, work and leisure.  Here are three different 
colored papers.  The red papers are representative of time in school.  
The yellow papers are representative of time doing work to help the 
family earn money.  For example, time when you fish, follow the 
animals, or work with the family business. The blue papers are 
representative of leisure time.  Now, I would like that you to choose 10 
papers of any of the colors that represent your typical day.  For 
example, if you work more than you have leisure time, it is necessary to 
choose more of the yellow papers than blue papers.  If you go to work 
more than school, it is necessary to choose more of the yellow papers 
than the red papers.  If you have more leisure time than time in school, 
it is necessary to choose more of the blue papers that the red papers.  
Do you understand?  (If so, give the child the three types of the papers.  
If not, explain again.) 
                                                 
32
 Lybbert et al. (2007) use a similar approach to derive the subjective probability distribution of 
pastoralist’s climate forecasts in Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. 
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Using this module generates an approximate distribution of children’s time between 
the three categories.  If simple recall of hours spent in each activity, children might be 
prone to recall errors regarding the distribution of hours spent across the three areas.  
In this way, the feature of prime interest, the distribution of time spent across work, 
school and leisure is placed at the forefront of the exercise.  If hours are simply 
recalled for the activities and then the distribution is calculated, the implicit purpose of 
the survey question is masked from the respondents. 
Borgers et al. (2000) suggest that with 11-16 year olds an important feature of 
obtaining reliable survey responses is to keep survey respondents motivated.  A face to 
face interview with visual aids can serve to keep the attention of youth, so long as a 
proper interview environment with out perceived pressure from parents is possible.  
The questionnaire design also gives children the opportunity to ―practice‖ responses to 
this type of question by preceding the question of interest, their allocation of time 
between school, work and leisure, with questions about the relative distribution of 
their diets between rice, sorghum and millet in the first question and cereals, fruits and 
vegetables, and meat in the second question.  Evidence regarding the reliability of this 
type of question is presented in the following section. 
IV: Descriptive Statistics 
To examine changes in the distribution of children’s time across work, schooling and 
leisure, hours data and the results of the subjective child labor module that elicits the 
relative distribution of children’s time across the three activities are presented. Table 
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4.1 presents the hours and subjective module data
33
.  According to the hours data 
presented in Table 4.1, children spend 38.9 hours per week working.  20.2 hours per 
week, or 51.9% of children’s work time, is allocated to domestic work and 18.69 
hours per week, or 48.1% is devoted to market oriented work.  Work constitutes 
34.7% of children’s time, 44.6% of children’s time is devoted to leisure, and 9.9% of 
the child’s time is devoted to school (approximately 11 hours per week) 34.  When 
compared to the subjective child labor module, the allocation of children’s time 
working is reported to be 47.6%
35.  However, children’s leisure time is reported to be 
29.4% and time at school or doing school work is 23%.   
Table 4.1:  Children’s Time Allocation: 
Unconditional Hours by Activity 
 
Hours Mean Std. Dev. 
School 11.06 0.51 
Farm 9.50 0.45 
Family Business 9.18 0.38 
Chores 15.48 0.50 
Child Care 4.72 0.28 
Market Work 18.69 0.64 
Domestic Work 20.20 0.65 
Total Work 38.89 1.06 
Subjective Measures  
School 2.30 0.10 
Work 4.76 0.08 
Note:  Probability weighted means.  N=1675  
                                                 
33
 Due to data cleaning to eliminate outliers, 245 observations were trimmed from the sample due to 
unrealistic hours reports over 18 hours a day in domestic or market activities which represents 10% of 
the sample. 
34
 The percentage of children’s time devoted to particular activities in this paragraph is calculated from 
the hours data assuming that the child sleeps 8 hours a day and that this time is not included as leisure 
time.  The reason for this is that sleeping time was not included as leisure time in the subjective module.  
Since the reason we are presenting the hours data is to make some comparison to the subjective results, 
the methodology to calculate comparable statistics ought to be based on the same fundamental 
assumptions.   
35
 The percentage of children’s time allocated to schooling, work, or leisure can be calculated from their 
mean responses by simply multiplying the response by 10 because the child selects 10 differently 
colored cards to represent their week.  Hence, each card represents a decile of time.   
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Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 illustrate the distribution of the responses, work, school and 
leisure for the subjective module.  The work responses form a bimodal distribution 
with a lower peak centered around 2 and a higher peak centered around 7 (Figure 4.1).  
Perhaps more predictably, the schooling responses also have a bimodal distribution 
around 0 and 6 which suggests that children either go to school a lot, almost 60% of 
their time or not at all (Figure 4.2).  Leisure has a unimodal distribution centered at 2 
(Figure 4.3).   
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Figure 4.1:  Histograms of Children’s Work Rankings 
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Figure 4.2:  Histograms of Children’s School Rankings 
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Figures 4.3:  Histogram of Children’s Leisure Rankings 
The correlation among the same colored response groups for the work, school and 
leisure questions and the two ―practice‖ questions described in the Data Description 
permit an internal verification of independent response patterns.  If previous same 
colored responses yield correlated responses in later questions, the independence of a 
respondent’s responses would be questionable.  Given the respondents are aged 10-17, 
a skeptic might assert a ―favorite color‖ hypothesis to explain response patterns.  
However, correlations are low between same colored questions (Table 4.2).  The 
highest correlations presented in Table 4.2 exist between yellow responses between 
sorghum and legume consumptions (.15).  The largest positive correlations between 
similar colored response categories and the work, school and leisure categories of 
interest are leisure and millet consumption with a .1 correlation.  Other correlations 
between the response categories of interest and the other similarly colored responses 
are negative.   
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Table 4.2:  Correlations between Color Groups in Questions 
  Red Responses 
  Q1-Rice Q2-Cereal Q3-School 
Q1-Rice 1   
Q2-Cereals 0.122 1  
Q3-School 0.0305 -0.1068 1 
  Yellow Responses 
  Q1-Sorghum Q2-Legumes Q3-Work 
Q1-Sorghum 1   
Q2-Legumes 0.1502 1  
Q3-Work -0.0153 -0.1295 1 
  Blue Responses 
  Q1-Millet Q2-Meat Q3-Leisure 
Q1-Millet 1   
Q2-Meat 0.0285 1  
Q3-Leisure 0.0977 -0.0446 1 
Hours data by rural/urban and gender dimensions are disaggregated in Table 4.3.  
Urban children (14.7 hours) report four additional hours of schooling than rural 
children (10.5 hours) per week.  However, the unconditional schooling hours mean is 
no different between girls and boys.  Boys report more intensive farm activity (13.25 
hours) versus girls (4.66 hours).  Girls report higher numbers of hours in the family 
businesses that are generally female run, doing domestic chores, and providing child 
care for other children.  Rural children do more market oriented work, while urban 
children do more domestic work.  Farm work and work in the family business mean 
hours are greater in the rural context by 4.6 hours and 1 hour, respectively.  Domestic 
chores and providing child care are 2.6 hours and 2.4 hours greater in urban areas, 
respectively.  Disaggregated hours data by the child’s age are presented in Table 4.4.  
Mean unconditional weekly hours reveal that younger children (ages 10-13) spend 
more time than older children (ages 14-17) watching siblings and going to school.  
Children do larger amounts of domestic chores and work in the family business as 
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they grow older.  Weekly hours of farm work increases slightly as children become 
older as well.   
Table 4.3:  Children’s Time Allocation:  Unconditional Hours per Week of  
Girls and Boys in Rural and Urban Areas 
 
 Urban Rural Girls Boys 
Hours Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
School 14.72 0.92 10.54 0.57 11.05 0.80 11.07 0.67 
Farm 6.32 0.70 9.95 0.50 4.66 0.56 13.25 0.63 
Family 
Business 8.35 0.67 9.30 0.42 11.33 0.62 7.52 0.45 
Chores 17.75 1.03 15.16 0.55 20.55 0.82 11.56 0.56 
Child Care 6.88 0.47 4.41 0.31 6.28 0.49 3.51 0.30 
N 501  1174  733  942  
         
Table 4.4:  Children’s Time Allocation:  Unconditional Hours  
per Week by Child’s Age 
Age N  School Farm 
Family 
Business Chores 
Child 
Care 
10 281 Mean 12.45 7.75 8.31 12.59 4.86 
  SD 1.22 0.90 0.80 0.98 0.62 
11 140 Mean 12.83 6.43 9.47 15.81 6.31 
  SD 1.89 0.97 1.45 2.18 1.14 
12 246 Mean 12.60 10.18 9.75 16.26 4.44 
  SD 1.48 1.21 1.13 1.42 0.61 
13 178 Mean 10.08 9.35 10.53 16.11 7.09 
  SD 1.47 1.33 1.06 1.55 1.08 
14 231 Mean 14.14 7.91 6.68 13.26 2.39 
  SD 1.32 0.91 0.77 1.12 0.44 
15 212 Mean 7.75 13.53 9.87 15.31 4.96 
  SD 1.23 1.51 1.06 1.38 0.72 
16 250 Mean 8.20 10.49 9.69 18.44 5.10 
  SD 1.19 1.49 1.01 1.32 0.90 
17 137 Mean 9.74 9.95 10.86 18.73 3.99 
  SD 1.94 1.45 1.51 1.95 0.84 
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Descriptive statistics for the covariates are displayed in Tables 4.5.A, 4.5.B, 4.6, and 
4.7.  These covariates include children’s characteristics (sex, age, and ethnicity), 
parental characteristics (parent’s age and education), household composition variables, 
household assets and unearned income (livestock numbers and value, agricultural 
capital, durables and migrant remittances), and production and health shocks (Tables 
4.5.A and 4.5.B).  Table 4.6 presents village characteristics including regional 
dummies, village access to roads, commune population, and villages per commune 
which all proxy for labor market integration and economic opportunities for adults and 
children.  Table 4.7 displays the school characteristics which account for school 
availability and quality available to children.  The distribution of shocks across regions 
is presented in Table 4.8 which are discussed in the previous chapter.    
Table 4.5.A:  Descriptive Statistics:   
Household and Child Characteristics 
  Mean Std. Dev.   
Child Characteristics    
Sex (Boy=1) 0.545 0.498  
Ethnicity    
Sonrai 0.665 0.472  
Tamasheq 0.134 0.341  
Peuhl 0.111 0.313  
Bambara 0.040 0.196  
Other Ethnicity 0.050 0.217  
Age Dummies    
Age 10 0.201 0.401  
Age 11 0.075 0.264  
Age 12 0.138 0.345  
Age 13 0.085 0.279  
Age 14 0.135 0.342  
Age 15 0.129 0.335  
Age 16 0.145 0.353  
Age 17 0.091 0.287  
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Table 4.5.A (Continued)  
  Mean Std. Dev.   
Adult Characteristics     
Mother’s Education (1 if any education) 0.055 0.227  
Father’s Education (1 if any education) 0.106 0.308   
Age of Household Head 41.2 21.6   
Age of Household Head’s spouse  33.7 14.7  
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the             
standard errors are corrected for clustering. For all variables,  
N=1,856.   
Table 4.5.B:  Descriptive Statistics:   
Household and Child Characteristics 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Household Composition   
Own Child 0.803 0.398 
Number of Girls in HH 1.407 1.215 
Number of Boys in HH 1.722 1.361 
Number of Adult Women in HH 1.697 1.277 
Number of Adult Men in HH 1.638 1.148 
Household Assets and Unearned Income    
Herd Size 19.18 19.54 
Herd Value (FCFA) 531946 57044 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA) 47051 12744 
Durables (FCFA) 302671 69356 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA) 40508 114356 
Shocks    
Production Shock    
No Crop Loss 0.533 0.042 
Small Crop Loss 0.217 0.034 
Large Crop Loss 0.250 0.036 
Labor Availability Shock    
Adult Male Sick 0.131 0.019 
Adult Female Sick 0.212 0.045  
Child Sick 0.144 0.037  
 
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the  
standard errors are corrected for clustering. For all variables,         
N=1,856.   
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Table 4.6:  Descriptive Statistics:   
Community Characteristics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 
Regional Characteristics and 
Distribution     
Urban 0.086 0.281 
River Access 0.331 0.472 
Regional Indicators     
Niafunke  0.377 0.486 
Goundam  0.166 0.373 
Dire 0.159 0.367 
Tombouctou 0.099 0.300 
Rharous 0.073 0.261 
Bourem 0.119 0.325 
Kidal 0.007 0.081 
Access to Roads     
Road Connects with Village 0.139 0.347 
within 1-10km 0.417 0.495 
within 11-20km 0.232 0.423 
more than 20km 0.212 0.410 
Commune Population     
less than 5000 0.093 0.291 
5001-10000 0.225 0.419 
10001-20000 0.391 0.490 
20001-30000 0.146 0.354 
more than 30000 0.146 0.354 
Villages per Commune     
Less than 10 0.152 0.361 
11-20 0.205 0.405 
21-30 0.285 0.453 
more than 30 0.358 0.481 
N=151 villages 
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Table 4.7:  School Characteristics 
Primary School Characteristics     
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
No Primary School Access 151 0.258 0.439 
Primary School in Village 151 0.563 0.498 
less than 5 km 151 0.099 0.300 
greater than 5 km 151 0.079 0.271 
Multiple Primary Schools in Village 151 0.132 0.395 
Student-Teacher Ratio—Primary 107 45.496 20.418 
Repetition Rate—Primary 98 0.305 0.148 
Boys Exam Pass Rate—Primary 71 0.651 0.266 
Girls Exam Pass Rate—Primary 67 0.590 0.325 
Secondary School Characteristics       
Secondary School in Village 151 0.159 0.367 
High School Characteristics       
High School in Village 151 0.026 0.161 
 
Table 4.8:  Distribution of Shocks by Region 
Region 
Male 
Illness 
Female 
Illness 
Child 
Illness 
Small 
Crop 
Shocks 
Large 
Crop 
Shocks 
Niafunke 0.107 0.082 0.082 0.138 0.198 
Goundam 0.079 0.041 0.011 0.185 0.166 
Dire 0.183 0.165 0.018 0.064 0.009 
Tombouctou 0.270 0.255 0.102 0.153 0.163 
Rharous 0.329 0.146 0.195 0.000 0.890 
Bourem 0.071 0.503 0.420 0.330 0.260 
 
V: Econometric Specification 
To investigate the household’s allocation of children’s time in domestic work, market 
work and school, three econometric specifications using children’s hours of work in 
the past week and the child’s own subjective evaluation of their distribution of time 
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are described below.  The first specification investigates conditional hours in work and 
schooling activities controlling for potentially confounded household unobservables, 
such as parental preferences over the allocation of children’s time, with a random 
effects specification.  The marginal effect on labor and schooling hours in response to 
production and health shocks are identified using a second specification.  The effects 
of asset-shock interactions investigates the role that assets may have in mitigating 
increases in children’s work in response to unexpected shocks.  The last specification, 
an ordered probit with random effects, uses responses from the child’s subjective 
evaluation of the distribution of their time to compare the effects of covariates with the 
hours specifications, the impact of shocks and asset-shock interactions using an 
ordered probit model.   
Specification 1:  Measuring Conditional Labor Supply Functions:   
Controlling for Unobservables 
The marginal effects of child-specific (age, gender), parental (age, education), 
household (assets, unearned income, household composition), village (size, school and 
road infrastructure), district (population and density), and region dummies on 
conditional child labor supply functions and schooling hours are estimated which 
control for potential household unobservables.  Conditional labor supply and 
schooling hours specifications are examined because the allocation of children to 
domestic work, market work or schooling is a two step decision, participation and 
conditional hours response as described in Heckman’s seminal work (Heckman 1974 
and 1990).  In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, participation decisions by households 
were analyzed to investigate the influence of specific covariates and shocks.  
However, outside of the worst forms of child labor, negative impacts on child welfare 
or their longer term human capital are difficult to decipher if the focus is solely on 
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participation.  Attention is now turned to the conditional hours specification which is 
specified: 
 aih ih h ihHours X Z      ,                  (4.7) 
where ih h ihc v   , ihX are child and parental characteristics and hZ are village, district 
and region variables associated with the household.   
Household unobservables, hc , including parental preferences, are likely influences 
over the allocation of children’s time.  Since fixed effects capture all time-invariant 
characteristics of the cross-sectional units, no estimate of the effect of parental 
education or household assets on child work and school participation would be 
possible.  However, these effects have a documented impact on children’s schooling 
and work (Dumas and Lambert 2004), which cannot be ignored.  To control for 
potential household unobservables, additional assumptions with respect to the strict 
exogeneity of the covariates on children’s hours are required and the uncorrelatedness 
of the household unobservable hc and child and household characteristics, ihX and hZ .  
Specification 2:  Identifying Labor Substitution Effects of Production and Health 
Shocks and Asset-Shock Interactions 
To investigate the role that shocks may have on children’s work and school hours, the 
dichotomous shock variable is included in the above specification which becomes: 
aih ih h h ihHours X Z shocks        .                 (4.8) 
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If 0  , the shock increases the number of hours allocated to work or schooling.  The 
role of assets in mitigating the impact of shocks on children’s hours can also be 
investigated as in Beegle et al. (2006).  Including an asset shock interaction yields an 
estimate of the responsiveness of assets, given a shock, on the children’s hours in 
work or school such that:  
( )aih ih h h h h ihHours X Z shocks assets shocks           .             (4.9) 
When 0  , increased assets also increase the hours of work or schooling.  With 
respect to work, this suggests that assets are child labor complementary.  However, 
with respect to schooling, it suggests that assets are complementary to children’s 
school hours.  When 0  , assets mitigate the effects of unexpected production and 
illness shocks on children’s work.  As noted in the previous chapter, cross-sectional 
variation of asset and shock interactions are not ideal specifications to identify the ex-
post smoothing role that assets may have in mitigating child labor responses to shocks 
due to variation within the sample of the timing of asset liquidation.  This potentially 
confounds a wealth effect with the asset liquidation effect as a household response to 
the shock.  However, the inclusion of seasonal variables controls for potential 
variations in the interaction terms due to the season of the household’s responses.    
Specification 3:  Measuring Intensity of Schooling and Work Activities using 
Children’s Subjective Responses:  Ordered Probit model with Random Effects 
An ordered probit model with random effects is used to estimate the impact of 
covariates on the intensity of child work as measured by the subjective child labor 
module that elicits the distribution of children’s work time relative to other activities.  
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The dependent variable will be the rank that the child puts on the amount of time they 
spend conducting work for the household or schooling. 
Let | , ~ (0,1)e x z Normal .  From the subjective child labor module, the threshold 
parameters are divided into one unit increments such that: 
y=0  if y* ≤ 1 
y=1  if 1 < y* ≤ 2 
y=2  if 2 < y* ≤ 3 
y=3  if 3 < y* ≤ 4 
y=4  if 4 < y* ≤ 5 
y=5  if 5 < y* ≤ 6 
y=6  if 6 < y* ≤ 7 
y=7  if 7 < y* ≤ 8 
y=8  if 8 < y* ≤ 9 
y=9  if 9 < y* ≤ 10 
y=10  if y* > 10.                 (4.10) 
Each response probability can be calculated from the conditional distribution of y 
given x using the standard normal assumption for the error term
36
. 
1 1 1
1 2 2 1
9 10 10 9
P(y=0| X,Z,c)=P(y* | , , ) ( | , ) ( [ ])
P(y=1| X,Z,c)=P( y* | , , ) ( [ ]) ( [ ])
.
.
P(y=9| X,Z,c)=P( y* | , , ) ( [ ]) ( [ ])
P(y=10| X,Z,c)=P
X Z c P X Z c X Z X Z
X Z c X Z X Z
X Z c X Z X Z
       
       
       
         
        
        
11 11(y*> | , , ) 1 ( [ ])X Z c X Z      
                   (4.11) 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Subscripts are suppressed for notational convenience. 
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The log likelihood function that is maximized is formulated: 
1 2
1 11
( , , ) [ 0]log( ( [ ]) [ 1]log( ( [ ])
( [ ]) ... [ 10]log( ( [ ])
i i i
i
l y X Z y X Z
X Z y X Z
        
     
         
        
        (4.12) 
The results from these three specifications are discussed in the next section.   
VI: Empirical Results 
Hours Data Results 
Ordinary least squares regression results are presented in Table 4.9 which serve as a 
comparison to the preferred specification which controls for household level 
unobservables.  In Table 4.10, the household level random effects estimates are 
presented. Household variables, including child and parental characteristics, have 
significant effects on children’s hours of work and school.  Gender, in particular, has 
significant effects on the allocation of children’s time.  At the mean, boys spend 5 
hours more doing farm work, but less time than girls in the family business (-3.2 
hours), doing domestic work (-6 hours), and providing childcare (-2.9 hours).  
Mother’s and father’s education lowers the amount of time children spend doing 
domestic work by 5.2 hours and 3.8 hours, respectively.  However, education has no 
effect on market oriented work or schooling hours.  Household composition, measured 
by the numbers of girls, boys, men and women in the household, also have significant 
effects on certain domestic and market activities.  Additional girls or boys increases 
the amount of time children spend conducting childcare, while additional girls also 
increase the time a child conducts household domestic work.  Household assets have 
no significant effects on children’s hours in work and school.  A plausible hypothesis 
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for this result would be that assets influence selection into certain activities, but once a 
child is selected into an activity, they work a given amount.  This hypothesis is 
supported by evidence in Chapter 3.   
Table 4.9:  Conditional Schooling and Labor Supply Functions 
  School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Boy Indicator -0.425 6.499*** -3.841*** -5.931*** -2.434*** 
 (0.522) (1.615) (1.212) (1.274) (0.774) 
Household 
Composition      
biological child 
indicator -1.243 0.682 0.683 -2.153 -1.862* 
 (1.166) (1.367) (1.226) (1.372) (1.041) 
number of girls -0.418 0.413 0.081 0.881** 0.756*** 
 (0.361) (0.687) (0.353) (0.442) (0.257) 
number of boys -0.114 -0.503 -0.285 -0.536 0.0745 
 (0.255) (0.565) (0.381) (0.468) (0.393) 
number of Adult 
Men -0.357 0.667 0.084 0.733 -0.634 
 (0.332) (0.671) (0.391) (0.498) (0.390) 
number of Adult 
Women -0.363 -0.090 -0.846 -0.794 -0.79 
 (0.316) (0.745) (0.668) (0.650) (0.509) 
Father's Age 0.016 -0.048 0.013 0.008 0.056*** 
 (0.017) (0.041) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) 
Mother's Age -0.009 0.004 0.062* -0.050 0.019 
 (0.031) (0.059) (0.033) (0.049) (0.025) 
Household Assets      
Livestock Value 
(FCFA) 0.047 0.039 -0.106 -0.124 0.098 
 (0.033) (0.177) (0.103) (0.099) (0.070) 
Herd Size (Number 
of Animals) -0.040* -0.009 0.018 0.032 -0.018 
 (0.021) (0.049) (0.034) (0.032) (0.021) 
Agricultural 
Capital (FCFA) -0.041** -0.026 0.029 -0.052*** 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.037) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) 
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Table 4.9 (Continued) 
  School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Household 
Durables (FCFA) 0.059 -0.447* -0.086* 0.015 -0.073 
 (0.039) (0.235) (0.050) (0.082) (0.047) 
Migrant 
Remittances 
(FCFA) -0.151 0.058 0.381*** 0.324 0.326** 
 (0.124) (0.288) (0.099) (0.227) (0.146) 
Parental 
Education      
Any Mother's 
Education -0.913 -0.872 -1.658 -6.507** -1.56 
(1=Yes) (1.113) (3.130) (2.114) (2.780) (1.025) 
Any Father's 
Education 0.367 3.477* -1.307 -3.095* -0.637 
(1=Yes) (0.744) (2.096) (1.615) (1.611) (1.407) 
Community 
Characteristics      
Access to River -5.775** 6.739** 4.519*** 5.484*** 1.742 
(1=Yes) (2.839) (2.636) (1.691) (1.852) (1.422) 
Roads      
within 1-10km -3.017 -6.837** -2.058 -8.836*** -1.926 
 (2.497) (3.313) (2.095) (2.809) (1.793) 
within 11-20km 0.539 -2.015 -0.258 -6.510** 2.217 
 (3.215) (3.761) (2.740) (3.087) (1.820) 
greater than 20km 0.100 -5.471 0.017 -8.253*** -4.623** 
 (2.593) (3.617) (2.780) (2.917) (2.215) 
Commune 
Population      
less than 5000 
people -1.695 -1.317 6.193* 1.908 -7.228* 
 (2.879) (4.813) (3.575) (3.423) (4.156) 
5-10,000 people -0.839 0.792 3.755 12.830*** 2.741 
 (4.624) (3.869) (2.873) (3.004) (2.179) 
10-20,000 people -2.132 -1.786 -2.572 -0.989 -5.297*** 
 (2.556) (2.385) (1.589) (2.006) (1.898) 
Villages per 
Commune      
fewer than 10 2.310 -2.615 -6.960 -19.850*** -6.238 
 (5.806) (6.788) (5.444) (4.538) (4.163) 
11-20 0.071 -3.871 -6.876** -15.74*** -10.96*** 
 (4.059) (5.474) (3.333) (3.616) (2.661) 
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Table 4.9 (Continued) 
 Villages per 
Commune School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
21-30 1.189 -1.779 1.407 -11.64*** -0.203 
 (4.100) (4.363) (2.774) (3.067) (2.431) 
School 
Characteristics      
Primary School in 
Village -1.421 -3.218 -0.062 -3.028 -0.665 
 (3.926) (3.771) (2.319) (2.976) (3.070) 
Primary School 
within 1-5km 16.69 0.033 -0.597 -0.411 -4.096 
 (12.440) (4.599) (3.045) (3.949) (2.989) 
Primary School 
farther than 5km -1.399 -2.681 -3.843 0.32 9.271 
 (4.297) (5.590) (4.319) (3.972) (7.649) 
Multiple Primary 
Schools -1.521 -5.190** -6.529*** -4.942* -2.246 
(1=Yes) (1.790) (2.388) (2.111) (2.742) (2.461) 
Student-Teacher 
Ratio -0.006 0.078* -0.006 0.071 -0.023 
 (0.054) (0.046) (0.031) (0.043) (0.028) 
Repetition Rate 5.445 -4.233 3.42 -4.019 -0.477 
 (4.483) (5.669) (4.449) (4.968) (4.079) 
Exam Pass Rate-
Boys 9.99 7.386** -2.862 -0.843 -6.486*** 
 (7.977) (3.213) (2.260) (2.666) (2.396) 
Exam Pass Rate-
Girls -7.979 -7.171** 2.191 4.743* 7.134*** 
 (7.749) (3.109) (2.634) (2.698) (2.379) 
Secondary School 
in Village -0.633 -2.563 -0.671 -2.179 -3.770** 
 (1.723) (2.111) (1.946) (2.086) (1.620) 
High School in 
Village -3.205 -5.905 9.986*** -2.309 0.277 
 (2.792) (4.958) (3.060) (3.107) (2.360) 
Constant 42.64*** 11.16 11.84** 36.75*** 22.24*** 
 (6.689) (7.681) (4.573) (5.950) (4.910) 
Observations 582 802 1063 1399 728 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per 
commune, ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not 
displayed.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.10:  Conditional Schooling and Labor Supply  
Functions with Random Effects 
 School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Boy Indicator 0.232 5.118*** -3.119*** -5.954*** -2.917*** 
      (0.300)      (0.860)      (0.582)      (0.727)     (0.502) 
Household 
Composition      
biological child 
indicator -0.343 -0.434 -0.389 -0.804 -0.762 
      (0.566)      (1.089)      (0.831)      (0.977)    (0.683) 
number of girls -0.475 0.009 0.438 0.816** 0.545** 
      (0.348)      (0.463)      (0.342)      (0.383)     (0.277) 
number of boys -0.155 0.256 0.042 -0.149 0.509* 
      (0.312)      (0.408)      (0.311)      (0.340)     (0.278) 
number of Adult 
Men -0.239 0.997** 0.362 0.428 -0.331 
      (0.412)      (0.486)      (0.388)      (0.450)     (0.372) 
number of Adult 
Women -0.454 -0.810 -1.231*** -1.011** -0.443 
      (0.426)      (0.522)      (0.424)      (0.491)     (0.405) 
Father's Age 0.001 -0.059* 0.000 0.021 0.009 
      (0.020)      (0.031)      (0.021)      (0.023)     (0.019) 
Mother's Age -0.003 0.033 0.038 -0.013 0.032 
      (0.030)      (0.041)      (0.031)      (0.033)     (0.026) 
Household Assets      
Livestock Value 
(FCFA) 0.050 -0.027 -0.097 -0.039 0.028 
      (0.068)      (0.148)      (0.084)      (0.086)     (0.086) 
Herd Size (Number 
of Animals) -0.030 0.002 0.037 0.025 -0.006 
      (0.030)      (0.045)      (0.031)      (0.034)     (0.029) 
Agricultural 
Capital (FCFA) -0.050 -0.073 0.038 -0.063 0.019 
      (0.040)      (0.064)      (0.053)      (0.061)     (0.037) 
Household 
Durables (FCFA) 0.060 -0.12 -0.090 -0.027 -0.052 
      (0.052)      (0.173)      (0.073)      (0.065)     (0.059) 
Migrant 
Remittances 
(FCFA) -0.135 0.170 0.424* 0.316 0.215 
      (0.149)      (0.289)      (0.221)      (0.215)    (0.206) 
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
 School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Parental 
Education      
Any Mother's 
Education -1.068 0.259 -0.436 -5.167*** -0.828 
(1=Yes)      (1.299)      (2.668)      (1.626)      (1.847)     (1.236) 
Any Father's 
Education -0.075 1.741 -2.051 -3.778*** -1.004 
(1=Yes)      (1.083)      (1.955)      (1.336)      (1.408)     (1.094) 
Community 
Characteristics      
Access to River -3.499** 5.358*** 2.595* 4.405*** 2.022* 
(1=Yes)      (1.519)      (1.962)      (1.348)      (1.496)     (1.197) 
Roads      
within 1-10km -0.15 -3.913** -2.122 -5.640*** -2.024 
      (1.972)      (1.905)      (1.530)      (1.605)     (1.433) 
within 11-20km 2.029 0.15 -0.573 -3.527* 0.416 
      (2.605)      (2.220)      (1.955)      (1.970)     (1.682) 
greater than 20km 2.986 -3.57 -1.067 -5.542** -2.957* 
      (2.185)      (2.642)      (2.196)      (2.209)     (1.766) 
Commune 
Population      
less than 5000 
people -0.509 -3.747 6.071 0.59 -9.354*** 
      (3.333)      (4.900)      (4.262)      (3.822)     (3.452) 
5-10,000 people 2.958 -1.074 2.187 10.88*** -5.012*** 
      (2.454)      (3.323)      (1.943)      (2.311)     (1.771) 
10-20,000 people -1.019 -4.751* -4.258** -2.741 -6.994*** 
      (2.183)      (2.615)      (1.891)      (2.171)     (1.725) 
Villages per 
Commune      
fewer than 10 -0.582 -1.479 -5.572 -17.62*** -0.951 
      (3.894)      (6.703)      (4.228)      (4.393)     (3.378) 
20-Nov -0.726 0.421 -8.855*** -14.05*** -4.965* 
      (2.796)      (4.540)      (2.763)      (3.083)     (2.651) 
21-30 0.724 0.905 -0.694 -9.640*** 0.819 
      (2.942)      (3.809)      (2.583)      (2.839)     (2.410) 
School 
Characteristics      
Primary School in 
Village 4.180 -1.915 2.506 0.074 -0.326 
      (3.620)      (3.000)      (2.410)      (2.709)     (2.388) 
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
 School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Primary School 
within 1-5km 18.66*** -2.349 2.027 0.121 -1.989 
      (6.135)      (3.281)      (2.636)      (3.039)     (2.912) 
Primary School 
farther than 5km -0.166 1.307 5.328 7.670* 2.673 
      (5.899)      (4.445)      (3.438)      (4.013)     (3.620) 
Multiple Primary 
Schools 1.219 0.775 -0.920 1.094 0.234 
(1=Yes)      (1.999)      (1.844)      (1.399)      (1.601)     (1.450) 
Student-Teacher 
Ratio -0.008 0.052 -0.029 0.012 -0.017 
      (0.039)      (0.039)      (0.029)      (0.035)     (0.030) 
Repetition Rate 1.700 -8.768** -1.148 -4.360 -3.581 
      (4.016)      (4.417)      (3.862)      (4.062)     (4.145) 
Exam Pass Rate-
Boys 11.40*** 7.296** -3.948 -4.718 -5.610* 
      (3.559)      (3.461)      (3.111)      (3.364)     (2.963) 
Exam Pass Rate-
Girls -9.170*** -4.039 2.673 6.264* 5.512* 
      (3.247)      (3.345)      (3.035)      (3.241)     (2.988) 
Secondary School 
in Village -0.0574 -6.137*** -4.056*** -2.443 -5.257*** 
      (1.294)      (1.747)      (1.565)      (1.502)     (1.659) 
High School in 
Village -3.903 -11.46*** 2.672 -6.395** 0.549 
      (2.454)      (3.581)      (2.299)      (2.513)     (2.073) 
 Constant  32.24*** 8.504 16.66*** 30.93*** 17.86*** 
       (3.688)      (5.728)      (3.859)      (4.179)     (4.642) 
 Observations  582 802 1063 1399 728 
 Number of hid  379 537 640 837 467 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per commune, 
ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not displayed.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.11:  Impact of Shocks-Random Effects 
  School Farm 
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Large Crop 
Loss 0.603 3.146* -0.292 0.808 0.011 
(1=Yes) (1.559) (1.605) (1.339) (1.485) (1.344) 
Small Crop 
Loss -2.154* -0.45 -1.783 -0.842 0.033 
(1=Yes) (1.305) (1.573) (1.239) (1.395) (1.139) 
Adult Male 
Sick 0.625 -0.676 1.671 -0.731 -0.090 
(1=Yes) (1.479) (1.856) (1.550) (1.685) (1.358) 
Adult Female 
Sick -0.619 3.239 2.161 1.279 -0.121 
(1=Yes) (1.631) (2.034) (1.713) (1.951) (1.810) 
Child Sick -1.067 3.966* -1.663 1.052 -0.980 
(1=Yes) (1.683) (2.186) (1.766) (2.012) (1.925) 
Observations 582 802 1063 1399 728 
Number of 
households 379 537 640 837 467 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All covariates are estimated in the regression, but 
only the shock results are displayed. Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.  * 
significant at 10% ,** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
Household shocks from either production or illness shocks have mixed effects on the 
distribution of children’s time37.  When production shocks are large, conditional on a 
child already being engaged in farm work, weekly hours increase by 3.1 hours.  
Smaller production shocks yield decreases in the child’s weekly school hours by 2 
hours.  This result is not entirely consistent because there is no increase in other labor 
activities to compensate for the decrease in schooling time.  Child labor responses to 
illnesses within the household also suggest that children are primarily substitutes for 
other children.  When other children within the household are sick, children’s farm 
                                                 
37
 In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, I examine the plausibility of the exogeneity of these shocks and 
several of the assumptions of the random effects model, namely strict exogeneity with a small panel.  
This previous analysis suggests that despite the self-reported nature of these shocks, they are plausibly 
exogenous.   
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work increased by 4 hours.  The inconsistency of the production shock results are 
clarified by disaggregating the results by gender.   
In Tables 4.12.A and 4.12.B, the impact of production and sickness shocks are further 
investigated by disaggregating the sample by gender.  Large production shocks induce 
increased farm labor supply from boys by 3.2 hours, while smaller production shocks 
induce girls’ labor to increase by 5.9 hours.  There are also gender disaggregated 
effects on schooling as a result of production shocks.  Smaller production shocks 
cause a reduction of 2.7 hours in boys weekly schooling.  Girls’ hours in school drop 
by 3.5 hours when an adult female is sick.  When an adult male is sick, girls’ hours 
working in the family business increase by almost 5 hours.  This result suggests that as 
men become sick and earning potential decreases for men that women in the 
household, often the proprietors of small income generating business, increase their 
activities which require girl child labor.  When other children in the household are 
sick, boys increase the number of hours they work on the farm (4 hours) and girls 
increase the number of hours the engage in chores by 5.7 hours.  The gender 
disaggregation increases the precision of the estimates of the impact of shocks on 
children’s time distribution.   This also suggests, as argued in the previous chapter, 
that strong child labor substitution effects may be reinforced by poor labor market 
integration that prevents households from hiring in labor.  This is caused by high 
transportation costs due to the spatial dispersion and low population density in 
Northern Mali.   
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Table 4.12.A:  Conditional Schooling and Labor Supply  
Disaggregated by Gender 
  School Farm Work Family Business 
Sample 
Restriction Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Large Crop Loss 0.889 0.193 3.251* 0.705 -0.499 -0.840 
 (1.753) (2.487) (1.795) (2.866) (1.519) (2.178) 
Small Crop Loss -2.745* -1.844 -1.673 5.883** -1.836 -1.919 
 (1.610) (2.001) (1.802) (2.884) (1.446) (1.937) 
Adult Male Sick 0.625 2.525 -0.676 -1.564 1.671 4.919*** 
(1=Yes) (1.479) (1.856) (1.856) (2.779) (1.550) (1.768) 
Adult Female 
Sick -0.619 -3.494** 3.239 4.703 2.161 -0.185 
(1=Yes) (1.631) (1.757) (2.034) (2.934) (1.713) (1.929) 
Child Sick -1.067 1.681 3.966* -2.157 -1.663 1.194 
(1=Yes) (1.683) (2.183) (2.186) (3.303) (1.766) (2.354) 
Observations 332 250 584 218 580 483 
Number of hid 255 205 431 173 420 373 
     Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All covariates are estimated in the regression, 
     but only the shock results are displayed. Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.          
     * significant at 10% ,** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 4.12.B:  Conditional Schooling and Labor Supply  
Disaggregated by Gender 
  Chores Child Care 
Sample 
Restriction Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Large Crop Loss -0.571 1.795 -0.144 1.233 
 (1.839) (2.174) (1.693) (2.020) 
Small Crop Loss -0.992 -1.439 0.998 -0.0848 
 (1.667) (2.097) (1.483) (1.615) 
Adult Male Sick -0.731 -0.245 -0.090 0.484 
(1=Yes) (1.685) (2.057) (1.358) (1.593) 
Adult Female 
Sick 1.279 -2.097 -0.121 0.46 
(1=Yes) (1.951) (2.148) (1.810) (1.877) 
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Table 4.12.B (Continued) 
  Chores Child Care 
Sample 
Restriction Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Child Sick 1.052 5.751** -0.980 -3.602 
(1=Yes) (2.012) (2.486) (1.925) (2.622) 
Observations 734 665 352 376 
Number of hid 525 509 272 289 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All covariates are estimated in the regression,  
but only the shock results are displayed. Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.   
* significant at 10% ,** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Asset-shock interactions provide evidence about the role that different assets 
(durables, agricultural capital, or livestock) play in mitigating the impact of shocks on 
children’s time allocation.  Both durables and agricultural capital reduce the impact of 
large crop loss shocks on children’s hours of school and work (Table 4.13).  An 
additional 100,000 FCFA (USD 194) of durables reduces the hours children spend 
working on the farm by 1.2 per week.  Agricultural capital also increases the hours 
that a child spends in school if exposed to a large crop loss shock by 7.5 hours.  This 
may illustrate that responses to shocks are less labor intensive when higher levels of 
agricultural capital are available to the household.  Livestock values have mixed, but 
negligible effects per 100,000 FCFA on children’s domestic work when exposed to a 
small crop loss shock.  With respect to asset–illness shock interactions (Table 4.14), 
higher levels of durables increase children’s hours in school by .84 hours when men 
are sick.  Increased livestock values also have a significant impact on children’s work 
hours when adult women are sick.  An additional 100,000 FCFA of livestock value 
decreases children’s hours per week on the farm (-.97 hours), in the family business (-
.5 hours), and doing household work (-.6 hours). 
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Table 4.13:  Asset Crop Loss Shock Interactions 
 School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Durables x Large Crop Loss -0.103 -1.169* -0.173 0.210 0.041 
 (0.445) (0.600) (0.419) (0.433) (0.494) 
Durables x Small Crop Loss 0.0189 0.291 0.183 0.137 0.170 
 (0.128) (0.808) (0.172) (0.201) (0.392) 
Agricultural Capital x Large 
Crop Loss 7.464** 5.026 0.700 1.831 4.367 
 (3.673) (3.132) (3.633) (3.572) (4.342) 
Agricultural Capital x Small 
Crop Loss -0.694 2.971 -1.614 0.603 -0.010 
 (2.842) (2.697) (2.003) (2.337) (1.732) 
Livestock Value x Large Crop 
Loss -0.104 -0.205 -0.462 -0.500 0.222 
 (0.321) (0.313) (0.294) (0.307) (0.324) 
Livestock Value x Small Crop 
Loss -0.063 -0.072 -0.22 -0.246* 0.228 
 (0.117) (0.235) (0.143) (0.138) (0.148) 
Observations 582 802 1063 1399 728 
Number of hid 379 537 640 837 467 
Notes:  All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100 000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$. All covariates estimated in the regression, but only 
asset interaction results displayed.  Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.  * significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 4.14:  Asset-Illness Shock Interactions 
 School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Durables x Sick Male 0.837** -0.509 0.644 0.068 -0.015 
 (0.346) (0.762) (0.516) (0.440) (0.331) 
Durables x Sick Female 0.186 1.479** -0.148 0.685 0.276 
 (0.520) (0.664) (0.607) (0.417) (0.450) 
Durables x Sick Child -0.243 -1.096 -0.422 -0.206 0.077 
 (0.362) (0.931) (0.664) (0.143) (0.097) 
Agricultural Capital x Sick 
Male -0.102 0.14 -1.011 0.013 -0.029 
 (0.116) (0.222) (1.160) (0.186) (0.116) 
Agricultural Capital x Sick 
Female 1.659 1.904 -5.005 -1.825 0.836 
 (2.544) (3.489) (3.093) (3.310) (3.004) 
132 
 
Table 4.14 (Continued) 
 School Farm  
Family 
Business Chores Childcare 
Agricultural Capital x Sick 
Child -0.814 4.788 3.653 -0.799 -2.429 
 (4.170) (4.079) (3.513) (3.811) (3.249) 
Livestock Value x Sick 
Male -0.229 0.178 -0.254 -0.399* 0.014 
 (0.178) (0.265) (0.307) (0.233) (0.190) 
Livestock Value x Sick 
Female 0.116 -0.966*** -0.518** -0.602** -0.286 
 (0.201) (0.358) (0.238) (0.246) (0.228) 
Livestock Value x Sick 
Child -0.060 0.459 0.317 0.339 0.571* 
 (0.201) (0.479) (0.251) (0.260) (0.345) 
Observations 582 802 1063 1399 728 
Number of hid 379 537 640 837 467 
 Notes:  All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100 000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$. All covariates estimated in the regression, but only 
asset interaction results displayed.  Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.  * significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
As noted in the discussion of the econometric specification, these results should be 
interpreted with caution due to the cross-sectional nature of the data.  However, these 
results are broadly consistent with the role that assets may have in an ex-post 
responses to shocks.  Households with higher levels of durables will be able to have 
fewer liquidity constraints to hire in labor.  However, the magnitudes of these 
coefficients are rather small which may reflect the difficulty of hiring in labor due to 
poor labor market integration or imperfect asset markets.  The magnitudes of the 
coefficients for agricultural capital are much larger which suggests that capital 
intensive responses to production shocks reduces the demand for child labor.  
Likewise, livestock value both increases the demand for child labor by necessitating 
more supervision of livestock and decreases the demand for child labor by providing 
the household a relatively liquid asset to sell in response to idiosyncratic shocks.  
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Though the econometric specification is not ideal, due to data limitations, the 
interpretation of these coefficients is broadly consistent with theory.   
Ordered Probit Results 
The ordered probit model controlling for random effects is presented in Table 4.15.  
Note that a one unit increase in work according to a child’s work intensity ranking 
equates to a 10% increase in work relative to schooling and leisure time.  Gender has 
no significant impact on the child work intensity estimation.  Household composition, 
assets and parental education have significant effects on children’s work intensity.  
Household composition, specifically the number of boys in the household decreases 
the probability that children will have higher work intensities.  Increased herd sizes 
slightly increase children’s work intensity and lower the amount of time children 
spend in school.  This may be because livestock require supervision and monitoring 
which are often tasks delegated to children.  However, other measures of household 
assets including durables, agricultural capital or livestock values have no significant 
effect on children’s work intensity.   
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Table 4.15:  Ordered Probit — Shocks with Asset  
Interactions and Random Effects 
 School Work 
Asset Interactions with:  
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Boy Indicator 0.044 0.037 -0.096 -0.100 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.072) (0.073) 
Household Composition     
biological child indicator 0.092 0.098 -0.014 -0.027 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.096) (0.097) 
number of girls -0.038 -0.030 0.009 0.006 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.038) (0.039) 
number of boys 0.033 0.039 -0.058* -0.043 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.032) (0.032) 
number of Adult Men -0.067 -0.088 0.061 0.096** 
 (0.063) (0.061) (0.043) (0.041) 
number of Adult Women 0.079 0.068 -0.065 -0.049 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.046) (0.046) 
Father's Age -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mother's Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Assets     
Livestock Value (FCFA) 0.003 0.023 0.007 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
Herd Size (Number of Animals) -0.008* -0.011** 0.007** 0.006* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA) 0.007 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household Durables (FCFA) 0.006 0.004 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA) -0.036* -0.026 0.018 0.014 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Parental Education     
Any Mother's Education 0.619*** 0.732*** -0.504*** -0.582*** 
(1=Yes) (0.220) (0.220) (0.190) (0.195) 
Any Father's Education 0.632*** 0.648*** -0.498*** -0.510*** 
(1=Yes) (0.178) (0.173) (0.140) (0.142) 
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Table 4.15 (Continued) 
 School Work 
Asset Interactions with:  
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Community Characteristics     
Access to River -0.383* -0.317 -0.254* -0.362** 
(1=Yes) (0.223) (0.228) (0.151) (0.152) 
Roads     
within 1-10km 0.345 0.393 -0.334** -0.367** 
 (0.240) (0.241) (0.159) (0.158) 
within 11-20km 0.334 0.371 -0.068 -0.070 
 (0.304) (0.308) (0.190) (0.193) 
greater than 20km 0.696** 0.691** -0.824*** -0.855*** 
 (0.329) (0.335) (0.224) (0.228) 
Commune Population     
less than 5000 people 0.361 0.371 -0.540 -0.580 
 (0.532) (0.541) (0.381) (0.386) 
5-10,000 people -0.063 -0.001 -0.459** -0.552** 
 (0.322) (0.331) (0.234) (0.236) 
10-20,000 people 0.096 0.253 -0.137 -0.208 
 (0.314) (0.315) (0.211) (0.212) 
Villages per Commune     
fewer than 10 0.623 0.748 -0.111 -0.025 
 (0.620) (0.626) (0.441) (0.447) 
11-20 0.246 0.284 -0.054 0.019 
 (0.426) (0.422) (0.303) (0.303) 
21-30 0.153 0.151 0.326 0.330 
 (0.396) (0.403) (0.282) (0.286) 
School Characteristics     
Primary School in Village 1.269*** 1.249*** -0.561** -0.502* 
 (0.435) (0.436) (0.266) (0.266) 
Primary School within 1-5km 0.042 0.021 -0.371 -0.445 
 (0.557) (0.569) (0.301) (0.304) 
Primary School farther than 5km -0.911 -0.828 -0.127 -0.248 
 (0.657) (0.660) (0.384) (0.387) 
Multiple Primary Schools 0.149 0.092 0.269* 0.400** 
(1=Yes) (0.245) (0.249) (0.156) (0.158) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.008 -0.008 0.009*** 0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Repetition Rate 0.042 -0.179 -0.247 0.052 
 (0.569) (0.575) (0.395) (0.400) 
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Table 4.15 (Continued) 
 School Work 
Asset Interactions with:  
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Exam Pass Rate-Boys -0.601 -0.555 -0.231 -0.278 
 (0.468) (0.472) (0.307) (0.314) 
Exam Pass Rate-Girls 1.087** 1.017** -0.195 -0.202 
 (0.442) (0.445) (0.297) (0.302) 
Secondary School in Village 0.801*** 0.983*** -0.869*** -1.055*** 
 (0.204) (0.203) (0.149) (0.147) 
High School in Village 0.163 0.107 -0.468* -0.552** 
 (0.343) (0.351) (0.252) (0.259) 
Asset Shock Interactions     
Durables x Large Crop Loss 0.110**  -0.081**  
 (0.053)  (0.035)  
Durables x Small Crop Loss 0.019  -0.017  
 (0.025)  (0.021)  
Agricultural Capital x Large Crop 
Loss -1.085**  0.464*  
 (0.448)  (0.282)  
Agricultural Capital x Small Crop 
Loss -0.183  0.256  
 (0.356)  (0.235)  
Livestock Value x Large Crop 
Loss 0.098***  -0.054**  
 (0.037)  (0.025)  
Livestock Value x Small Crop 
Loss 0.031**  -0.019  
 (0.015)  (0.014)  
Durables x Sick Male  0.017  -0.078* 
  (0.051)  (0.046) 
Durables x Sick Female  0.064  -0.059 
  (0.070)  (0.044) 
Durables x Sick Child  -0.021  -0.010 
  (0.043)  (0.015) 
Agricultural Capital x Sick Male  -0.002  0.017 
  (0.023)  (0.020) 
Agricultural Capital x Sick Female  -0.404  -0.073 
  (0.408)  (0.301) 
Agricultural Capital x Sick Child  -0.236  0.690* 
  (0.595)  (0.368) 
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Table 4.15 (Continued) 
 School Work 
Asset Interactions with:  
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Production 
Shock 
Health 
Shock 
Livestock Value x Sick Male  0.003  -0.005 
  (0.032)  (0.024) 
Livestock Value x Sick Female  0.063*  -0.051** 
  (0.033)  (0.026) 
Livestock Value x Sick Child  -0.064*  0.029 
  (0.033)  (0.029) 
Observations 1626 1626 1626 1626 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$ District population, number of villages per commune, 
ethnicity and seasonal indicators are included in the regression, but results are not displayed.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Parental education also affects children’s work intensity.  Both mother’s and father’s 
education has significant effects on lowering the probability that a child increases their 
work intensity one category by .50 and .49, respectively.  Parental education also 
increases the proportion of time the child spends in school.  An increase of one decile 
of time spent in school is .62 more likely when the child’s mother has been educated 
or .63 when the child’s father has been educated.  School characteristics such as 
having a primary or secondary school in the village increase children’s school 
intensity and reduce work intensity.   
Household crop and health shocks, both of which may cause unexpected decreases in 
income, increase the intensity of children’s work, suggesting that children are used as 
insurance against unexpected income fluctuations (Table 4.16).  However, the 
intensity of the crop shock and the household member affected by the health shock 
determine the responsiveness of children’s work.  Large crop shocks increase the 
probability that a child will have a higher work ranking by .58 while small crop losses 
have no significant effects.  Morbidity shocks to other children in the household also 
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increase children’s work intensity, raising the probability that they will be at a higher 
subjective ranking by .31.    
Table 4.16:  Ordered Probit with Random Effects and Shocks 
  School Work 
Large Crop Loss -0.309 0.584*** 
(1=Yes) (0.207)    (0.142) 
Small Crop Loss 0.0871 0.201 
(1=Yes) (0.194)  (0.139) 
Adult Male Sick 0.071 0.0108 
(1=Yes) (0.188)  (0.140) 
Adult Female Sick -0.0152 -0.0769 
(1=Yes) (0.211)   (0.150) 
Child Sick -0.36 0.310* 
(1=Yes) (0.225)    (0.163) 
Observations 1626 1626 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects.  All 
coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are 
multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 USD. 
All covariates are included in regression, but 
coefficients are not reported for brevity.  
Asset-shock interactions by households provide evidence about the role that different 
asset and shock types may have on child labor and school intensity.  These results are 
presented in Table 4.15.  Durables lower the selection probability that a child increases 
work intensity in response to large crop shocks by 8.1% for each additional 100,000 
FCFA of asset value that the household owns.  For the same increment of durables, a 
11% greater probability was estimated that a child will report increased schooling 
intensity in the face of a large production shock.  Agricultural capital value interacted 
with a large crop loss had negative effects on children’s school and positive effects on 
children’s work intensity, but the estimated effects were much larger (-1.085 and .464, 
respectively).  Households with higher levels of agricultural capital may have more 
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ex-post smoothing mechanisms, but these strategies inevitably require labor for which 
children may be an available source.  Livestock values, like durables, increased the 
probability that the child spent more time in school and less time working in the face 
of large production shocks.  Smaller production shocks interacted with assets had no 
significant effects on the subjective assessments of children.   
When asset-illness shock interactions are estimated, an increase of 100,000 FCFA in 
durables lowers a children’s subjective work ranking with probability 7.8% when an 
adult male is sick.  Livestock value interacted with women’s sicknesses also mitigate 
the effects of increased labor demands from the households on children.  The 
probability that a child reports a lower level of work is decreased by 5.1% for each 
additional 100,000 FCFA of livestock value and higher levels of schooling by 6.3%. 
When another child falls ill, increased livestock values decrease the intensity of 
children’s schooling time by 6.4%.  However, agricultural capital interacted with other 
children’s sickness increases the probability that a child has a higher work ranking by 
69%.   
VII: Conclusions 
Child labor substitution effects caused by exposure to shocks have potentially large 
welfare implications for children and longer term intergenerational effects for children 
of undereducated parents.  The empirical results presented in this chapter show less 
compelling labor substitution patterns than in the participation data.  This suggests that 
households add workers to increase labor supply as a first response rather than 
increase the hours of household members already working in an activity.  However, if 
measurement error contaminates the hours data, then increased variability of results, 
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without biasing coefficient estimates, could explain less statistically significant 
patterns.  As an alternative to hours data, the subjective module data is consistent with 
participation data presented in Chapter 3, since it may minimize proxy respondent bias 
from parents.    
Subjective evaluations by children indicate that when their household faces a 
production shock, their work time increases and schooling time decreases.  Durables 
and livestock assets increase children’s time in school and decrease their work time in 
the face of large production shocks.  This suggests that these asset stock help mitigate 
child labor responses to shocks.  However, stocks of agricultural capital have the 
opposite effect.  In the face of large production shocks, children work more when their 
families have access to agricultural capital which presents a specific challenge to the 
program design of development interventions in northern Mali.  Because of 
widespread food insecurity due to a lack of public investment and poor agro-
ecological conditions, agricultural interventions often have as objective to increase 
agricultural productivity by increasing the farmer’s agricultural capital.  While the 
farmer may be more productive, it also requires more labor inputs, especially when 
exposed to production shocks.  Programs should be aware that farmers not only 
require assistance in increasing farm production, but decreasing the variability of 
production caused by crop loss shocks.  Linking interventions to continued school 
enrollment or providing crop insurance would be one program design feature that 
would minimize the impact of increased labor demand on children when households 
are exposed to production shocks.   
Given other evidence from social protection programs (de Janvry et al. 2006, 
Ravallion and Wodon 2000), this suggests an important continued area of child labor 
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research into how households may use child labor as an ex-post response to 
idiosyncratic shocks, even with access to social protection or other development 
interventions designed to minimize exposure to risk.  
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CHAPTER 5:  ACCESS TO IRRIGATION AND THE ESCAPE FROM POVERTY:  
EVIDENCE FROM NORTHERN MALI 
 I. Introduction 
Empirical evidence suggests that irrigation projects have positive impacts on 
agricultural production and the reduction of poverty for farmers (von Braun, Puetz, 
and Webb 1989; Hussain and Hanjra 2004; Smith 2004; Lipton 2007; and Hussain 
2007b).  Access to irrigation provides farmers with a reliable water source at critical 
times in the crop’s life cycle, removing the dependence and inherent uncertainty of 
rainfed and lake-based agricultural systems in arid and semiarid regions of northern 
Mali.  This reduction in risk faced by farmers is likely not only to increase mean 
agricultural returns but also to reduce their vulnerability to income fluctuations.  While 
farmers are exposed to unforeseen production shocks regardless of the production 
system, irrigation minimizes these shocks by permitting a wider range of ex-post 
smoothing mechanisms to be used, which causes fewer distress sales of crop stocks or 
assets.  Lipton (2007) reports that in India, irrigated areas had 2.5 times lower standard 
deviation of crop output per year during the period 1971—84.  
Because irrigation investment is not homogeneous between or within countries, this 
paper contributes to the literature on the impact of internationally financed irrigation 
projects on household agricultural production, household consumption, and nutrient 
intakes in northern Mali, an area that possesses few of the preconditions for 
agricultural growth, such as good quality soil, frequent and adequate rainfall, moderate 
temperatures, and sufficient infrastructure.  Most international attention has been paid 
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to the Office du Niger irrigation scheme
38
 in the Segou region of Mali.  However, 
small-scale village-level projects (30–40 hectares) and larger-scale projects (500 
hectares) dot the inner Niger delta and north of Tombouctou into the Saharan desert, 
which is one of the poorest regions of Mali and an area hardest hit by the Sahel 
droughts
39
.  These irrigation projects are not investments by farmers in boreholes or 
wells for irrigating their personal fields; rather they are community-level investments 
that result from household, village, and international organization partnerships.  
Borehole or well investment by households is less frequent in northern Mali because 
of its arid climate, which results in a low water table and increased difficulty in 
constructing wells.  The dominant type of irrigation project considered here are those 
that use motorized pumps to redistribute water from the Niger River throughout a 
canal irrigation system.  
The analysis in this paper is based on field research, including a multi-topic household 
survey in northern Mali, conducted in 1997–9840 and again in 2006.   Because these 
data were not generated as a random experiment, several identification problems exist, 
which the econometric strategy attempts to control.  The first is the endogeneity of 
access to irrigation due to nonrandom program placement.  This bias occurs when 
intentional or implicit targeting rules are used to allocate projects to villages.  These 
village-level characteristics are more likely to correlate with the explanatory variables 
                                                 
38
 The Office du Niger was originally constructed in 1932 as a gravity irrigation scheme during French 
colonialism.  While widely regarded as a failure into the early 1970s, a restructuring of the Office du 
Niger from 1979 to 1996 has improved the technical efficiency of the institution and increased grain 
yields for farmers (Couture, Lavigne Delville, and Spinat 2002).  
39
 Understanding the effectiveness of these projects is not only of economic importance but also 
political importance.  The Government of Mali has used investment in irrigation and infrastructure in 
Northern Mali as a strategy to bring peace to an area of social unrest caused, in part, by economic 
destitution.   
40
 These data, originally collected by Luc Christiaensen with support from John Hoddinott, have been 
made available by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (Christiaensen 1998)  
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if the programs are allocated either to highly productive areas to ensure program 
success or to less productive areas to target the poor.  In either case, estimates of the 
project impact derived from outcome indicators will contain upward or downward 
bias, respectively, due to the group’s pretreatment characteristics. 
A second source of bias in program estimates is the selection bias due to non-
mandatory program participation.  Access to irrigation is likely to be correlated with 
household characteristics such as education, which may influence the likelihood of 
technology adoption or the ability of a farmer to lobby on behalf of his community for 
the intervention; access to water, which is a necessary condition for motorized 
irrigation; and whether households live in rural or urban areas, which may increase the 
facility of program implementation.  Program placement is not random.  Unless the 
allocation of program interventions was intentionally randomized or can be viewed as 
a natural experiment, the distribution of observable and unobservable village and 
household characteristics between treatment (with irrigation) and comparison groups 
(without irrigation) will not be statistically equivalent.   
The econometric strategy employed to address the nonrandomized program placement 
in villages and adoption decisions by households within these villages is threefold.  
Difference in differences, propensity score matching, and matched difference-in-
differences estimators are estimated, drawing on a growing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the estimation of program effects from non-experimental data (Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Smith and Todd 2005; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
2004; Jalan and Ravallion 2003; and Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007).  As a robustness 
check for the propensity score matching and matched difference-in-differences 
estimates, four different estimators (nearest-neighbor matching, matching with 10 
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closest neighbors, kernel Epanechnikov, and local linear matching are employed to 
produce point estimates.  Estimates of the impact of irrigation are robust to both 
econometric strategy and choice of estimator.  Despite these robustness checks, it 
should be noted that the fundamental role that unobservables may have in driving 
these relationships is not adequately addressed by difference in differences or 
propensity score matching.  Because irrigation investments were not allocated to 
villages randomly and participants were not selected into plots randomly,
41
 the paper 
cannot completely rule out the question of whether unobservable characteristics drive 
the relationship.  However, because allocation of village-level projects is predicated on 
proximity to the Niger River, there are strong observable characteristics that facilitate 
the construction of legitimate treatment and comparison groups.   
Besides measuring the impact of irrigation, this paper attempts to reconcile differences 
in impact assessments made using agricultural production and household 
consumption.  Because increases in agricultural production do not necessarily transfer 
one-to-one into gains in household consumption, critics of irrigation suggest that 
increased input costs erode the benefits of irrigation projects (Kouyate and Haidara 
2006). However, empirical evidence from other antipoverty programs suggests that if 
a participant’s time horizon is sufficiently short, the program may be viewed as a 
temporary intervention, yielding no changes in a participants’ permanent income 
(Ravallion and Chen 2005).  This paper investigates the hypothesis that households 
may save surpluses in agricultural production by accumulating livestock. 
Alternatively, irrigators sharing additional food gained from irrigation with non-
irrigators in their village could also explain the discrepancy between average effects of 
                                                 
41
 Although in most villages, after the irrigation scheme is built, participants are allocated an irrigated 
plot randomly in the village scheme.  This controls, at least, for differences in unobserved soil quality 
among adopters.   
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irrigation on production and consumption.  Either hypothesis would understate the 
gains from irrigation if household consumption were used as the sole measure of 
welfare.  As part of a study of potentially offsetting secondary effects of irrigation, the 
paper examines whether access to irrigation increases the demand for child labor and 
induces changes in household composition due to increased labor demands.   
This paper’s organization is standard.  The second chapter presents a household model 
of agricultural investment and risk.  The third chapter describes the data and survey 
area. Chapter 4 presents the econometric strategy.  Chapter 5 presents the estimates of 
the direct effects of irrigation on household consumption, agricultural production, and 
nutrient intakes and discusses the secondary effects of irrigation, including livestock 
accumulation, food sharing within villages, household composition, and child labor. 
These variables measure potential ex-ante changes to household savings behavior, 
informal insurance networks, and labor demand induced by access to irrigation.  A 
final chapter concludes the paper.  
II. A Model of Irrigation Investment and Risk 
Rosenzweig and Binswinger (1993) propose a theoretical model to investigate the 
relationship between risk and agricultural investment.  In this paper, the model is 
applied to irrigation investments made jointly by international organizations and 
village agricultural producers to install irrigation schemes.  Sensitivity to risk is 
captured in the theoretical framework by modeling farm households whose utility 
function values not only mean consumption over time but also the variability of this 
consumption.   
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Consider a farm household that maximizes utility over mean consumption, μc, and 
wants to minimize the standard deviation of consumption, ζ c.  The farm household 
maximizes a utility function V such that: 
( , )c cU V   ,                   (5.1) 
where 0V   and 0V  .  The farmer produces output by choosing productive 
investments iI , where 1,...,i N , such as fertilizer, irrigation, or high-yielding seeds.  
Meyer (1987) and Meyer and Rasche (1992) show that this mean-standard deviation 
approach is equivalent to expected utility maximization under the location and scale 
parameters condition.  That is, when random variables differ only by location and 
scale, rankings based on expected utility or moments of the distribution are consistent.  
The farm household realizes a profit from investment decisions such that: 
( , )ipf x I wx   ,                    (5.2) 
where p is the vector of output prices for the production function, ( , )if x I , which 
produces a vector of outputs.  The production technology, (.)f , transforms inputs x, 
such as labor, purchased at cost, w.  (.)f  has a positive first derivative and a negative 
second derivative.  Agricultural investments, Ii, are assumed to exhibit constant returns 
to scale in the production function.  Households allocate a fraction of their wealth, W, 
to agricultural technology.  This is determined by the function g(αi), where αi is a 
vector of the value share of investment opportunity i from total wealth, W.  This term 
g(αi)W does not enter the profit function as a cost because it is a portfolio allocation of 
wealth.   
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Agricultural risk is characterized as a mean, μr , and a standard deviation, σ r.  Then, 
following Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), the mean and standard deviation of 
farmers’ profits given by Equation 5.2 is: 
( )i rg W   ,                   (5.3) 
( )i rW    ,                   (5.4) 
where  (αi) measures the riskiness of the investment portfolio.   Assume also the 
second derivatives of g(αi) and  (αi) are less than zero.  Then the mean of 
consumption is  
( , )c S N    ,                   (5.5) 
where mean agricultural profits,  , are scaled by a function that allocates a fraction 
of mean profits between household savings, S, and intravillage sharing according to 
social norms, N.  The standard deviation of consumption is 
ζ c = κ (W) ζ π ,                   (5.6) 
where κ (W) is a function of wealth that interacts with the standard deviation of 
profits, and it is assumed that κ’ (W) < 0, or increased wealth, mutes the effects of 
changes in the standard deviation of profit on the standard deviation of consumption. 
The standard deviation of agricultural profits scaled by a function of wealth [κ (W)] 
varies with the standard deviation of consumption to permit a wide variety of 
assumptions concerning financial markets.  If ζ c = ζ π (that is, κ (W) = 1), the 
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illiquidity of the asset market is implicitly assumed.  The alternative assumption would 
be that ζ c = 0, which implies that households can fully insure against income 
uncertainty.   
Since V is quasi-concave, the first-order conditions are given by   
( , ) ( ) ( )i rV S N g V W        .                      (5.7) 
Profit maximization requires that ( ) 0ig   , since 1( )i i ig g g    , the marginal 
contribution to mean profits must be equalized across investments, given the 
optimality of farmer decisions.  Since the right-hand side of the equation is negative, 
farm households who are risk averse, with a diverse portfolio of investments, have 
mean profits that will be lower than optimal.  That is, farmers pay a premium to 
reduce risk, which is the difference between optimal mean profits and mean profits 
that result from the solution to equation (5.7).    
Consider now an irrigation investment that has a high fixed cost but a large mean 
profit return and a reduction in the standard deviation of profits.  Farm households will 
clearly undertake the investment, given the quasi-concavity of the utility function if W 
> C, where C is the cost of the irrigation investment.  However, if borrowing 
constraints exist and C is larger than W, which it will often be for mechanized 
irrigation projects, then a net social welfare loss is sustained by beneficiaries of the 
project (B) if 
1 1
B B
I N
i i
C  
 
   ,                       (5.8) 
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and                                                                
1 1
0
I N
B B
i iB B
  
 
   .                      (5.9) 
Equations 5.8 and 5.9 state, first, that for irrigation investment to be an efficient 
investment, the difference between mean profits from irrigation, aggregated across all 
beneficiaries, and the next greatest mean profit from an investment, aggregated across 
all beneficiaries, ought to be larger than the cost of the irrigation investment.  Second, 
the mean variance of the irrigation investment for beneficiaries should be less than the 
mean variance from the next most profitable investment opportunity.  However, there 
also may be cases where the difference in mean profits between irrigators and non-
irrigators is large enough that, even if the standard deviation of profits is larger than 
that for non-irrigators, an irrigation investment would still increase social welfare.  
This case may exist because learning by doing from newer irrigation adopters will 
create higher variability in profits or the crop choice induced by irrigation, such as 
rice, has higher variance in yield due to its greater sensitivity to inputs (water, 
fertilizer, timing of labor inputs) then other rain-fed crops like millet.   
What this model does not address is how households choose to allocate their 
additional surplus.  Surplus from profitable investments can be consumed, saved, or 
shared with other villagers, as a form of altruism or quasi-insurance against 
idiosyncratic shocks.  In addition to testing the impact of irrigation investments on 
agricultural production, consumption, and nutrient intakes, this paper investigates 
whether households allocate unconsumed agricultural surplus to savings or to 
intravillage sharing.  It also estimates the average treatment effects of irrigation on 
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child labor, a potentially negative secondary effect of irrigation, caused by increased 
labor demand by irrigators.   
III. Survey Area and Data Description 
The data for this paper were collected as part of the Poverty and Food Security 
Household Survey in Northern Mali 2006 (Etude sur la Pauvreté et la Sécurité 
Alimentaire au Nord Mali 2006) conducted by the author.  This multitopic household 
survey was implemented to study household behavior related to human capital 
formation and agricultural production in northern Mali.  Of the 2,658 households in 
the sample, 245 households in the commune of Soboundou, Niafunke, that were 
originally surveyed in a similar study conducted in 1997–98, were resurveyed twice in 
2006.  Sample attrition from the 1997–98 round was 12 percent, which is within the 
bound of attrition commonly found by other surveys (Alderman et al. 2000). Further 
details related to tracking households from the 1997–98 survey and detailed 
methodological documentation of the survey design and implementation can be found 
in Dillon (2005) and in the previous chapter of this paper.  
The data set is composed of a village questionnaire and a household questionnaire.  
The village questionnaire was administered to village leaders in each village or town 
included in the study.  The household questionnaire was divided into men’s, women’s, 
and children’s sections and was addressed to the head of household and the head of 
household’s wife and children, respectively.  Data were collected on a wide range of 
variables to analyze the household’s agricultural production, income-generating 
activities, livestock, assets, education, health, and demographic composition.  
Questions concerning the household’s composition, education, primary activities, 
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migratory status of household members, and history of positive and negative economic 
shocks were addressed to the head of household, usually a man.  Questions concerning 
the household’s food consumption, meals shared between households, and health and 
dietary diversity were addressed to women.  Sections concerning possessions, nonfood 
expenditures, agricultural production, herding activities, credit, and time allocation 
were addressed to both men and women. 
Agroecological conditions throughout most areas of Northern Mali would not be 
favorable for agricultural production without the Niger River, which is the dominant 
ecological resource in the region.  The inner Niger Delta is a potentially productive 
agricultural area in which flooding from the Niger augments water levels in temporary 
and permanent lakes and ponds, as well as smaller streams and tributaries.  Land 
quality deteriorates as the distance from the river increases.  Farmers harness water 
resources through motorized pump irrigation and the use of water-recession 
agriculture around the lakes and streams and in the Niger River itself, as its water 
levels decrease seasonally.  Rain-fed agriculture that does not depend on the water 
levels of the Niger River is also extensively practiced.  However, rain-fed agriculture 
is a difficult endeavor.  The Saharan zone (a desert or arid region) receives less than 
150 millimeters of rainfall per year. This varies starkly with the Sahelien zone (a 
grassland or semi-arid region), which receives 200–600 millimeters per year, and the 
south of Mali, which can receive as much as 600—1,200 millimeters per year 
(Christiaensen 1998).  
Despite persistent poverty in northern Mali, it is important to note that the agricultural 
sector has not remained static over the past eight years.  Table 5.1 illustrates the 
distribution of water control systems used by farmers in northern Mali.  Since 1997, 
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the agricultural sector has shifted toward irrigated agriculture, with a 30 percent 
increase in access to irrigation in the sample studied.  While the utilization of rain-fed 
agriculture has remained somewhat constant, producers using lake-based systems have 
substantially declined.  The increasing number of producers using solely a lake-based 
system is swamped by the decline in those using lake and rain-fed systems in tandem.  
The increase in use of irrigation correlates with the increase in irrigation investment by 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which began making irrigation 
investments in the late 1990s, as a post-conflict development strategy following the 
Touareg Rebellion.   
Table 5.1: Utilization of different agricultural production systems 
(% of farmers who use the different systems) 
 
 1997–98 2005–06 
Irrigation 0.4% 30% 
Lake 6.8% 18.50% 
Rainfed 35.0% 33% 
Irrigation and  lake 0.0% 1% 
Irrigation and rain 9.4% 10% 
Lake and rain 41.9% 6% 
Irrigation, lake, and 
rain 6.4% 2% 
Notes: N = 246. The different agricultural systems are 
defined by the system that the farmer uses to water his plot.  
These include a strictly irrigated system, a lake system, 
rainfed agriculture, and combinations of these three. 
Production is highly labor-intensive with low levels of agricultural capital available to 
households.  Median agricultural capital is approximately 32,000 CFA francs (FCFA) 
per household, or 70 US dollars.  Other factors that contribute to higher agricultural 
productivity include labor inputs, crop choice, area cultivated, and input utilization.  
The median household uses 225 days of labor to cultivate 1.4 hectares.  Median 
expenditures on seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and manure inputs are 26,248 FCFA 
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(US$58) with the majority of input expenditure spent on seed and fertilizer.  These 
low levels of input utilization reflect a multiplicity of farming constraints, including 
limited access to inputs and technical capacity for appropriate inputs, as well as credit 
constraints.   
In the survey area, access to irrigation is facilitated by international organizations and 
NGOs who provide motorized pumps to villages at no charge or significantly 
discounted prices, which are then reimbursed over an extended period of time and 
with the condition that villages contribute labor for the construction of the irrigation 
infrastructure, undertake pump maintenance, and provide fuel for the pump’s 
operation.  Irrigation is primarily used for rice cultivation, rather than sorghum or 
millet, two traditionally rain-fed crops.  Rice production that relies on irrigation is 
cropped once per agricultural cycle.  Internationally, increased agricultural production 
from a dual cropping system is commonly cited as a benefit of irrigation.  However, 
the arid context in northern Mali does not allow a second cropping season after rice 
cultivation.  This is because temperatures in the dry season are high (in excess of 40º 
C) and receding river levels  make it impossible to provide the minimum water 
required for rice plants or other cash crops. The benefits of irrigation in northern Mali 
are accrued through increased water supply and control during the primary agricultural 
season.   
Table 5. 2 investigates the relationship between agricultural production and household 
consumption descriptively.  Mean agricultural production is 2.1 tons, compared with 
643 kilograms using a lake-recession system, or 288 kilograms using rainfed 
agriculture.  Mean total annual household consumption (2,085,778 FCFA) is also 
highest when farmers use irrigation.  Farmers who use ng rainfed agriculture have 
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slightly higher household consumption than those who use lake-recession agriculture, 
but the difference is only 23,000 FCFA (less than US$50) over an entire year.  The 
standard deviations of both agricultural production and consumption are higher under 
irrigation than under the two other water-control systems. Differences in farmer’s 
skills may also generate greater variation in household production and consumption 
variables, because rice cultivation requires cultivation of seedlings that then must be 
replanted with appropriate space between plants in the irrigated plot.  Rice seedlings 
are also highly sensitive to the timing and dosages of fertilizer.  Despite the higher 
standard deviations of consumption and production, the high means of agricultural 
production with irrigation relative to other water-control systems indicates that rice 
production is not necessarily a higher risk investment for the farmer.  This is because 
the standard deviation may not be equivalent to ―risk,‖ when farmers evaluate both the 
mean yield and standard deviation of a different agricultural technology before 
adopting.   
Table 5.2:  Total household agricultural production and  
consumption in 2006, by water control system 
Total Household 
Agricultural 
Production Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 
Percentile 
50
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile 
Irrigation 2,147.4 1,649.9 1,188 1,725.9 2,400 
Lake-recession  643 933.5 157.5 270 679.5 
Rainfed 288.4 283.3 121.3 196 406.7 
Total 1202.1 1473.5 196 620.4 1758.9 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Total Household 
Consumption  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 
Percentile 
50
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile 
Irrigation 2,085,778 1,490,314 1,180,530 1,938,500 2,615,860 
Lake-recession  1,356,355 844,554 698,200 1,141,015 1,758,480 
Rainfed 1,586,750 1,027,597 728,150 1,500,581 2,150,700 
Total 1,724,158 1,221,531 785,500 1,501,691 2,254,350 
Notes:  N=246. Total household agricultural production is measured production of male and female 
household plots during the 2005/06 agricultural season in kilograms.  Total household consumption is 
the annualized household consumption aggregate calculated from men and women’s assets, non-food 
and food expenditures following Deaton and Zaidi (2002).   
Because of the labor intensity of farm production in northern Mali, lack of inputs, 
high rice prices relative to other cereals, and large differences (more than 1 ton) in 
production per hectare between rice and other grains, investment in irrigation is likely 
to have a high return.  Table 5.3 illustrates changes in total agricultural production 
and nutrient intakes between the 1998 and 2006 surveys by village.  The percentage 
of households with access to irrigation in 2006 by village is reported in column 3 of 
Table 5.3.  Villages with access to irrigation had dramatic increases in agricultural 
production and daily household caloric intake, with the exception of the village of 
Ouaki.  For the entire sample, however, the mean household daily caloric intake 
increased by only 138 calories over the eight years between the surveys.   
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Table 5.3:  Descriptive statistics:  Access to irrigation,  
agricultural production, and caloric intake by village 
Village Number 
Percentage 
of 
Households 
with Access 
to Irrigation 
in 2006 
Total 
Agricultural 
Production, 
1997–98 
Total 
Agricultural 
Production, 
2005–06 
Total Daily 
Household 
Calories, 
1998 
Total 
Daily 
Househol
d 
Calories, 
2006 
 
              
Aldianabangou 15 0 61.3 156.3 8,354 7,752  
Tomba 36 68 61.1 2,309.0 4,888 6,309  
Mangourou 27 0 154.3 192.4 5,295 5,588  
Gouaty 7 0 54.6 359.3 4,682 8,252  
N'goro 54 0 417.0 377.6 6,206 5,425  
Tomi 12 75 757.9 2,735.4 5,744 8,389  
Hamakoira 17 59 309.7 2,006.2 5,716 9,285  
Goundam 
Touskel 12 0 962.4 962.5 8,000 6,293 
 
Ouaki 47 28 1,060.5 1,022.6 6,833 5,639  
  Anguira 19 0 213.3 674.3 4,141 3,885  
Total 246 0.24 447.1 1,028.2 6,048 6,186  
Notes:  Agricultural production is calculated as in the previous table.  Daily household calories are 
imputed from food intake data.    
Tables 5.4.A and 5.4.B disaggregate changes in real consumption by initial quartiles to 
assess whether gains or losses in consumption were equally distributed across the 
quartiles.  Total household consumption is adjusted using a Paasche price index of 
grain prices.
42
  Since budget shares for the households in the sample range from 73 to 
88 percent of the household budget, this approximation is an adequate representation 
of the real prices facing households.  In all the villages with access to irrigation, the 
largest percentage changes in real consumption occurred at the lowest quartile.  
Changes in consumption for the lowest quartile with irrigation range between 29.8 and 
61.4 percent, while the rate of change for the whole sample is only 23.3 percent. 
                                                 
42
 A Paasche price index is constructed that is composed of rice, sorghum, and millet prices and 
quantities from the 1998 and 2006 survey rounds, following Deaton and Zaidi (2002).  
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Table 5.4.A:  Descriptive statistics: Total real consumption  
by village and expenditure quartile 
Village Variable 
Consumption 
1998 
Consumption 
2006 
% 
Change 
Aldianabougou N 15   
 
25th 
Percentile 457,310 414,612 -10.30% 
 
50th 
Percentile 571,500 699,878 18.30% 
  
75th 
Percentile 890,485 1,023,894 13.00% 
Tomba* N     
 
25th 
Percentile 236,204 391,448 39.70% 
 
50th 
Percentile 398,780 487,046 18.10% 
  
75th 
Percentile 574,528 727,867 21.10% 
Mangarou N 27   
 
25th 
Percentile 252,360 355,582 29.00% 
 
50th 
Percentile 282,648 516,960 45.30% 
  
75th 
Percentile 376,765 756,938 50.20% 
Gouaty N 7   
 
25th 
Percentile 70,485 214,187 67.10% 
 
50th 
Percentile 167,278 788,450 78.80% 
  
75th 
Percentile 772,840 1,194,649 35.30% 
N'goro N 54   
 
25th 
Percentile 370,373 272,836 -35.70% 
 
50th 
Percentile 603,695 416,862 -44.80% 
  
75th 
Percentile 963,610 563,961 -70.90% 
Notes:  *  denotes villages with access to irrigation.  Total household consumption is the 
annualized household consumption aggregate calculated from men and women’s assets, non-
food and food expenditures following Deaton and Zaidi (2002).  Real consumption aggregates 
were calculated using a Paasche price index as described in the text.    
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Table 5.4.B:  Descriptive statistics: Total real consumption  
by village and expenditure quartile 
 Village Variable Consumption1998 Consumption 2006 % Change 
  Tomi* N 12   
  25th Percentile 234,075 443,177 47.20% 
  50th Percentile 347,885 672,364 48.30% 
  75th Percentile 551,365 849,806 35.10% 
  Hamakoira* N 17   
  25th Percentile 177,560 459,855 61.40% 
  50th Percentile 368,765 654,008 43.60% 
  75th Percentile 478,750 980,372 51.20% 
  Goundam Touskel N 12   
  25th Percentile 234,560 380,632 38.40% 
  50th Percentile 362,880 526,776 31.10% 
  75th Percentile 540,273 710,009 23.90% 
  Ouaki* N 47   
  25th Percentile 204,490 291,196 29.80% 
  50th Percentile 341,265 430,489 20.70% 
  75th Percentile 544,673 660,106 17.50% 
  Anguira N 19   
  25th Percentile 110,740 199,824 44.60% 
  50th Percentile 188,075 285,570 34.10% 
  75th Percentile 364,305 529,828 31.20% 
 All Villages N 246   
  25th Percentile 252,360 329,119 23.30% 
  50th Percentile 399,070 482,522 17.30% 
   75th Percentile 613,710 714,636 14.10% 
Notes:  *  denotes villages with access to irrigation.  Total household consumption is the annualized 
household consumption aggregate calculated from men and women’s assets, non-food and food 
expenditures following Deaton and Zaidi (2002).  Real consumption aggregates were calculated using a 
Paasche price index as described in the text.    
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Figures 5.1 to 5.3 provide descriptive evidence of the differences in the kernel 
densities for total household consumption, agricultural production, and total livestock 
units held by the households, disaggregated by access to irrigation. The dashed lines 
represents the density of the comparison group of households without irrigation in 
2006, while the solid line represents the density of households with access to irrigation 
in 2006.  The shapes of these densities are relatively similar; however the means are 
clearly higher in the irrigation densities.  These density estimates are only descriptive, 
in the sense that none of the selection bias is accounted for by disaggregating the 
densities according to irrigation access.  In the next chapter, different econometric 
strategies for estimating the returns to irrigation on production, consumption per 
capita, and nutrient intakes are discussed, controlling for selection bias and 
endogenous program placement.  
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Figure 5.1:  Kernel density estimates of total household consumption (in FCFAs) 
for households with and without irrigation 
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Figure 5.2:  Kernel density estimates of total household agricultural  
production for households with and without irrigation 
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Figure 5.3:  Kernel density estimates of total household livestock  
units for households with and without irrigation 
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IV. Estimating Treatment Effects Using Nonexperimental Data 
To estimate average treatment effects, recognizing the problem of selection bias 
between treatment and comparison groups, one ideally wants to estimate Δ = Yt
1
-Yt
0
, 
which is the difference of the outcome variable of interest at time t between two 
treatments, denoted by the superscripts 1 and 0.  However, the econometrician is 
unable to estimate Δ in this way because a household cannot receive two treatments 
simultaneously.  The evaluation problem is one of missing data, due to the 
impossibility of assigning households to both treatment and control groups.  The 
econometrician is forced to measure the average treatment effect (ATE) given the 
observable data: 
1 0( | 1) ( | 0)t tATE E Y T E Y T    .                   (5.10)  
When data are generated through a properly implemented random experimental 
design, the expectations of the treatment and comparison groups are equal because the 
groups are  composed of randomly allocated members, ensuring that the distribution of 
observable and unobservable characteristics of the groups are equivalent in a statistical 
sense.  With a randomized design, the selection bias, 1 0( | 1) ( | 0)t tE Y T E Y T   , 
equals zero, which establishes that the estimate of the average treatment effect 
provides an unbiased estimate of its impact.  
Randomized experiments are not always possible or plausibly implemented, so that 
absence of selection bias is a credible assumption.  Hence, applied econometricians 
163 
 
are often forced to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated households 
(ATT), given a vector household characteristic, X :   
1 0 1 0( | , 1) ( | , 1) ( | , 1) ( | , 0)t t t tATT E X T E Y Y X T E Y X T E Y X T          , 
         (5.11) 
where, because 0( | , 1)tE Y X T   is unobservable, it is assumed that: 
0 0( | , 1) ( | , 0)t tE Y X T E Y X T   .               (5.12) 
Difference in differences, propensity score matching, and difference-in-differences 
matching estimators require identification assumptions with nonexperimental data.  
An important body of literature has tested these nonexperimental estimators against 
experimental benchmarks and against each other (see, for example, Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Smith and Todd 
2005; and Diaz and Handa 2006. Nonexperimental estimators can perform well if the 
set of observable characteristics is rich enough to create valid treatment and 
comparison groups. The advantages and disadvantages of these estimators are 
described below.   
Difference-in-Differences 
The difference-in-differences (DID) estimator is estimated by comparing the mean 
changes between treatment and control groups over two periods.  The DID estimator 
controls for treatment group fixed effects by differencing.  However, the DID 
estimator assumes that rates of change between the two groups would have been the 
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same without the development intervention.  The identification of this estimator 
requires the following three assumptions (Smith and Todd 2005).  The first is that 
there are no differences in unobservables between the treatment and comparison 
groups E (εh1- εh0) = 0.   The second is that there is no interaction between the 
observables and the treatment E [(εh1- εh0) T] = 0.  Lastly, identification of the 
difference-in-differences estimator requires that there is no interaction between the 
differences in unobservables and the observable characteristics of the treatment and 
comparison groups, or E[(εh1- εh0) (X h1- X h0)] = 0 .   
Difference in differences estimates control for time-invariant fixed effects by 
differencing them out of the estimates.  However, there are potentially several sources 
of unaccounted bias.  The first source of bias could be the result of the effects of 
program interventions on the comparison group.  Because the original sample is 
composed of 10 villages within the same district, effects of the irrigation investment 
may ―rub off‖ on the control group.  This would diminish the impact estimate 
constructed by making comparisons between control and treatment groups.  However, 
due to the relatively large distances between villages and the paucity of public or 
private transportation, these effects are likely to be small at best.  Four out of 10 
villages in the original study are located on the opposite sides of the Niger River, so a 
physical barrier inhibits easy interaction between villages.  The second source of bias 
is due to possible selection bias.  If initial conditions that influence village- and 
household-level welfare are correlated with the selection criteria for program 
participation, biased impact assessments will result.  In our case, access to irrigation is 
strongly predicated by access to the Niger River.  Villages that have access to the 
Niger may have more commercial activities and lower transportation costs, which 
would increase their purchasing power.  While difference in differences estimates do 
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not completely control for this selection bias, using propensity score matching or 
propensity score matching along with the difference in differences estimates can 
control for the correlation between observable factors influencing household welfare 
and program participation.     
Propensity Score Matching 
To estimate the effects of irrigation, propensity scores are used to match households 
with similar observable characteristics, varying only the treatment, which is access to 
irrigation.  Households are matched to each other conditional on a set of observable 
household and village characteristics, Z and V, respectively.  Propensity scores are 
estimated to match households with similar observable characteristics, varying only 
the treatment—access to irrigation.  The following probit model is estimated using a 
vector of household characteristics, Z and village characteristics, V, to obtain 
predictions of household propensity scores, where: 
*
, , , ,v h v h v h v hP Z V     ,                (5.13) 
where   Pv, h = 1 , if P
*
v, h > 0              (5.14) 
         = 0 otherwise.  
Then the distribution of Pv h,, given Z v h, V v,h,, yields the familiar result: 
*
, , , , , ,( 1| , ) ( 0 | , )v h v h v h v h v h v hP P Z V P P Z V    
           , , , , ,( | , )v h v h v h v h v hP Z V Z V       
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, , , ,1 ( ) ( )v h v h v h v hZ V Z V          
                                  =1-Ф(-β Z v, h - γ Vv, h ),                      (5.15) 
where Ф(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.   
 
To estimate equation (5.13), household variables are used as controls, including 
household size, household assets such as household durables and total livestock units, 
the age of the household head, an education indicator for the household head and his 
or her spouse, an ethnicity indicator variable, and landholdings.  Village 
characteristics include indicators for distance to the nearest road, distance to the Niger 
River, and the log price for transporting a sack of rice to Mopti, a regional center.  
These characteristics control for village development; access to water, which is a 
necessary precondition for pump agriculture, given the dearth of rainfall; and market 
integration.  When the propensity score matching estimates are generated, the sample 
is also restricted to matches within villages, so that intervillage fixed effects do not 
bias the estimates.  Table 5.5 displays the descriptive statistics for the household and 
village characteristics.   
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Table 5.5:  Household descriptive statistics for propensity matching 
Household Characteristics     Education of Head (1 if yes) 0.11 
Access to Irrigation 0.23    (0.31) 
  (0.42)  Education of Spouse (1 if yes) 0.07 
Age of Household head* 3.86    (0.26) 
  (0.69)  Ethnicity   
Household Durables*  11.1  Peulh (1 if yes)  0.18 
  (1)    (0.38) 
Total Livestock Units 3.05  Village Characteristics  
  (5.69)  
Road through 
Village  0.26 
Land (Hectares) 2.18    (0.44) 
  (2.80)  
Road between 1-
10kms  0.45 
Land Squared (Hectares) 9.23    (0.50) 
  (22.81)  River Access  0.31 
Household size* 1.40    (0.46) 
  (0.50)  
Rice Transport Price 
to Mopti  2152.66 
            (568.37) 
Notes: N=242.  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Mopti is the nearest urban area.  
* denotes the natural logarithm of a variable was taken and used for analysis.  
These variables are used in the specification to generate the propensity scores that 
should satisfy the balancing property.  That is, the treatment and comparison 
observations are tested to ensure equality of observables across different propensity 
score groupings, so that there is an appropriate distribution of characteristics in each 
grouping of propensity scores.  The assumption that 0 < P(T=1 | Z ) < 1 is satisfied in 
our sample and the top and bottom 5 percent of the sample have been trimmed, 
following Smith and Todd (2005).  Figure 5.4 illustrates the region of common 
support from the density estimates of the propensity scores by treatment status.   
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of propensity scores for households with  
irrigation and without irrigation 
Four matching estimators are employed as robustness checks.  These estimators 
include a single nearest-neighbor matching estimator with replacement, a nearest-
neighbor estimator using the 10 nearest neighbors with replacement, an Epanechnikov 
kernel-matching estimator, and a local linear matching estimator.  Both nearest-
neighbor matching estimators are constructed with replacement of observations after 
they are matched.  Replacement increases the quality of the matches by using more 
information to construct the counterfactual, but it increases the variance of the 
estimator by reducing the number of nonparticipant observations used in the 
comparison group.  A nearest-neighbor estimator using 10 nearest neighbors with 
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replacement increases the quality of matches but with the tradeoff that the variance of 
the estimator is increased. 
The third estimator employed is the Epanechnikov kernel-matching estimator for the 
average treatment effect on the treated, which is constructed such that: 
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,           (5.16) 
where T is the treatment group, K is the kernel function, C is the comparison group, 
and an is the band-width parameter proposed in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd  (1997) 
and Heckman et al. (1998).   
The last estimator is the local linear matching estimator, which is a generalized 
version of the kernel estimator.  The advantage of the local linear matching estimator 
is that it is generally more robust to data design densities and has a faster rate of 
convergence at the boundary points (Smith and Todd 2005).  These four estimators are 
used here to generate propensity score estimators, but they will also be used in the 
next section as a robustness check with the difference-in-differences matching 
estimator.   
Difference-in-Differences Matching Estimator 
The last econometric strategy to evaluate the impact of irrigation is a difference-in-
differences matching estimator.  Let the outcome variable of interest (agricultural 
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production, consumption, nutrient intake, or dietary diversity) be represented by Yht for 
household h=1,…, N at time t=1, 2.  Then variation in Yht is explained by covariates 
Xht for household h at time t.  The treatment variable, T indicates the household’s 
access to irrigation.  P is the propensity score estimated as in the above section using 
the probit model.  In a pooled cross section,    
ht ht htY X T P       ,            (5.17) 
where the error term  represents an idiosyncratic (εht) error term.  Because selection 
bias due to the correlation of program placement with household characteristics 
(assets, education, location, etc.) is probable, the inclusion of the propensity score 
controls for the selection bias of the observable characteristics when the impact of 
irrigation is estimated on the outcome variables. Using the predicted propensity scores 
and taking first differences with the panel subsample yields the difference-in-
differences matching estimator, γm.   
2 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( )
m
h h h h h hY Y X X T P           .            (5.18) 
To provide estimates of irrigation’s impact that do not necessarily depend on the 
estimator chosen, the results of nearest-neighbor estimates with the closest neighbor, 
nearest-neighbor estimates with the 10 closest neighbors, the Epanechnikov kernel 
estimator, and the local linear matching estimator are all reported as robustness 
checks.  These estimators were described above.  All standard errors of the estimator 
are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions.  In the next section, the results of these three 
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different econometric techniques to account for selection bias and endogenous 
program placement are presented.   
V. Empirical Results 
 Impact Estimates using Difference-in Differences and Propensity Score 
Matching 
In the difference-in-differences results (Table 5.6), the consumption aggregates for the 
control group are higher than those of the irrigation group were before most of them 
actually had access to the irrigation intervention.  This may be because irrigation 
interventions were targeted initially to relatively poor villages. The difference-in-
differences estimate between groups is 148,529 FCFA or almost US$300. Increases in 
the consumption aggregate of the irrigation group are significant at the 1 percent level.  
Agricultural production by households with access to irrigation has increased more 
than threefold over the past eight years, compared with farmers who do not have 
irrigation.  Agricultural production for the control group declines slightly.  Increases in 
the irrigation group are significant at the 1 percent level.  The difference-in-differences 
estimate suggests a 1.9-ton increase for households who have access to irrigation.  
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Table 5.6:  Difference-in-Differences Results 
    1998   2006 
Differences   
1998-2006   
Variable  N Mean SD N Mean SD     
Consumption 
Aggregate (Real 
FCFAs) 227 482,729 346558 246 541,155 294,436 65,225 ** 
With irrigation 81 427,961 343826 82 589,107 299,357 160,755 *** 
Without Irrigation 146 513,114 345494 164 517,178 289,891 12,226  
Difference   with 
and without 
irrigation  -85,152   71,929  148,529 *** 
Agricultural 
Production (kg) 246 447.1 879.1 246 1,028.2 1,554.6 581.0 *** 
With Irrigation 82 589.9 958.5 82 2,472.5 1,845.2 1,882.6 *** 
Without Irrigation 164 375.7 830.5 164 306.0 605.2 -69.7  
Difference with and 
without irrigation   214.3     2,166.5   1,952.3 *** 
Daily Household 
Calories 228 5,307.4 301.0 228 5,096.9 208.4 -210.5  
With irrigation 59 4,398.1 387.0 59 6,234.8 474.8 1,836.8 *** 
Without irrigation 169 5,624.9 380.5 169 4,699.7 220.0 -925.2 *** 
Difference with and 
without irrigation   -1,226.8   1,535.1  2,762 ** 
Daily Household 
Protein (grams) 228 160.5 8.9 228 139.3 5.7 -21.1 *** 
With irrigation 59 136.0 11.4 59 172.4 13.1 36.4 *** 
Without irrigation 169 169.0 11.3 169 127.8 6.0 -41.2 *** 
Difference in protein 
with and without 
irrigation   -33.1   44.6  77.6 *** 
Notes: *significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level.  *** significant at 1% level.  
Calorie and protein intakes per day between households with and without access to 
irrigation are also displayed in Table 5.6.  These results can be compared with the 
recommended dietary allowances of the Food and Nutrition Board of the National 
Academies, which recommends a daily caloric intake of 2,500 calories and protein 
intake of 392 grams per day for active adult males (Otten et al. 2006).  Households 
with access to irrigation have increased their daily caloric intake by 1,836 calories, 
whereas households without irrigation have decreased their daily caloric intake by 925 
calories.  Statistically significant increases in protein intakes are also found in 
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households who have access to irrigation.  The difference-in-differences estimate is 
77.6 grams of additional daily protein intake per household.  Despite statistically 
significant increases in both calories and protein, households with irrigation still fall 
18,000 calories below what would be required for the mean household of six in the 
sample, according to the recommended dietary allowances.   
Table 5.7 presents the results of the probit model used to estimate the propensity 
scores given village and household characteristics.  Significant characteristics that 
predict access to irrigation include infrastructure such as roads and access to the Niger 
River.  However, this is not a causal model.  The specification chosen satisfies the 
balancing property and does not include all observable household characteristics from 
the data set that could possibly influence irrigation access.  The use of the balancing 
property to include variables as part of the propensity score specification ensures that a 
comparison group is constructed with observable characteristics distributed 
equivalently across quintiles in both the treatment and comparison groups, as 
described by Smith and Todd (2005).  
Table 5.7:  Probit model results 
   Irrigation  
HH Characteristics  
Ln Age of Household head -0.026 
     (0.130) 
Ln Household Durables  0.012 
     (0.145) 
Total Livestock Units -0.047 
     (0.035) 
Land (Hectares) -0.343 
     (0.318) 
Land Squared (Hectares) 0.078 
     (0.071) 
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Table 5.7 (Continued) 
   Irrigation  
Ln Household size -0.17 
     (0.282) 
Education of Head (1 if yes) 0.114 
     (0.437) 
Education of Spouse (1 if yes) 0.08 
     (0.486) 
Ethnicity  
Peulh (1 if yes) -0.551 
     (0.504) 
Village Characteristics  
Road through Village 14.168 
 (2.334)*** 
Road within 10kms 0.648 
     (0.679) 
River Access 14.6 
 (1.964)*** 
Rice Transport Price to Mopti 0 
      (0.001) 
Notes: N=212. Constant is included. Mopti is the  
nearest urban area. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 5.8 reports the estimates of the four matching estimators specified for 
consumption, agricultural production, and nutrient intakes.
43
  The results indicate 
significant effects when either propensity score matching or the difference-in-
differences estimator are calculated. However, the magnitudes of the effects estimated 
with propensity score matching are larger than the difference-in-differences estimates.  
Consumption is significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels across the different matching 
estimators.  The effect of irrigation on the household total consumption aggregate 
varies from 734,908 to 776,748 FCFA, depending on the estimator used.   Total 
agricultural production, total daily caloric intakes, and total daily protein intakes are 
significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels.  The effect of irrigation on total agricultural 
                                                 
43
 The Stata command psmatch2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) is used to estimate the 
treatment effects in the empirical section.  
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production ranges from 1.25 to 1.83 tons per household.  Increases in calories and 
protein per week are also statistically significant. 
Table 5.8:  Average treatment effects on the treated estimates  
using four different propensity score matching estimators 
Estimator N 
Nearest- 
Neighbor 
Matching (1) 
Nearest- 
Neighbor 
Matching (10) 
Kernel 
Epanechnikov 
Local Linear 
Matching 
Estimator 
Outcome Variables           
Household Consumption 
(FCFA) 98 775,674 734,908 776,748 775,673 
  (339,480)** (270,311)*** (278,568)*** (320,187)** 
Agricultural Production 
(kg) 98 1,254 1,647 1,361 1,835 
  (351)*** (276)*** (341)*** (292)*** 
Daily Total Household 
Calories 98 8,428 9,205 9,796 8,429 
  (3,596)** (2,916)*** (3,194)*** (3,697)** 
Daily Total Household 
Protein 98 228 281 299 228 
  (114)** (89)*** (99)*** (108)** 
Household Composition          
Men 98 .78 .906 .862 .776 
  (.530) (.420)** (.424)**           (0.517) 
Women 98 .286 -.178 .041 .286 
  (0.578)           (0.434)           (0.475)           (0.562) 
Boys 98 -.510 -.361 -.405 -.510 
            (0.491)           (0.340)           (0.375)           (0.497) 
Girls 98 0 -.337 -.082 0 
             (0.536)           (0.436)           (0.469)           (0.560) 
Informal Food Sharing          
Meals Given to other HH 98 .367 .690 .756 .367 
  (.475) (0.363)* (.390)* (.487) 
Meals Received from other 
HH 98 -1.449 -.527 -.443 -1.449 
  (1.611) (1.291) (1.086) (1.545) 
Net Sharing Indicator 98 .224 .204 .213 .224 
(1 if HH gives more meals 
than received)  (.087)** (.076)*** (.079)*** (.085)*** 
Livestock (in Total 
Livestock Units) 98 6.4 6.3 5.8 6.4 
  (2.19)*** (2.323)*** (2.05)*** (2.321)*** 
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Table 5.8 (Continued) 
Estimator N 
Nearest- 
Neighbor 
Matching (1) 
Nearest- 
Neighbor 
Matching (10) 
Kernel 
Epanechnikov 
Local Linear 
Matching 
Estimator 
Children's Weekly School 
Hours 137 -12.4 -2.33 -1.014 -10.73 
 (children)           (6.68)*           (4.003)           (5.22)           (6.443)* 
Children's Weekly Farm 
Work Hours 137 7.15 4.42 6.82 3.36 
  (children) (5.26) (4.657) (4.207) (4.86) 
Note:  All standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions.  * Significant at the 10% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level.   
Lastly, the matched difference-in-differences estimator, using propensity scores to 
control for the endogeneity of access to irrigation, is estimated in Table 5.9, which 
presents the average treatment effects on the treated.  The difference-in-differences 
matching estimates indicate that the impact of irrigation on consumption ranges from 
694,921 to 739,050 FCFA.  Estimates of the impact of irrigation on agricultural 
production range from 1.17 to 1.89 tons per household.  The impact of total household 
calories and protein intakes per week are also statistically significant across the 
matching estimators, although the matched difference-in-differences estimates are 
greater across all estimators.  The propensity score matching estimates and matched 
difference in differences are similar, despite variations in the estimators and evaluation 
techniques. 
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Table 5.9:  Difference-in-differences matching 
 
N 
  
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Matching (1) 
  
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Matching (10) 
  
Kernel 
Epanechnikov 
  
Local Linear 
Matching 
Estimator 
  
Differences in the Outcome 
Variables  
(1998-2006) 
Household Consumption 
(FCFA) 98 738,148 694,921 739,050 738,148 
  (310093)** (274,938)** (292275)** (318,645)** 
Agricultural Production (kg) 98 1,170 1,591 1,284 1,888 
  (367)*** (288)*** (341)*** (295)*** 
Daily Total Household 
Calories 98 11,371 10,494 10,618 11,371 
  (4862)** (3,742)*** (4,230)** (4,611)** 
Daily Total Household Protein 98 360 326 328 361 
  (141)** (115)*** (126)** (144)** 
Livestock (in Total Livestock 
Units) 98 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.6 
  (2.13)*** (2.07)*** (2.03)*** (2.19)*** 
Household Composition      
Men 98 .429 .733 .625 .429 
  (.483) (.364)** (.370)* (.444)** 
Women 98 .265 -.139 .106 .265 
  (.585) (.449) (.514) (.601) 
Boys 98 -.326 -.237 -.073 -.327 
  (.548) (.411) (.439) (.550) 
Girls 98 -.061 -.112 .187 -.061 
   (.587) (.438) (.471) (.605) 
Note:  All standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions.  * Significant at the 10% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level.   
Differences in the Impact of Irrigation on Household Agricultural Production 
and Consumption  
Despite the robust response of the estimates to different estimators on the impact of 
irrigation on household agricultural production and total consumption, the benefits of 
agricultural production induced by irrigation technology do not transfer one-to-one 
into gains in household consumption.  The lack of unity between production and 
consumption potentially presents a problem in establishing irrigation’s impact on 
poverty reduction, because gains in agricultural production could be offset by higher 
178 
 
input costs, which erode the benefits of irrigation technology and are reflected in 
lower household consumption.   
There are two hypotheses that could explain this pattern in the data.  Consuming the 
gains from increased agricultural production from irrigation may not be the only 
household strategy for increasing welfare.  Households could also save these gains or 
share some of them with others in their village, either for purely altruistic reasons or as 
an informal kind of intravillage insurance against future shocks.  Empirical evidence 
for the saving hypothesis is found in other studies.  Ravallion and Chen (2005) found 
that antipoverty programs in southwest China had little impact on consumption but a 
large impact on household saving, because the community expected that the program’s 
duration would be short.   
To test the hypotheses of increased savings or increased intravillage sharing, the 
estimates of a standardized asset, livestock, reported in total livestock units (TLUs) 
and the number of meals shared and received are estimated using propensity score 
matching.  The evaluation estimators support both hypotheses: saving via livestock 
accumulation and sharing of meals both increased. Irrigation significantly increases 
livestock holdings by 5.8 to 6.4 TLUs using propensity score matching and 6.2 to 6.6 
TLUs with matched difference in differences (Table 5.8).  Meals given to other 
households significantly increase by 0.69 to 0.76 meals per week, while the number of 
meals received did not change with any statistical significance (Table 5.9).  According 
to a net sharing indicator that represents 1 if the household is a net sharer, or 0 if the 
household receives more meals than it gives, households were 20.0–22.4 percent more 
likely to be net sharers if they had access to irrigation.   
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In addition to these variables, the number of hours children spend in school and on 
farm work and changes in household composition are evaluated as outcome variables, 
using propensity score matching in Table 5.8.  Child labor could plausibly increase 
with the introduction of irrigation technology because the demand for household labor 
will increase as the household responds to more lucrative income opportunities, which 
increase the opportunity costs of children’s time.  While there was no effect on the 
hours children spent on farming, hours spent on schooling did decrease in households 
with access to irrigation by 10.7 to 12.4 hours per week in two of the estimators used.  
Decreased hours of schooling have potentially serious long-term implications for 
human capital accumulation. Another outcome variable that may erode the effects of 
increased agricultural production on household consumption is household composition 
changes that increase household size in response to the increased labor demands that 
irrigated agriculture necessitates.  In Table 5.8, the propensity score matching 
estimates illustrate that in households with access to irrigation, the number of men in 
the household increased by almost one additional member, while there was no effect 
on the number of women, boys, or girls.   
VI. Conclusions 
Regardless of the estimation method used to evaluate irrigation investments in 
northern Mali, significant positive increases in total household consumption, 
agricultural production, and caloric and protein intakes are estimated for households 
who have access to irrigation.  These results reinforce previous studies on smallholder 
irrigation investments by showing that, in an area with low agricultural potential, 
welfare gains can be realized with targeted investment (Lipton, Litchfield, and Faurès 
2003; Hussain 2007b).  Irrigation investment also induces households to save more 
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and share more within their villages, which is a type of investment in informal social 
insurance.  Both of these responses to irrigation are effects not captured by estimating 
program effects using consumption aggregates.  
In future work, a major interest will be to investigate the role that village-level 
investments in irrigation have in reducing inequality within villages and households.  
Because irrigation interventions are primarily targeted at the village level in northern 
Mali, this may promote greater reductions in poverty and inequality than larger-scale 
projects that are primarily targeted to larger urban population centers.  Because male 
and female expenditure data were collected, investigating the impact of irrigation on 
intrahousehold inequality may also yield important insights into household behavior.  
Differences in welfare gains between genders may be of particular concern because 
most irrigation projects are targeted to men.  If irrigated plots require more labor, then 
women may be drawn away from their plots to work on irrigated plots, for which they 
do not control the output.   
This paper provides direct evidence about the returns to irrigation by tracking 
households from 10 villages over an eight-year period.  Small-scale irrigation projects 
can have significant impacts on household consumption, agricultural production, and 
nutrition.  In an environment such as northern Mali, where the Sahelian droughts have 
been severe and agro-ecological conditions are not favorable to rain-fed agriculture, a 
green revolution is possible if villages harness the water provided by the Niger River.  
Not only do irrigation projects increase village food supply, but they also reinforce 
informal sharing within villages and help households build assets that may serve to 
buffer consumption against transitory income fluctuations, particularly during the lean 
season.  These secondary effects of irrigation projects can be overlooked if net 
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benefits of irrigation projects are only evaluated with respect to household 
consumption.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Understanding how households make labor allocation decisions and schooling choices 
for children is a critical intertemporal choice for households where reductions in 
income today from allocating children to non-renumerative activities such as school or 
leisure are offset by the discounted value of the child’s future earnings.  This 
dissertation presents two papers which address the participation of children and their 
distribution of time in market activities, domestic activities, and schooling. The last 
paper investigates whether village irrigation investments by international 
organizations have durable impacts on household level outcomes including 
consumption, agricultural production, and nutrition, as well as the household’s asset 
accumulation and informal sharing networks between irrigators and non-irrigators. 
These labor allocation and production decisions are arguably the two most critical 
decisions that households face in northern Mali through which a better understanding 
by development economists and policy makers will enable their application to 
influence long term economic development.    
While there is an extensive literature on child labor and schooling individually, there 
has been less but increasing attention to examining explicitly the joint determination 
of children’s time including both schooling and various forms of child labor.  Chapters 
3 and 4 also examine the magnitudes of changes in the probabilities that children work 
and the changes in the hours of work that children do, conditional on working, in 
response to production and health shocks.  They also investigate whether and which 
type of assets mitigate the effects of shocks on increasing child labor and preventing 
children from being withdrawn from school which is critical to the design of 
development interventions.  If assets do mitigate much of the increased risk of 
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children to increased work in response to unexpected shocks, then one would expect 
that policies that increase macroeconomic stability and the development of financial 
markets would be a critical component of protecting children from the vagaries of 
unexpected covariate and idiosyncratic shocks.  However, if assets have a mixed role 
in protecting children from being withdrawn from school and increasing their 
participation or hours of work, then understanding children’s labor substitutions 
patterns within households which depend on parent, child, household, and village 
characteristics are essential to the design of effective social protection programs.    
Evidence from chapter 3 illustrates these points.  Production shocks from harvest 
period pest infestations induce households to withdraw children from school and 
increase the probability that they are selected into farm work.  Health shocks to 
women increases the probability that a child participates in the family business and 
childcare activities.  These results are robust to varying assumptions about the 
structure of unobserved heterogeneity at the household and village levels.  Different 
measures of household assets are also constructed to test whether assets serve as a 
buffer against increased child labor in response to shocks.  Assets such as livestock 
have mixed effects on child labor and schooling, depending on the shock and asset 
type.  However, household durables are substitutes for increased child labor when 
households face health shocks.   
Chapter 4 uses hours data from the same activities considered in chapter 3 to compare 
the effect of household, individual, village and district characteristics on labor supply 
and hours in school.  These data are considered in the same robust framework where 
household random effects and cross-equation correlations are allowed as verification 
across different specification of the consistency of the results.  In addition a subjective 
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survey module where children report the relative distribution of their time is included 
in the analysis as a comparison with the hours data. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 investigated the role that access to irrigation has on household 
welfare, agricultural production and nutrition.  Significant changes in the agricultural 
sector in northern Mali suggest a large contribution of irrigation to welfare increases 
over the past 8 years.  Using difference in differences, propensity score matching and 
matched difference in differences, the impact of access to irrigation on household 
consumption, production, and nutrient intakes is estimated.   Though the net benefit 
ratios calculated from household consumption range from 1.5-1.6, differences between 
the agricultural production and consumption treatment effects suggest that gains in 
agricultural production value do not transfer uniquely to household consumption.  
Two alternative hypotheses are tested; that the gains in agricultural production induced 
by irrigation yield higher household saving or intra-village transfers from irrigators to 
non-irrigators contribute to informal social insurance.  Chapter 5 provides evidence of 
both saving and sharing within villages as an alternative strategy to consuming gains 
in agricultural production.  This finding suggests that estimating program impact using 
consumption per capita may underestimate the welfare gains of irrigation investment 
by ignoring the household’s saving and informal insurance network.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire Organization 
 
Community Characteristics  
1. Meta-data  
2. Health  
3. Migration  
4. School  
5. Infrastructure  
6. Agriculture  
7. Physical and Demographic Characteristics  
 
Household Questionnaires  
 
Women’s Questionnaires 
1. Household Information  
2. Possessions  
3. Agricultural Exploitation  
4. Herding  
5. Non-Agricultural Revenue  
6. Non-Food Expenditures  
7. Credit/Savings  
8. Food Consumption (together with HH Head)  
9. Food Security Survival Strategies  
10. Women’s Time Allocation  
 
Men’s Questionnaires 
1. Household Information  
2. Household Composition (with female respondent)  
3. Household Education  
4. Household Activities  
5. History of Household  
6. Migration  
7. Agricultural Exploitation  
8. Herding  
9. Fishing  
11. Non-Agricultural Revenue  
12. Non-Food Expenses  
13. Credit/Savings  
14. Men’s Time Allocation  
15. Economic Shocks  
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Children’s Questionnaires 
1. Child Work  
2. Education  
3. Child Health  
4. Anthropometry  
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Appendix 2: Sample Decomposition 
Cercle 
Number of 
Communes 
Represented 
Number of 
Rural PSUs 
Number of 
Urban PSUs 
HH 
Selected 
Niafunke 8 55 2 819 
Goundam 7 21 5 455 
Dire 10 23 2 243 
Tombouctou 5 14 1 272 
Rharous 4 10 1 85 
Bourem  3 16 2 294 
Kidal 1 0 1 13 
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Appendix 3:  Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Chapter 3   
School Participation 
1 if child attended school during the last 
school year; 0 otherwise 
Farm Participation 
1 if the child engaged in farming during the 
school year; 0 otherwise 
Family Business Participation 
1 if the child engaged in the family business 
during the school year; 0 otherwise 
Childcare Participation 
1 if the child engaged in caring for other 
children of the household during the last 
school year; 0 otherwise 
Market Production and School 
Participation 
1 if the child attended school and participated 
in either farmwork or the family business; 0 
otherwise 
Home Production and School 
Participation 
1 if the child attended school and participated 
in child care; 0 otherwise 
Market and Home Production 
Participation 
1 if the child participated in either farm work 
or the family business and childcare; 0 
otherwise 
Withdrawn from School 
1 if the child was withdrawn from school 
during the past academic year given that they 
had been enrolled previously; 0 otherwise 
Child Characteristics  
Boy Indicator 1 if a boy; 0 otherwise 
Age Indicator for ages 11-17 
An Indicator was created for each age 11-17 
which was 1 if the child was a given age 
Ethnicity 
by ethnic group; an indicator is included for 
each ethnic group except the most populous 
ethnic group 
Household Composition  
Biological child indicator 
1 if the child is the biological child of parents 
that reside in the household; 0 otherwise 
Number of girls 
Number of girls aged 0-17 years old in the 
household 
Number of boys 
Number of boys aged 0-17 years old in the 
household 
Number of adult men 
Number of adult men aged 18 or older in the 
household 
Number of adult women 
Number of adult women aged 18 or older in 
the household 
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Household Assets and Unearned 
Income  
Livestock Value (FCFA) 
the value of livestock owned by both men and 
women in the household in FCFA 
Herd Size (Number of Animals) 
the number of animals owned by both men and 
women in the household 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA) 
the value of agricultural capital owned by the 
household in FCFA 
Household Durables (FCFA) 
The value of durable assets owned by the 
household in FCFA 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA) 
the value of migrant remittances received by 
the household over the past 4 months in FCFA 
Parental Characteristics  
Any Mother's Education 
1 if the child's mother has any education; 0 
otherwise 
Any Father's Education 
1 if the child's father has any education; 0 
otherwise 
Age of HH Head 
Age of the household head indicated from the 
household roster 
Age of HH Head's spouse 
Age of the household head's spouse indicated 
from the household roster 
Community Characteristics  
Access to River 
1 if the village has access (within 5 km) of the 
Niger River; 0 otherwise 
Roads  
within 1-10km 
1 if the village is within 1-10km of a road; 0 
otherwise 
within 11-20km 
1 if the village is within 11-20 km of a road; 0 
otherwise 
greater than 20km 
1 if the village is farther than 20km from a 
road; 0 otherwise 
School Characteristics  
Primary School in Village 
1 if the village has a primary school in the 
village proper; 0 otherwise 
Primary School within 1-5km 
1 if the village is within 1-5 km of a primary 
school in another village; 0 otherwise 
Primary School farther than 5km 
1 if the village is farther than 5km from a 
primary school; 0 otherwise 
Multiple Primary Schools 
1 if the village has more than one primary 
school; 0 otherwise 
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Student-Teacher Ratio 
The student to teacher ratio reported from 
interviewing school principals from the 
Community Questionnaire 
Repetition Rate 
The Repetition rate in the child's school as 
reported in the Community Questionnaire 
Exam Pass Rate-Boys 
The Final 6th grade or 9th grade exam pass 
rate for boys as reported by the school 
principal in the Community Questionnaire 
Exam Pass Rate-Girls 
The final 6th grade or 9th grade exam pass rate 
for girls as reported by the school principal in 
the Community Questionnaire 
Secondary School in Village 
1 if there is a secondary school in the village; 
0 otherwise 
High School in Village 
1 if there is a high school in the village; 0 
otherwise 
Shocks 1 if the household reported a large crop loss on 
any of its plots over the previous agricultural 
season; 0 otherwise 
Large Crop Loss 
Small Crop Loss 
1 if the household reported a small crop loss 
on any of its plots over the previous 
agricultural season; 0 otherwise 
Adult Male Sick 
1 if any adult male was sick in the household 
in the past month such that they were unable to 
work; 0 otherwise 
Adult Female Sick 
1 if any adult female was sick in the household 
in the past month such that they were unable to 
work; 0 otherwise 
Child Sick 
1 if any child was sick in the household in the 
past month such that they were unable to 
work; 0 otherwise 
    
Chapter 4  
  
Hours   
School 
The number of hours the child normally 
spends in school during the school year 
Farm 
The number of hours the child normally 
spends doing farm work during the school year 
Family Business 
The number of hours the child normally 
spends doing work in the family business 
during the school year 
Chores 
The number of hours the child spends doing 
chores and domestic work during the school 
year 
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Child Care 
The number of hours the child spends caring 
for other children in the household during the 
school year 
Market Work 
The number of hours the child spends doing 
farm work and working in the family business 
during the school year 
Domestic Work 
The number of hours the child spends caring 
for other children and doing household chores 
in the household during the school year 
Total Work 
The total number of hours the child spends 
doing market and domestic work during the 
school year 
Subjective Measures  
School 
The number of school (red) cardboard papers 
out of 10 total papers the child selects to 
represent the proportion of their week that they 
spend in school 
Work 
The number work (yellow) cardboard papers 
out of 10 total papers the child selects to 
represent the proportion of their week that they 
spend in working 
    
Ch. 5  
HH Characteristics   
Ln Age of HH head log of the age of the household head 
Ln HH Durables  log of the household's durable stock 
Land (Hectares) 
Number of hectares of land cultivated by the 
household 
Land Squared (Hectares) 
The number of hectares squared that the 
household cultivates 
Ln HH size log of the household size 
Education of Head (1 if yes) 
1 if the household head has any education; 0 
otherwise 
Education of Spouse (1 if yes) 
1 if the household head has any education; 0 
otherwise 
Ethnicity  
Peulh (1 if yes) 1 if the head of household is of Peulh ethnicity 
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Household Consumption (FCFA) 
Total household consumption calculated for 
one year from weekly food expenditures, non-
food expenditures and assets.  Quantities of 
purchased food, food received from other 
households and own consumption were valued 
at village median prices calculated from the 
survey data.  Assets were assumed to have an 
annualized value of 20% of their current value.   
Agricultural Production (kg) 
Total household agricultural production per 
hectare from men's and women's plots 
Daily Total Household Calories 
Daily total household calories imputed from 
the food quantities reported in the 
consumption module.  Calories associated 
with the quantities were the total edible 
portion of matched food items to the USDA 
National Nutrition Database 
Daily Total Household Protein 
Daily total household protein imputed from 
the food quantities reported in the 
consumption module.  Calories associated 
with the quantities were the total edible 
portion of matched food items to the USDA 
National Nutrition Database 
Informal Food Sharing 
 
Meals Given to other HH 
Number of meals that are given by the 
household to other households in the previous 
week 
Meals Received from other HH 
Number of meals that are received by the 
household from other households in the 
previous week 
Net Sharing Indicator 
1 if HH gives more meals than received from 
other households; 0 otherwise 
Livestock (in Total Livestock Units) 
The number of animals was scaled by a 
conversion factor to be equal to a Tropical 
Livestock Unit.                  1 cattle = 1 TLU 
1 goat== .15 TLU 
1 Horse= 1 TLU 
1 Mule= 1.15 TLU 
1 Donkey= .65 TLU 
1 camel = 1.45 TLU 
1 poultry = .005 TLU 
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Appendix 4:  Child Labor Model 
To summarize the household’s problem, the parents must choose the following 
variables for the respective period: 
   Period 1:   n. 
 Period 2: 2c , 
H
A
F
A TT , , , ,
F H S
C C CT T T , s , k . 
The household’s problem can be reduced in complexity by substitution of the home 
and market production equations (3.4 and 3.5) into the second period budget 
constraint.  Equations 3.2 and 3.3 can be substituted into the monotonically increasing 
utility function as it will bind at the optimum.  The cognitive skills production 
function (Equation 3.7) can be substituted in Equation 3.6, the period 3 income of the 
child, which can directly replace its argument in the utility function.  After these 
substitutions, the household’s problem reduces to a three equation system with a utility 
function and two time constraints (adult and child):   
MAX     
1
2 3 2
[ ( ,  |  ,  ) -  -  ( , ) ( ) , ]
*( , ( , )]
F F F F F F H H H H H H W W
A C A A C C A C A A C C A Au p q T T K L w T w T h T T w T w T w T b c s n k rk
nU c y c E


       

 
  , , , , , , , 2 WAF H F H Sc T T T T T T kA A C C C  
s.t. ,                    (A.1) 
F H S L
C C C C CT T T T T    ,                 (A.2) 
F H W L
A A A A AT T T T T     .                 (A.3) 
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The Lagrangian function can be written as follows after which the first order 
conditions are as follows:  
£ = U + λ1 2( ) ( )
F H S L F H L
C C C C C A A A AT T T T T T T T T        ,            (A.4) 
FOC (if λ1, λ2 > 0), 
 
n:   2 3*( , )U c y =
2
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a


1( )b c s  ,               (A.5) 
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3
*
( , ) ( )SC
yU
f Q s g T
y E
 


 
=
2
u
a


 ,               (A.6) 
S
CT :  
3
3
*
( , ) ( )SC
yU
n f Q s g T
y E
 


 
= 1  ,               (A.7) 
:
H
CT  
2
u
a


[ ( , )H H HA C Ch T T w  ] = 1 ,               (A.8) 
:
F
CT  
2
u
a


[ ( , )F F FA C Cp q T T w   ] = 1 ,               (A.9) 
k:   
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 

 
.                (A.10) 
Equations A.5 - A.11 characterize the allocation of the household’s optimal number of 
children, the distribution of adult and child time across activities, the child’s period 2 
consumption and the allocation of assets for period 3 adult consumption.  The 
household’s decisions are examined given these first order conditions, including the 
optimal number of children and child participation in schooling, domestic production, 
and market production.   
Fertility Conditions 
Rearranging Equation A.5 yields the condition by which the household chooses its 
optimal number of children, n*.  For each additional child, the income equivalent of an 
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additional child is equated to the marginal cost of the child.  The cost of each 
additional child includes period 1 costs, b, of the child’s birth and early child care 
costs including medical care, clothes, period 1 consumption, period 2 consumption, 
and the cost of school if the household elects to send the child.   
2 3
1
2
*( , )U c y
b c s
u
a

  


               (A.11) 
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